

ONE

Key Concepts and Theories About 'Race'

David Smith

1 This chapter attempts to explore the meanings of some central concepts in
2 the field of race, ethnicity, and identity, and to show how these underpin
3 contemporary arguments about multiculturalism, migration, and 'Britishness'.
4 The aim is to provide initial clarification of the issues explored in more
5 detail in subsequent chapters. In pursuit of this, the chapter moves from a
6 discussion of fundamental theories of race, in their historical development
7 and their current expression, to an exploration of some of the key issues in
8 recent political and policy debates. It explores the move away from biological
9 understandings of 'race' towards the more sociologically and culturally sensitive
10 concept of 'ethnicity', and how racist ideology has followed a similar path, from
11 claims based on a biological hierarchy of 'races' to claims about the threats to
12 traditional and national identity posed by cultural diversity and difference.
13 The chapter explores, and takes issue with, recent claims that policies of
14 multiculturalism have promoted segregation and eroded national identity.
15 It also shows how anti-racist arguments have also become more complex,
16 as simple polarities of white and black, oppressor and oppressed, have been
17 replaced by a less essentialist appreciation of the complexity and ambiguity of
18 racial identities.

19 **The Meanings of 'Race'**

20 Many writers have commented on the problems of definition and usage
21 that arise in discussions of race, racism and associated concepts (Goldberg
22 and Solomos, 2002). Well-founded unease about the meaning of 'race', in
23 particular, has led to the practice of putting scare quotes around the word, to
24 show that the writer does not suppose that it can be used unproblematically;
25 to avoid this awkwardness, some writers have preferred the term 'ethnicity',
26 which suggests a more socially situated, less biological concept (just as 'gender'

1 is often preferred to 'sex' by writers wishing to convey a sense that the
2 differences between women and men are not simply a matter of biology).
3 This preference does not, however, remove all difficulties. Social scientists
4 often speak of 'essentially contested concepts' when dealing with terms whose
5 meanings are inherently unstable and liable to shift over time and in different
6 contexts: Bowling and Phillips (2002, pp. xvi–vii), for example, treat not
7 only 'race', but also 'ethnicity', 'crime', and 'discrimination', as 'essentially
8 contested'. They describe their discomfort in the face of a tension between
9 'empiricism' and 'social constructionism'. Empiricism, in this context, assumes
10 that race and crime are real, that they exist in some objective, essential sense,
11 which allows them to be observed and measured; social constructionism takes
12 these terms to refer to 'dynamic social processes', and therefore assumes that
13 their meanings are multiple and fluid. The dilemma for Bowling and Phillips,
14 as for other writers in this field, is that they need to use apparently objective
15 and factual data on racial (or ethnic) differences in offending, prosecution,
16 sentencing, victimization, etc., for the purposes of analysis, while 'contending
17 that race is not "real" outside the racist ideologies and discriminatory practices
18 that bring it into being' (p. xvii). But, even though race is a social construct,
19 it has real, material effects, and the approach of Bowling and Phillips is
20 therefore to reject essentialist views of race while 'retaining race and ethnic
21 categories in order to illuminate the racialised patterns of everyday human
22 experience' (p. xvii).

23 This approach is broadly that which informs the following discussion. Race
24 is the key term in the vocabulary of this field, from which many of the other
25 terms flow, either by direct derivation from it or through a rejection of its
26 implications. From the beginning, the idea of race was bound up with ideas
27 of racial difference and superiority and inferiority. Considering only Europe, it
28 is possible to find a conception of race and racial distinction in the writings
29 of the ancient Greeks, for whom non-Greeks were generically 'barbarians'
30 (people whose language sounded like 'Bar-bar'), and usually regarded as by
31 definition inferior to Greeks (de Ste. Croix, 1983, pp. 416–7) – although in
32 the fifth century BCE Herodotus argued in the second book of his *History* that
33 the Greeks had borrowed from the Egyptians in culture and religion, and not
34 *vice versa* (Bernal, 1987). In mediaeval Europe, religious hatred and suspicion
35 was mixed with ideas of racial difference in Christian hostility towards Jews,
36 and later towards Muslims from the Middle East and North Africa. According
37 to Wieviorka (2002), however, 'race' in something like its contemporary sense
38 is a later European invention, associated with the beginnings of maritime
39 empire-building in the fifteenth century. What Wieviorka (2002, p. 460)
40 calls 'protoracist' conceptions of race and difference were articulated from the
41 seventeenth century, in European accounts of the African and native American
42 peoples whose lands they invaded. Physical differences between these peoples
43 and the supposed European norm were noted, described, treated as signs
44 or causes of inferiority, and explained mainly in terms of differences in the

1 natural environment, especially climatic differences. Towards the end of the
2 eighteenth century, the first 'scientific' conceptions of race began to appear
3 (thus considerably preceding Darwin and the theory of evolution, which is
4 sometimes blamed for providing the basis for a scientific classification of racial
5 differences and the establishment of a racial hierarchy).

6 **Scientific Racism**

7 Gould (1996) describes the development of such a hierarchy from an originally
8 relatively neutral description of the geographical distribution of human types
9 (defined as races). The first account of human races with scientific claims was
10 produced in 1758 by the Swedish Carolus Linnaeus, regarded as the founder
11 of the modern system of biological taxonomy (genera, species, and individ-
12 uals). Linnaeus proposed a four-fold classification: *homo sapiens Americanus*,
13 *Europeus*, *Asiaticus*, and *Afer* (African). This was modified by the German
14 naturalist J.F. Blumenbach, who by 1795 had developed Linnaeus' scheme into
15 a five-fold classification. Humans belonged to one of five varieties: Caucasian
16 (for light-skinned inhabitants of Europe and adjacent areas), Mongolian (for
17 East Asian people), Ethiopian (for dark-skinned Africans), American (for the
18 indigenous people of the Americas), and Malay (for the people of the Pacific
19 islands and the aboriginal people of Australia). The classification was by now
20 not merely geographical but explicitly hierarchical, ordered by Blumenbach
21 according to the eccentric and subjective criterion of physical beauty, which
22 supposedly had reached its apex (according to the evidence of skulls) among the
23 Caucasus Mountains in modern Russia and Georgia. Blumenbach attributed
24 the degeneration of the non-Caucasian races to the effects of climate, and
25 believed that it was in principle reversible: the descendants of 'Ethiopians'
26 transported north out of Africa might eventually become white. While such
27 thinking is offensive to modern readers, according to Gould (1996, p. 405),
28 Blumenbach 'was the least racist, most egalitarian, and most genial of all
29 Enlightenment writers on the subject of human diversity'; he believed in the
30 fundamental unity of humanity, and that the moral and intellectual differences
31 among the racial groups were minor – certainly not enough to justify the
32 exploitation of one by another. It is his classification, however, that became the
33 most influential scientific account of human races, and elements of it remain
34 in official use.

35 A simpler and more overtly racist classification of humanity was devised by
36 the French aristocrat Gobineau, who published his views on 'the inequality
37 of human races' between 1853 and 1855 (Darwin's *The Origin of Species* was
38 not published until 1859). Gould (1996, p. 379) describes Gobineau as the
39 'grandfather of modern academic racism' and 'undoubtedly the most influential
40 academic racist of the nineteenth century'. His scheme, which divided
41 humanity hierarchically into whites, yellows, and blacks, was enthusiastically
42 embraced by ideological racists. According to Gobineau, civilizations prospered

1 to the degree that they maintained racial purity, and declined as a result of
2 miscegenation; the white races would maintain their superior position only if
3 they remained relatively pure and avoided diluting their stock by breeding with
4 the inferior yellow and brown races. This kind of argument, of course, became
5 familiar in the twentieth century, not only in the genocidal programme of
6 Nazism but in advocacy of eugenics and controlled reproduction to maintain
7 the purity and strength of national stocks. Vanstone (2004) shows that the
8 eugenicist movement, by now reliant on a particular view of evolutionary
9 theory for its scientific basis, was a far from negligible influence on the early
10 development of the probation service: the only solution for offenders deemed
11 degenerate, it was argued, was 'permanent detention and complete segregation'
12 (Vanstone, 2004, p. 39). In the early years of the twentieth century, eugenic
13 thinking often formed part of a package of 'progressive' ideas for social
14 improvement and modernization, sometimes in the form of 'Lombrosianism'.
15 Lombroso, as all students of criminology know, began his work with the study
16 of differences in human skulls (on which Gobineau also based his theories),
17 and received from this his insight that criminals were examples of evolutionary
18 'atavism', throwbacks to an earlier stage of human development; in this, even
19 if 'white', they resembled the inferior races as described by Gobineau and
20 his followers.

21 Eugenic plans for the maintenance and improvement of national racial
22 stocks ceased, for most people, to be morally or intellectually defensible after
23 the Second World War and the revelation of the Nazi programme for the
24 extermination of Jews and other groups considered a threat to racial purity.
25 The point of discussing the roots of racial theory here is, as it was for Gould
26 (1996) in his additional chapters for the second edition of his book, that in spite
27 of this discredit the basic ideas of racial theory persist in ostensibly respectable
28 academic writing. Gould was particularly concerned to refute the arguments of
29 Herrnstein and Murray (1994), whose book received much critical attention,
30 especially for its supposed demonstration that intelligence was stratified not
31 only by social class and status, but by race. Herrnstein and Murray studied
32 IQ results, not the size and shape of skulls, but their method of argument
33 and their results were similar to Gobineau's, and they were as confident as
34 he had been that 'race' was a scientific biological category, not an ideological
35 construct. Intelligence (as measured by IQ tests conducted on Americans) was
36 treated as an irrevocable hereditary fact, and the results showed that Asians
37 were slightly superior to Caucasians, and Caucasians substantially superior
38 to people of African descent (Gould, 1996, p. 369). It is worth noting in
39 this context that both Herrnstein and Murray have had considerable, though
40 controversial, influence in the fields of criminology, criminal justice, and social
41 policy, in Britain as well as the USA (e.g., Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985;
42 Murray et al., 1996). Herrnstein and Murray themselves claimed after its
43 publication that their arguments about racial differences were only a minor
44 topic of their book; but its publication and reception showed the continued

1 vitality of ideologies of racial difference, when given a new veneer of science
2 and statistical rigour.

3 **Identity and Difference**

4 **Essentialism and Hybridity**

5 Rejecting the claim that race is a natural category that denotes a biological
6 reality, we must, like Bowling and Phillips (2002), recognize that in using the
7 term we are referring to an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1983) – but
8 it is an imagined community with real, material effects. Race and ethnicity
9 need to be understood as social constructions, a means by which differences
10 can be recognized and accorded meaning (Goldberg and Solomos, 2002).
11 As socially constructed categories, they are liable to change their boundaries
12 across time and context, depending on who deploys the terms and for what
13 social or political purposes. For example, 'black' has quite different meanings
14 when employed by Gobineau and his intellectual descendants and when
15 used as a signifier of political affiliation and solidarity by groups formed
16 to resist racism and its effects, as it was in USA from the 1960s. In this
17 instance, a term whose origins lie in ideologies of racial difference and
18 hierarchy was subverted and used as an element in a political struggle against
19 racism; 'black' came to refer not primarily to race or even colour, but to
20 the experience of social subordination and oppression. But this subversion
21 also illustrates the difficulty of using a term that implies a fixed, biological
22 essence in a non-essentialist way. Whatever its value and success as a political
23 statement, this use of 'black' arguably obscures important differences among
24 minority ethnic groups. Modood (1994), for example, suggests that in resisting
25 the categories of racial difference, the term risks implying another false
26 essentialism, that the experience of all minority ethnic groups in Britain is
27 the same. Modood argues that the political conception of blackness that
28 was dominant in the 1980s denied the particularities of the experience of
29 racism among Asian communities, by equating racial discrimination with
30 discrimination on the basis of colour, not culture, and that the majority of
31 Asians rejected the attempt to impose on them an overly politicized 'black'
32 identity. In the contemporary probation context, this tension is reflected
33 in the different positions of the Association of Black Probation Officers
34 and the National Association of Asian Probation Staff, the first promoting
35 a political 'black' identity and the second insisting on the specificity of
36 Asian experiences of discrimination, for example, over religion and dress
37 (e.g., Heer, 2007).

38 Modood's (1994, p. 859) support for the 'new emphasis on multi-textured
39 identities' is reflected in much recent work that has sought to break with
40 the over-simple formulations of the past and to develop concepts that reflect
41 the complexity and differentiation within categories like 'Asian' or 'African-
42 Caribbean', or the catch-all category of 'Black and Minority Ethnic' (BME)

1 groups which is now generally used by the Home Office and other government
2 departments (e.g., Jansson, 2006). Hall (1992) for example, wrote of 'new
3 ethnicities' that call into question what it means to be black and, in a local
4 context, 'the dominant coding of what it means to be British' (Back, 1996, p. 4).
5 Others (e.g., Gilroy, 2000) have explored the nature of 'hybrid' identities
6 (such as African American or British Asian) in increasingly cosmopolitan
7 and globalized societies in which the traditional distinctions of nation and
8 race have (it is argued) become less important. In a more critical spirit,
9 May (2002) distinguishes hybridity theory from multiculturalism (which is
10 discussed below), arguing that the idea of hybridity, conceived as a positive
11 resource for social change, entails a rejection of ethnic and cultural rootedness
12 as a basis for identity; such traditional sources of identity are, according to those
13 who celebrate hybridity, inherently conservative, introverted, and backward-
14 looking. May argues that hybridity theory exaggerates the extent to which
15 'postmodern' identities are in fact hybrid rather than singular, and that it
16 removes a political resource for resistance to racism and discrimination by
17 suggesting that 'all group-based identities are essentialist' (May, 2002, p. 133) –
18 and therefore liable to practices of exclusion, racism, and violence. As part of a
19 defence of multiculturalism, May distinguishes between race and ethnicity, and
20 argues that while categorizations based on race have historically always been
21 essentialist, and associated with hierarchy and exploitation, categorizations by
22 ethnicity or nationhood need not be essentialized, nor do they necessarily entail
23 exclusion and conflict (Jenkins, 1997).

24 Ethnicity

25 As used in these contexts, 'ethnicity' has been stripped of virtually all the
26 biological connotations of 'race', and the use of the plural 'ethnicities' is
27 intended to signal a clean break with essentialism and a recognition of diversity
28 and difference; similarly, the use of 'racisms' recognizes that 'there is no
29 one monolithic racism but numerous historically situated racisms' (Back,
30 1996, p. 9). But ethnicity too *can* be used in an essentialist way, even when
31 referring to social and cultural, rather than biological and hereditary, difference:
32 culture rather than biology is conceived as an essential characteristic of a
33 particular group. Some of the literature on the Irish in Britain provides an
34 example. The most influential position on this, at least until recently, was
35 that the Irish were the largest minority ethnic group in Britain ('ethnic' here
36 surely makes sense only as a cultural category), and that their long-term
37 experience of deprivation and disadvantage was under-recognized because of
38 their 'invisibility' (Hickman and Walter, 1997). The claim about the size of
39 the Irish minority is based on the assumption that everyone with at least one
40 Irish-born parent should be counted (and will self-categorize) as Irish, and
41 this was accepted without argument by the 'Parekh Report' (Commission
42 on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 2000, pp. 31, 374), which declared

1 that, with an estimated population of 1,969,000 in England and Wales, the
2 Irish were 'by far the largest migrant community' (the figure was arrived
3 at by multiplying the number of Irish-born people recorded by the 1991
4 census by 2.5). In the event, 641,804 people in England and Wales described
5 themselves as ethnically Irish in the 2001 census (Office of National Statistics,
6 2003). Howard (2006) describes the campaign by 'ethnic activists' for a
7 question about Irish ethnicity to be included in the 2001 census, and what
8 he sees as their special pleading after the results appeared, and showed that
9 nothing like the predicted number of people saw themselves as Irish, or at
10 least defined themselves as such for census purposes. Howard argues that
11 the campaign to include the category 'Irish' in the ethnicity options in the
12 census was a predictable consequence of policies of multiculturalism, which
13 depend on the official recognition and institutionalization of a range of ethnic
14 groups; if a group is excluded from an existing system of ethnic classification,
15 it can be expected to mobilize for its inclusion. Official 'ethnic' categories
16 are thus the product of political pressures and decisions within the context of
17 multiculturalism.

18 **Multiculturalism and its Critics**

19 Policies of multiculturalism have long been attacked by the political right,
20 since they first emerged as an alternative to assimilation, initially in the Greater
21 London Council and London local authorities in the early 1980s. The basis of
22 this attack is essentially that multiculturalism undermines national unity and
23 identity and is thus unpatriotic (May, 2002). More recently, as immigration has
24 acquired a renewed political salience with the enlargement of the European
25 Union in May 2004, such policies have been criticized from elsewhere on the
26 political spectrum, and on rather less familiar grounds. One strand of criticism
27 can be associated with the French republican tradition, and insists that no ethnic
28 or cultural group should have any special legal standing; what matters is shared
29 citizenship, and (in principle) equality in education, housing, and employment.
30 This is why the idea of using a census to count the size of minority ethnic
31 groups is anathema to many politicians and social commentators in France.
32 A more influential kind of criticism has been articulated since 2005 by the
33 Commission for Racial Equality and latterly by its successor the Equality and
34 Human Rights Commission, both chaired by Trevor Phillips. As expressed
35 on the CRE's website (see the page on 'Integration, multiculturalism and the
36 CRE', archived since the reorganization at <http://83.137.212.42/sitearchive/cre/diversity/integration/index.html>,
37 accessed 24.2.2008), the argument is
38 that multiculturalism has led to more polarized communities and promoted
39 social and residential segregation. Multiculturalism is said to be characterized
40 by particularism rather than universalism, and a stress on group differences
41 rather than common identity and membership of some wider society (such as

1 might be represented by 'Britishness'). It is criticized for claiming that 'all
2 cultures are of equal value and must be publicly recognized as such', and
3 accommodated by the 'wider society' without any expectation of reciprocation
4 or compromise. It is said to entail a view of ethnic and cultural groups
5 as closed and conservative in their beliefs and practices, and as regarding
6 membership of these groups as the key defining feature of the identity of
7 their members. The results, it is said, are that public policy is shaped on the
8 basis of dubious assumptions that cultural organizations represent the interests
9 of minority ethnic groups more authentically than any other organizations
10 can, and thus participation in institutions and political activities based on
11 cultural identity is privileged over engagement with common democratic
12 processes and involvement in the civic and political institutions of the
13 wider society.

14 **'Sleepwalking to Segregation'?**

15 Multiculturalism's recognition of difference is then blamed for a supposed
16 increase in social and residential segregation. Phillips made a speech in
17 September 2005 on 'Sleepwalking to segregation' after '7/7' (the attacks by
18 Islamist suicide bombers on the London transport network on 7 July 2005).
19 He revived the long-expressed fear that parts of British cities would soon
20 experience the 'hyper-segregation' and ghettoization of many urban areas in
21 the USA. This anxiety had to some extent been laid to rest, or at least shown
22 to be exaggerated, by the findings of the 1991 census (Ratcliffe, 1996), but
23 Phillips apparently accepted the claim, to be found in much of the media
24 and some political rhetoric, that it had increased more recently (the latest
25 Census findings, which suggest the opposite, are discussed below). In the
26 CRE/Phillips argument, segregation is bad by definition, because it prevents
27 integration, the preferred policy goal, and integration is distinguished from
28 assimilation, defined on the website cited above as (in the form it took in the
29 1950s and 1960s):

30 *the absorption of minority migrant communities into the majority community with no*
31 *noticeable effect on the culture and way of life of the majority, while expecting that the*
32 *culture and way of life minorities brought with them would disappear.*

33 Minority cultures are not to be suppressed in order to establish a shared
34 identity of Britishness, but they are to co-exist with this 'national identity'
35 in 'a common sense of belonging'. Phillips describes integration as 'a two-way
36 street', meaning that 'settled communities accept that new people will bring
37 change with them', and the newcomers reciprocate by accepting that they too
38 will need to change.

39 There are problems with some of these formulations; for example, how
40 long does it take to become a settled community, and how long does

1 one remain a newcomer? While Phillips was writing in the aftermath of
2 the 7 July bombings, he may also have had in mind the recent arrival in
3 Britain of migrants from central and eastern Europe, to whom the term
4 'newcomers' could be applied more accurately than to the British-born
5 suicide bombers. The implications of this new pattern of migration for
6 concepts of multiculturalism, integration, and Britishness are discussed below.
7 A more obvious problem with Phillips' account is that the weight of evidence
8 suggests that residential segregation on ethnic lines has declined rather than
9 increased since 1991. The interpretation of the census data is complex and
10 has been disputed by geographers and demographers (Simpson, 2004; 2005;
11 Johnston et al., 2005), but the data certainly do not provide clear support
12 for Phillips' thesis about increasing segregation – which is not to deny that
13 some members of some groups, in some parts of the country, do live in highly
14 segregated conditions.

15 **Segregation and Integration**

16 Simpson (2007) gives a clear and accessible account of the main issues, in
17 terms both of demography and of the implications of his analysis for public
18 policy. He argues that the census figures do not support either 'white flight'
19 or 'Muslim self-segregation' arguments, and that some degree of concentration
20 of ethnic groups is inevitable, for purely demographic reasons. The argument,
21 in summary, is this: initial immigration follows demand for labour in urban
22 areas, and brings people to particular localities where cheap rented housing
23 is available. Friends and family members follow the pioneer immigrants into
24 the same places. If the minority ethnic population in a locality increases and
25 the white population decreases, we should not assume that this is because of
26 movement and retreat; births and deaths change populations naturally, and
27 since most immigrants are in their twenties, they have many years ahead
28 of them in which they are 'much more likely to have children than to die'
29 (Simpson, 2007, p. 5). Housing shortages in the areas of original settlement
30 create pressure for movement elsewhere, and those who move, and who move
31 furthest away, tend to be those who are relatively advantaged, for example, in
32 terms of income and marketable skills. This process of dispersal can lead to new
33 clusters of minority ethnic populations outside the original areas of settlement,
34 and Simpson concludes that concentrations of minority populations can thus
35 grow without any segregation, and in fact with more mixing.

36 Between 1991 and 2001, all minority ethnic populations in Britain, except
37 for Chinese and African groups, grew more through natural change than
38 through immigration, as is to be expected a generation or so after the period of
39 initial settlement. But this happened with no increase in segregation; instead,
40 for all minority groups there was a decrease in the 'index of dissimilarity'.
41 For example, in 1991, the index of dissimilarity (which measures evenness
42 of distribution) for Pakistanis was 75.1, and in 2001 it was 71.7; it would

1 be 100 if all Pakistanis lived in areas where no members of any other group
2 lived. It shows that the Pakistani population became more dispersed, with
3 its members more likely to live in ethnically mixed areas. The other index
4 used by Simpson, the index of isolation, measures lack of exposure to other
5 ethnic groups; it would also be 100 if all members of a particular group lived
6 in areas where no one else lived. In 2001, on average, whites lived in areas
7 that were 93.5% white (95.3% in 1991); for all other groups, the figure was
8 under 20% – that is, minority ethnic people tend to live in ethnically mixed
9 areas, not areas in which their own group predominates. The index of isolation
10 increased for African, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Chinese groups, but this is
11 purely because these were the groups whose size grew most between 1991
12 and 2001. The third measure used by Simpson is the number of ‘polarized
13 enclaves’ – wards in which one minority group is dominant. The number of
14 these remained tiny over the decade, at eight in both 1991 and 2001. In fact,
15 there was movement away from the areas of the greatest concentration of
16 their population by all minority ethnic groups, and movement into areas of
17 lower concentration, in a process of dispersal and mixing, not self-segregation
18 and retreat. Looking at the local authorities in which at least one ward had
19 a minority white population in 2001, Simpson finds only two cases where
20 there was movement out on the part of whites and a movement in on the
21 part of BME groups. The pattern one would find if increasing ghettoization
22 was happening, as a result of white flight and minority self-segregation, thus
23 barely exists; the two cases identified by Simpson, Harrow, and Waltham
24 Forest are ethnically diverse areas in which there is no ward in which the
25 white population is less than a quarter of the total. Thus, figures that have
26 been used to show increasing segregation, such as the forecast Simpson (2007)
27 makes for Birmingham, that white people will be in a minority by 2027, in
28 fact reflect only the natural growth of populations in which there are more
29 births than deaths; and in 2007, Birmingham was still ethnically diverse,
30 with a white population about twice the size of the population of Pakistani
31 origin.

32 Figures and projections derived from censuses of course have their limi-
33 tations: a full census is conducted only every ten years, and even then not
34 everyone is counted; homeless people and people in institutional care or
35 custody are not counted, and nor, on the whole, are Gypsy and Traveller
36 communities (treated as a distinct ethnic group by the Commission on the
37 Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000)). Furthermore, as was noted above
38 in the case of the Irish, the ethnic groups covered by the census and other
39 surveys are social constructions and subject to change over time; Simpson
40 (2007) gives the example of ‘British Bangladeshi’ as an ethnic category that
41 many people might find acceptable in 2007, but was barely available ten years
42 before. Population surveys in Britain have still hardly begun to take account
43 of the East European migrants who began to appear as a major element in
44 media panics about migration after the enlargement of the European Union in

1 May 2004, forming a relatively new target for racist and xenophobic fears and
2 media panics. With all due qualifications, though, the Phillips/CRE analysis –
3 that segregation has increased, and that this is at least partly because of the
4 excesses of policies of multiculturalism – does not survive scrutiny in the light
5 of the work of geographers and demographers.

6 **The Politics of Identity**

7 That analysis, however, reflected a widespread set of concerns. Simpson
8 (2007) concludes his paper by asking why such persistent political attention
9 is paid to segregation, and why political discourse tends to exaggerate the
10 differences among ethnic groups. A possible answer is in the rise of ‘the new
11 identity politics’ (Muir, 2007), a result of the forces of globalization and
12 in particular the greatly increased scale of movement of peoples, whether
13 in pursuit of economic opportunities or in flight from social dislocation,
14 conflict, and war. An important outcome has been a dramatic increase in
15 the number of ethnic and cultural groups with substantial populations in
16 Britain. Treating language as an indicator of identity, the CRE (2007) reports
17 that when the census team in 2001 consulted with local authorities about
18 what languages should be used for the dissemination of census forms and
19 information, they obtained a list of 24. The census itself showed that around
20 three million people in Britain were born in countries where English is not
21 the first language, but many of them will have been competent in English;
22 the problem for those concerned with segregation and separation – social
23 if not geographical – is people who are not competent in English. The
24 Commission on Integration and Cohesion, established by the government in
25 August 2006, made a particular point in its report, published in June 2007,
26 of questioning whether local authorities should continue automatically to
27 translate their materials into locally used languages, and suggested a more
28 selective approach, based on assessment of need and the vulnerability of
29 particular groups (Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007, p. 159).
30 Translations into a wide variety of languages are clearly a product of a
31 commitment to policies of multiculturalism, so the Commission’s scepticism
32 about their effects is an aspect of its scepticism about these policies more
33 generally.

34 Muir (2007, p. 4) suggests that the mobilities of globalization have ‘led some
35 to fear that older forms of solidarity and identity are being weakened while all
36 too familiar tensions and hostilities have gained a new lease of life’. These are
37 the tensions of racism and xenophobia, which of course arose in part from
38 ‘older forms of identity’. As Simpson (2007) argues, we should not assume,
39 as politicians, often do assume, that the erosion of old identities is always
40 a negative and regrettable process; indeed, the hardening and strengthening
41 of some such identities into what Giddens (1994) calls ‘fundamentalisms’

1 could be a major source of racist and nationalist, as well as religious and
2 cultural, hostility. It is this kind of consideration that has traditionally led
3 the political left to be wary of identities based on national tradition and
4 appeals to patriotism, but Muir (2007, p. 5) argues that a sense of national
5 identity is necessary for the realization of some of the 'key collective goals'
6 of the left in Britain, such as support for public goods like the health service
7 and greater participation in civic and political activities. Hence, the revival
8 of interest in 'Britishness' and what this means, which according to Gordon
9 Brown (2006) includes 'a sense of fair play, a belief in individual liberty and
10 a sense of civic responsibility'. Whether there is anything particularly 'British'
11 about this list is open to question, and it is vague enough to command general
12 assent (which was perhaps the intention); it is quite compatible with the
13 established appeal to Britishness, and sometimes Englishness, as a justification
14 for xenophobia and nationalism, often expressed politically as opposition to
15 the European Union. But the fact that the liberal, social democratic left
16 has begun to explore the meanings of Britishness as part of its concern
17 with questions of citizenship and social cohesion (ETHNOS, 2005) reflects a
18 growing sense that the question of identity has both become problematic (it can
19 no longer be taken for granted) and is crucial for the achievement of peaceful,
20 reasonably harmonious social relations and a safe, mutually supportive fabric
21 of social life. National identity, it is argued, needs to interact with local
22 senses of identity and belonging in the interests of 'community cohesion' –
23 authoritatively defined as the means of reducing inter-ethnic conflict (Cantle,
24 2001; 2005).

25 **Racism, Anti-racism, and Diversity**

26 The catalyst for the community cohesion agenda, and the origin of widespread
27 anxieties about segregation and identity, was the rioting in Bradford, Burnley,
28 and Oldham in the early summer of 2001. While the vocabulary of 'community
29 cohesion' tends to avoid specific engagement with issues of racism, there is no
30 doubt that racist hostilities and exclusions lay behind much of the anger and
31 resentment that were eventually expressed in collective violence (for Oldham
32 in particular, see Ray and Smith, 2004; Ray et al., 2004). Like 'race', racism is
33 difficult to define. Back (1996, p. 9) discusses the development of the term as
34 he moves towards his own definition (I have removed several references from
35 the quotation):

36 *Early writers concentrated on criticizing the legitimacy of the 'idea of race' or they*
37 *accepted the existence of 'races' and focused on the way in which they were constructed*
38 *in congenitally superior/inferior relationships. I will refer to racism as an ideology that*
39 *defines social collectivities in terms of 'natural' and immutable biological differences. These*
40 *are invested with negative connotations of cultural difference and inferiority, whereby the*
41 *presence of other 'races' can be correlated with the economic and social health of either a*

1 *specific region or the nation as a whole. Racism is defined within particular historical and*
2 *social contexts where past racial ideology can be used alongside new elements; thus there*
3 *is no one monolithic racism but numerous historically situated racisms.*

4 This is a useful explanation in that it acknowledges much of the complexity
5 of racism and the ways in which it is expressed, and Back's work itself fully
6 illustrates this complexity in showing how racist sentiments and attitudes
7 are often only one element in subtle and nuanced relationships among
8 young people from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Arguably,
9 though, Back's definition does not cover the full range of ways in which
10 racism is manifested in contemporary Britain (and elsewhere). Back (1996,
11 p. 67) himself writes of the 'new racism' that defines outsiders (in this case,
12 Vietnamese people) in terms of cultural rather than 'racial' difference, and
13 this shift from biology to culture is also identified by Wieviorka (2002) as
14 an important development in European racism since 1945. Racist rhetoric
15 came to place less emphasis on a biologically based hierarchy of superiority
16 and inferiority, and instead argued that cultural differences could be such as to
17 produce an inherent incompatibility between national or European values and
18 practices and those of some minority groups (Wieviorka, 2002).

19 This process, of defining and justifying racist hatred in cultural rather than
20 biological terms, can be seen, for example, in the propaganda of the British
21 National Party, which has increasingly been directed at 'Asians', especially
22 Muslims, on the grounds of cultural incompatibility, while disavowing overt
23 racism. Most of the white perpetrators of racist violence interviewed by
24 Ray et al. (2004) also denied holding racist views, even when there was
25 plentiful evidence that their offending had involved terms of racist abuse.
26 Since they were quite ready to talk about their use of violence, it is unlikely
27 that they were simply giving the interviewer what they judged would be
28 socially acceptable (or politically correct) answers. While this may have
29 motivated some (just as it may partly explain why broader surveys consistently
30 show low levels of support for overtly racist opinions (e.g., Ipsos MORI,
31 2007)), another interpretation is that at a rational, cognitive level, they
32 did not regard themselves as racist, at least in relation to a biological
33 conception of race. What they felt is another matter, and Ray et al. argue
34 that strong, barely acknowledged emotions of shame and resentment lay
35 behind their outbursts of violence against South Asian people whom they
36 perceived as undeservedly more successful, socially and economically, than
37 themselves. Very few articulated racism as an ideology, and they generally
38 saw themselves as disadvantaged relative to their South Asian victims, not in
39 a position of racial, or even cultural, superiority. It is clear that some forms
40 of racism, or some racisms, cannot be understood in terms of an ideology
41 of superiority derived from scientific rationalizations of imperialism, but in
42 terms that are cultural, situationally specific, and rooted in emotions rather
43 than beliefs.

1 Further shifts in the meanings of racism have emerged from the new patterns
2 of migration in the twenty-first century. In Britain and other Western European
3 countries, refugees and asylum seekers from countries devastated by war,
4 ethnic conflict, or civil breakdown, in parts of Africa and the Middle East,
5 have featured prominently in political and media discourse, often with an
6 implication that their claims to be fleeing from persecution and possible death
7 are false, and that they are actually motivated by the hope of economic
8 improvement (see Chapter 8 by Claire Cooper, 's in this book). This is
9 certainly the motive attributed to those who are supposedly the latest threat,
10 migrants from Central and Eastern Europe, and particularly from Poland,
11 since May 2004, when ten countries were admitted to membership. An Ipsos
12 MORI survey (2007) found that anxieties about immigration had grown
13 over the past five years, and that generally positive attitudes towards ethnic
14 diversity co-existed with a widely held view – among people from minority
15 ethnic groups as well as the white population – that there were too many
16 immigrants in Britain. The survey cites (p. 4) the European Social Survey
17 of 2002–03, which found that only a quarter of British respondents would
18 like to live in an area where almost nobody was of a different ethnic group
19 than themselves, a lower proportion than in other European countries apart
20 from Germany and Sweden. On the other hand, according to Ipsos MORI
21 (2007), more people identified immigration and race relations as the most
22 important political issue than any other, ahead of education, health, and
23 international terrorism. In relation to migrants from within Europe, many of
24 whom intend their stay in Britain to be temporary, racist sentiments are most
25 often justified not on biological or even cultural, but on economic grounds –
26 though no doubt economic arguments often mask less socially acceptable
27 hostilities. Enthusiasts for a globalized economy must logically support the
28 free movement of labour across national boundaries (Legrain, 2007), and it
29 is widely accepted that migrants have contributed to the British economy
30 by bringing scarce skills, particularly to the building industry, and being
31 prepared to do low-paid, often seasonal work that no one else will do,
32 particularly in agriculture (Travis, 2007). The dominant political rhetoric,
33 however, emphasizes the economic threats posed by migrants, in undercutting
34 wages, taking jobs that would otherwise be done by British citizens, and placing
35 an extra burden on local housing, health, and social services – and the criminal
36 justice system.

37 As the expressions of racism have become more complex and their targets
38 more diverse, anti-racist policies have had to discard the relatively simple
39 formulations used when they were first articulated in local government,
40 welfare, and criminal justice organizations in the 1980s. Then, racism tended
41 to be seen as monolithic, all-pervasive, and institutionalized (cf. Macpherson,
42 1999); the political conception of 'blackness' criticized by Modood (1994)
43 was generally accepted without much critical scrutiny; and multiculturalism
44 was rejected as a patronizing, if well-intentioned, concept that was a legacy of

1 colonialism and served only to reinforce the 'power of the white community'
2 (Gardiner, 1985). Walker (2002) discusses the origins of anti-racist discourse
3 in the field of social work, the successful efforts by groups of black practitioners
4 to incorporate it into social work training in the late 1980s, and the eventual
5 reaction in the name of common sense and resistance to 'political correctness'
6 on the part of Conservative ministers and media commentators. Practical
7 competences came to replace anti-racist and anti-oppressive values at the core
8 of the curriculum, and the discourse of diversity joined, if it did not quite
9 replace, that of anti-racism. 'Diversity' is clearly a broader, more diffuse term
10 than 'anti-racism', and it perhaps lacks the same sense of political purpose and
11 commitment to action. It covers, in a sample text from 1995 cited by Walker
12 (2002, p. 111):

13 *people from ethnic minority groups, people with disabilities, people with HIV/AIDS, people*
14 *with different religions and cultures, people with different class backgrounds, people whose*
15 *first language is not English, gay and lesbian people.*

16 As Walker notes, in the discourse of diversity, the emphasis is on numerical
17 minorities and lack of representation, not on the experience of exclusion
18 and disadvantage. It is about valuing and respecting difference, not taking
19 political action against discrimination. In view of the shifts in meaning of 'race'
20 and 'racism' outlined here, however, and the demographic changes that have
21 accompanied them, it has become impossible to use the terms with the former
22 sense of certainty and confidence. A simple black/white binary division, in
23 which the whites have all the power and only they can be racist (since racism
24 involves not only the expression of prejudice but the exercise of power),
25 is inadequate for understanding the complexities of inter-cultural relations,
26 tensions, and conflicts in globalized twenty-first century societies.

27 **Conclusion**

28 This chapter has tried to explain some of the complexities and ambiguities
29 of the key concepts and debates involved in discussing race and racism. It has
30 argued that the term from which the others flow, 'race', is a social and historical
31 construction whose meanings and uses have changed over time. It denotes
32 an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1983), but an imagined community
33 that has real, material effects, through processes of exclusion, discrimination,
34 and violence. This sense of 'race' is far removed from that given to it by
35 biologists and psychologists who, with or without the aid of Darwin's account
36 of evolution, claimed that it had an objective, scientific status which allowed
37 for the hierarchical ordering of hereditary human types. While much of their
38 work now seems (or ought to seem) little more than historical curiosity, it is
39 important to remember that scientific racism is far from dead, and continues,
40 lightly disguised to inform supposedly objective studies of the distribution

1 of intelligence across social groups. Contrary to the assumptions of some
2 commentators in the period immediately after the Second World War, the
3 biological conception of race survived the holocaust.

4 Rejecting biologically essentialist conceptions of race, social scientists and,
5 for different reasons, political activists, began in the 1960s to use the term
6 to describe social divisions and patterns of exploitation and discrimination,
7 particularly in the USA and Europe. 'Black' became a politically charged term,
8 denoting the experience of racism perpetrated by dominant white groups; later,
9 it became the banner under which a wide variety of disadvantaged groups
10 united in an anti-racist struggle. But this was itself criticized from the early
11 1990s for substituting a cultural and political essentialism for a biological one:
12 ethnicity, the term preferred to 'race' because it carried less biological baggage
13 and recognized that the categories in question were socially constructed, could
14 itself be used in narrow and exclusionary ways. The case of the supposedly
15 distinctive ethnic character of the Irish in Britain provides an example. It was
16 argued (Modood, 1994) that different minority ethnic groups had distinctive
17 experiences of racism and discrimination which needed to be acknowledged.
18 Furthermore, ethnic identities were not simple and singular but complex and
19 multiple: in a world of global flows and mobility, identities were increasingly
20 hybrid. Patterns of migration also became more diffuse and varied, bringing to
21 Western Europe and North America people with whom there had previously
22 been little direct interaction, for example, from parts of the former Soviet
23 Union and Yugoslavia.

24 Policies of multiculturalism, entailing the institutional recognition of a range
25 of ethnic groups, developed to take account of this increasing diversity. After
26 the riots in northern English towns in 2001, however, and still more after
27 the suicide bombings in London by British-born Islamists in July 2005, these
28 policies came under attack, not only from their traditional enemies on the
29 political right but from Trevor Phillips the Chair of the Commission for
30 Racial Equality. He argued that multiculturalism encouraged a sense of the
31 essentialism of difference and, by accepting uncritically the equal validity of the
32 beliefs and attitudes of all minority cultural groups, promoted mutual ignorance
33 and suspicion instead of participation by all groups in common social and
34 political institutions. In particular, he blamed multiculturalism for fostering
35 increased residential segregation, which had been identified as an important
36 contributor to the divisions and hostilities that lay behind the 2001 riots
37 (Cantle, 2001). Work by demographers and geographers suggests that in fact
38 there is very little sign of the processes of 'white flight' or Muslim withdrawal
39 into mono-cultural enclaves identified as the motors of ghettoization and ethnic
40 separation, but the critique of multiculturalism has led to a new stress in
41 government policy on national identity – what it means to be British, and
42 how a shared sense of Britishness can be encouraged.

43 Understandings of racism also became more complex in response to the
44 growing complexity of patterns of discrimination and inter-group conflict.

1 The old political conception of racism as ‘prejudice plus power’ came to
2 seem inadequate to reflect new patterns of hostility and conflict, in which
3 whites constructed themselves as victims, and tensions between minority
4 groups became increasingly apparent (as in the violence between young black
5 and Asian people in Lozells, Birmingham, in October 2005). While there
6 was some evidence of a decline in overtly racist attitudes among the white
7 population by 2005 compared with five years before (and certainly compared
8 with three decades earlier), there was also evidence of a heightened concern
9 about immigration, not only among whites but among minority ethnic groups.
10 In response to these contradictions and the increase in the number of minority
11 ethnic groups with substantial populations in Britain, as a result of new
12 patterns of movement and migration, commentators began to think of racism
13 as complex and polymorphous, its expression varying over time, place, and
14 social and political context. It followed that anti-racist strategies needed to
15 evolve beyond the simple didactic certainties of their original formulation, and
16 from this process emerged the concept of ‘diversity’, encompassing not only
17 ethnic difference but differences of faith, (dis)ability, and sexual preference.
18 Public bodies were encouraged to develop policies that recognized and valued
19 diversity; they were to foster diversity among their own staff, and ensure
20 that they provided services appropriate to the different needs of different
21 groups. Anti-racism’s focus on relations of oppression and subordination was
22 replaced by a blander, but perhaps more politically manageable, commitment
23 to achieving a diversity of services that mirrored the diversity of service users.
24 This is the diversity agenda to which all the agencies of the criminal justice
25 system are ostensibly committed.

28 **Summary**

29 This chapter explains some of the complexities and ambiguities of the key
30 concepts and debates involved in discussions of race and racism, and provides
31 a grounding for the chapters that follow. It argues that while the term ‘race’ is a
32 social and historical construction whose meanings and uses have changed over
33 time, to some degree ‘scientific’ racism persists. Rejecting biologically essentialist
34 conceptions of race, social scientists and, for different reasons, political activists,
35 began in the 1960s to use the term ‘race’ to describe social divisions and patterns
36 of exploitation and discrimination. ‘Black’ became a politically charged term,
37 denoting the experience of racism perpetrated by dominant white groups; later it
38 became the banner under which a wide variety of disadvantaged groups united
39 in an anti-racist struggle. But this was itself criticized from the early 1990s for
40 substituting a cultural and political essentialism for a biological one: ethnicity,
41 the term preferred to ‘race’ because it carried less biological baggage and

42 *(Continued)*

1 (Continued)

2 recognized that the categories in question were socially constructed, and could
3 itself be used in narrow and exclusionary ways. Furthermore, ethnic identities
4 were not simple and singular but complex and multiple: in a world of global
5 flows and mobility, identities were increasingly hybrid.

6 Policies of multiculturalism, entailing the institutional recognition of a range
7 of ethnic groups, developed to take account of this increasing diversity. After
8 the riots in northern English towns in 2001, however, and still more after the
9 suicide bombings in London by British-born Islamists in July 2005, multiculturalism
10 came under attack, and was blamed by the Commission for Racial Equality for
11 fostering residential segregation and contributing to the divisions and hostilities
12 that lay behind the 2001 riots. Although work by demographers and geographers
13 suggests that in fact there is very little sign of the processes of 'white flight' or
14 Muslim withdrawal into mono-cultural enclaves, the critique of multiculturalism has
15 led to a new stress in government policy on national identity and on encouraging
16 a shared sense of Britishness.

17 Understandings of racism also became more complex in response to the
18 growing complexity of patterns of discrimination and inter-group conflict. The
19 old political conception of racism as 'prejudice plus power' came to seem
20 inadequate to reflect new patterns of hostility and conflict, in which whites
21 constructed themselves as victims and tensions between minority groups became
22 increasingly apparent (as in the violence between young black and Asian people
23 in Birmingham in October 2005). While there was some evidence of a decline in
24 overtly racist attitudes among the white population, there was also evidence of a
25 heightened concern about immigration amongst all ethnic groups. In response
26 to such developments, racism has increasingly come to be seen as complex
27 and polymorphous, its expression varying over time, place, and social and
28 political context. It followed that anti-racist strategies needed to evolve beyond
29 the simple didactic certainties of their original formulation, and from this process
30 emerged the concept of 'diversity', encompassing not only ethnic difference but
31 differences of faith, (dis)ability, and sexual preference. Anti-racism's focus on
32 relations of oppression and subordination was replaced by a blander, more
33 politically manageable, commitment to achieving a diversity of services that
34 mirrored the diversity of service users. This is the diversity agenda to which all
35 the agencies of the criminal justice system are ostensibly committed.

AQ: Please note,
citation (call out)
for this reference is
missing in text.

36 Key Texts

37 Goldberg, D.T. and Solomos, J. (2002) (eds) *A Companion to Racial and Ethnic*
38 *Studies*. Oxford: Blackwell.

39 Back, L. and Solomos, J. (eds) (2000) *Theories of Race and Racism: A Reader*.
40 London: Routledge.

References

- 1
- 2 Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and*
3 *Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- 4 Back, L. (1996) *New Ethnicities and Urban Cultures: Racisms and Multiculture*
5 *in Young Lives*. London: UCL Press.
- 6 Bernal, M. (1987) *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*.
7 London: Free Association Books.
- 8 Bowling, B. and Phillips, C. (2002) *Racism, Crime and Justice*. Harlow:
9 Longman.
- 10 Brown, G. (2006) 'The Future of Britishness', speech to the Fabian Society,
11 14 January (at [www.fabian-society.org.uk/press_office/news_latest_all.asp?](http://www.fabian-society.org.uk/press_office/news_latest_all.asp?pressid=520)
12 [pressid=520](http://www.fabian-society.org.uk/press_office/news_latest_all.asp?pressid=520)).
- 13 Cantle, T. (2001) *Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review*
14 *Team*. London: Home Office.
- 15 Cantle, T. (2005) *Community Cohesion: A New Framework for Race and*
16 *Diversity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- 17 Commission on the Future of Multi-Racial Britain (The Parekh Report) (2000)
18 *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*. London: Profile Books.
- 19 Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007) *Our Shared Future*. London:
20 Department of Communities and Local Government (at [http://www.](http://www.integrationandcohesion.org.uk/upload/assets/www.integrationandcohesion.org.uk/our_shared_future.pdf)
21 [integrationandcohesion.](http://www.integrationandcohesion.org.uk/upload/assets/www.integrationandcohesion.org.uk/our_shared_future.pdf)
22 [org.uk/our_shared_future.pdf](http://www.integrationandcohesion.org.uk/upload/assets/www.integrationandcohesion.org.uk/our_shared_future.pdf)).
- 23 Commission for Racial Equality (2007) *Ethnic Minorities in Britain*
24 (Factfile2). London: CRE (at [http://www.cre.gov.uk/downloads/factfile02_](http://www.cre.gov.uk/downloads/factfile02_ethnic_minorities.pdf)
25 [ethnic_minorities.pdf](http://www.cre.gov.uk/downloads/factfile02_ethnic_minorities.pdf)).
- 26 De Ste. Croix, G.E.M. (1983) *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*.
27 London: Duckworth.
- 28 ETHNOS (2005) *Citizenship and Belonging: What is Britishness?*
29 London: CRE.
- 30 Gardiner, D. (1985) *Ethnic Minorities and Social Work Training* (Paper 21.1).
31 London: Central Council for Education and Training in Social Work.
- 32 Giddens, A. (1994) *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*.
33 Cambridge: Polity Press.
- 34 Gilroy, P. (2000) *Between Camps: Nations, Cultures and the Allure of Race*.
35 London: Allen Lane/The Penguin Press.
- 36 Goldberg, D.T. and Solomos, J. (2002) 'General introduction', in
37 D.T. Goldberg and J. Solomos (eds) *A Companion to Racial and Ethnic*
38 *Studies*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- 39 Gould, S.J. (1996) *The Mismeasure of Man* (revised and expanded edition).
40 New York: Norton.
- 41 Hall, S. (1992) 'New ethnicities', in J. Donald and A. Rattansi (eds) *Race,*
42 *Culture and Difference*. London: Sage.
- 43 Heer, G. (2007) 'Asian employees in the probation service', *Probation Journal*,
44 54 (3), 281–5.
- 45 Herrnstein, R.J. and Murray, C. (1994) *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class*
46 *Structure in American Life*. New York: Free Press.

- 1 Hickman, M.J. and Walter, B. (1997) *Discrimination and the Irish Community*.
 2 London: CRE.
- 3 Howard, K. (2006) 'Constructing the Irish of Britain: ethnic recognition and
 4 the 2001 censuses', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29 (1), 104–23.
- 5 Ipsos MORI (2007) *Race Relations 2006: A Research Study*. London: CRE.
- 6 Jansson, K. (2006) Black and Minority Ethnic Groups' Experiences and
 7 Perceptions of Crime, Racially Motivated Crime and the Police: Findings
 8 from the 2004/05 British Crime Survey (Home Office Online Report 25/06).
 9 London: Home Office.
- 10 Jenkins, R. (1997) *Rethinking Ethnicity*. London: Sage.
- 11 Johnston, R., Poulsen, M. and Forrest, J. (2005) 'On the measurement and
 12 meaning of residential segregation: a response to Simpson', *Urban Studies*,
 13 42 (7), 1221–7.
- 14 Legrain, P. (2007) *Immigrants: Your Country Needs Them*. London: Little,
 15 Brown.
- 16 Macpherson, W. (1999) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Report of an
 17 Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny (Cm 4262). London:
 18 HMSO.
- 19 May, S. (2002) 'Multiculturalism', in D.T. Goldberg and J. Solomos (eds)
 20 *A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- 21 Modood, T. (1994) 'Political blackness and British Asians', *Sociology*, 28
 22 (4), 859–76.
- 23 Muir, R. (2007) *The New Identity Politics*. London: IPPR.
- 24 Murray, C., with Lister, R., Field, F., Brown, J.C., Walker, A., Deakin, N.,
 25 Alcock, P., David, M., Phillips, M., Slipman, S. and Buckingham, A.
 26 (1996) *Charles Murray and the Underclass: The Developing Debate*.
 27 London: IEA Health and Welfare Unit in association with the *Sunday*
 28 *Times*.
- 29 Office of National Statistics (2003) Census 2001: National Report for England
 30 and Wales. London: The Stationery Office.
- 31 Ratcliffe, P. (ed.) (1996) *Ethnicity in the 1991 Census, Volume 3: Social Geogra-*
 32 *phy and Ethnicity in Britain: Geographical Spread, Spatial Concentration and*
 33 *Internal Migration*. London: Office of National Statistics.
- 34 Ray, L. and Smith, D. (2004) 'Racist offending, policing and community
 35 conflict', *Sociology*, 38 (4), 681–99.
- 36 Ray, L., Smith, D. and Wastell, L. (2004) 'Shame, rage and racist violence',
 37 *British Journal of Criminology*, 44 (3), 350–68.
- 38 Simpson, L. (2004) 'Statistics of racial segregation: measures, evidence and
 39 policy', *Urban Studies*, 41 (3), 661–81.
- 40 Simpson, L. (2005) 'On the measurement and meaning of residential
 41 segregation: a reply to Johnston, Poulsen and Forrest', *Urban Studies*, 42
 42 (7), 1229–30.
- 43 Simpson, L. (2007) 'Demographic contributions to the debate on segregation,
 44 integration and diversity', paper to Conference on 'Segregation or
 45 integration: what's going on?', University of Manchester, 17 May (at [http://](http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/events/segint/conference/documents/Simpson17Mayscriptwithslides.doc)
 46 [www.ccsr.ac.uk/events/segint/conference/documents/Simpson17Mayscript](http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/events/segint/conference/documents/Simpson17Mayscriptwithslides.doc)
 47 [withslides.doc](http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/events/segint/conference/documents/Simpson17Mayscriptwithslides.doc))

- 1 Travis, A. (2007) 'Shortage of pickers may hit strawberry crop', *The Guardian*,
2 28 May.
- 3 Vanstone, M. (2004) *Supervising Offenders in the Community: A History of*
4 *Probation Theory and Practice*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- 5 Walker, H. (2002) *A Genealogy of Equality: The Curriculum for Social Work*
6 *Education and Training*. London: Woburn Press.
- 7 Wieviorka, M. (2002) 'The development of racism in Europe', in
8 D.T. Goldberg and J. Solomos (eds) *A Companion to Racial and Ethnic*
9 *Studies*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- 10 Wilson, J.Q. and Herrnstein, R.J. (1985) *Crime and Human Nature*. New York:
11 Simon and Schuster.