

POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

SECTION HIGHLIGHTS

- The Police and Juvenile Crime
- Police Roles and Responsibilities
- Police–Juvenile Relations
- Police Roles and Discretion
- Juvenile Offending and Police Discretion
- Race as a Factor in Juvenile Arrests
- Alternatives to Police Arrest and Custody

The first contact that a young juvenile offender has with the juvenile justice system is with a police officer. The nature and circumstances of this police contact are likely to be significant and have a lasting impression on a young person. In Section II we examine police roles and responsibilities in general, and the unique roles that police have when dealing with juvenile offenders. Children and juveniles are involved in a variety of law violations ranging from status offenses to more serious offending, and present special challenges for the policing function. We will discuss alternatives to traditional law enforcement strategies

118 JUVENILE JUSTICE

such as community- or problem-oriented policing; curfew enforcement; gang suppression strategies; preventive efforts such as D.A.R.E. and School Resource Officers; police procedures for taking juvenile offenders into custody; legal guidelines for interrogation and gathering evidence; and use of discretion or referral to juvenile court.

The Police and Juvenile Crime

For juveniles, the police role is considered especially important because young persons' views and attitudes toward law enforcement are shaped by their first encounter with a police officer. Juvenile offenders are involved in a disproportionately large number of crimes relative to their percentage of the population, so they present a special challenge for law enforcement. In 2005, law enforcement agencies in the United States made an estimated 2.1 million arrests of persons under age 18. Juveniles accounted for about 16% of all violent crime arrests and 26% of all property crime arrests in 2005 (Snyder, 2007, p. 1).

The police role with juveniles is expanded because they handle many noncriminal matters referred to as *status offenses*, including running away, curfew violations, and truancy as well as nondelinquent juvenile matters such as neglect, abuse, and missing persons reports. Most urban police departments have special police units or juvenile bureaus for handling the increasing number of juvenile cases. Duties of special juvenile officers include taking missing children reports; examining runaway cases; investigating juvenile crimes; contacting and interviewing juveniles, their parents, school officials, and complainants regarding the circumstances of an offense; maintaining juvenile records; and appearing in juvenile court.

Juveniles are less predictable than adults and often exhibit less respect for the authority of officers. The immaturity of many children and youth means that they are more vulnerable to the dares of other youth, and they often engage in deviant behavior when in the company of their peers. Many youth view the police officer on patrol not as a deterrent to delinquent behavior, but as a challenge to avoiding detection and confrontation while loitering at night or engaging in behaviors ranging from petty mischief, to property damage and vandalism, to more serious crimes of theft and assaults. The immaturity of youth, coupled with limited parental supervision and negative peer influence, presents special problems for police, who frequently encounter juveniles with little respect for law and authority. Juveniles also present a special problem for police because they are less cognizant of the consequences of their actions and the effects of their delinquent behavior on their victims, their parents and families, their peers, and themselves. Before discussing police roles with juvenile offenders, we provide an overview of police roles in general.

Police Roles and Responsibilities

Police officers are the most visible officials in the criminal justice system. They introduce citizens to the justice process. That introduction ranges from taking a report from a victim or witness to a crime, to issuing a traffic citation, to questioning or taking into custody a suspect in a misdemeanor or felony offense. Police are charged with preventing crime and enforcing the law. They are given the authority to make arrests, to use reasonable physical force when necessary, and to take persons charged with crimes into custody. Society entrusts a great deal of authority to police, but also expects a lot from them. Police are expected to provide public order and safety; to prevent crimes from occurring, and find and apprehend offenders when

crimes occur; and to perform a variety of law enforcement functions without violating constitutional rights. In reality, traditional police patrol does little to prevent crime. Police in most cases react to crime after it has already happened, responding to citizen calls, reporting to crime scenes, conducting investigations, and tracking and apprehending offenders. The fact that police are called upon for many services besides law enforcement makes their job even more difficult.

Police officers actually perform three roles in fulfilling their law enforcement responsibilities: law enforcement, order maintenance, and service (Wilson, 1968). The public and the police themselves have viewed the law enforcement function as the primary and most important task, and little attention was given to the others, which were considered less important and not “real law enforcement.”

Law Enforcement

The traditional law enforcement role of police is to detect and investigate crimes and to apprehend those responsible for committing crimes. Police attempt to detect crimes through regular police patrols and by responding to complaints of victims and statements of witnesses. The traditional law enforcement role gives police visibility to the public as they “protect and serve.” There are some additional challenges in policing crimes such as drug dealing, gambling, and prostitution, where there are no witnesses or clearly identified victims. To enforce laws against the so-called victimless crimes (or more appropriately termed “consensual” crimes, because persons involved are willing participants), police work as undercover officers to detect the crimes and make arrests. The law enforcement role includes enforcement of traffic laws and parking violations, and it is here that officers have the most interaction with the general public as law enforcers. To finalize their law enforcement role and ensure that suspects are brought to trial, police engage in interrogation of suspects, collection of physical evidence at a crime scene, and presentation of the evidence in court.

Order Maintenance

The order maintenance function of police involves crowd control during events such as parades, large public gatherings, music concerts, and sports competitions in indoor and outdoor stadiums; and patrolling on foot, on bicycle, on horseback, or in vehicles and on streets, sidewalks, and in public parks. The order maintenance function parallels the law enforcement role when officers intervene to control disorderly behavior. The order maintenance role is less clear (both to the public and to many police) than the law enforcement role, mainly because the behaviors being controlled are less clearly defined. “Disorderly behavior,” for example, generally refers to behavior that disturbs the public peace, but the exact definition and an officer’s determination whether the behavior warrants official intervention depend on the neighborhood location and the time during which the disturbance occurs. The officer’s role may be that of telling participants of a loud party to quiet down or dispersing a group of juveniles who are loitering on a street corner or in front of a business establishment.

Service Function

The third role of police is that of providing services to the public. This may include providing aid or assistance to persons in need, such as calling a tow truck for a stranded motorist;



▲ **Photo II-1** A juvenile offender suspect awaits verification of juvenile status and questioning by police. (© CORBIS)

transporting abandoned or neglected children to a hospital or shelter facility; delivering a baby whose mother did not make it to the hospital on time. The service function often results in a combination of functions, such as when one officer transports abandoned children to a shelter, and another officer locates the parent(s) and initiates a child abuse investigation (a law enforcement function). The service function more recently has come to include an educational component, such as when police are assigned to schools to assist in the education of children and youth on the dangers of drugs and how to avoid drug abuse.

The three primary roles of police are very different on a number of dimensions: criminal versus noncriminal, urgent versus routine, and dangerous versus relatively safe (Dorne & Gewerth, 1995). Police officers generally view the law enforcement function as the primary role, while order maintenance and service tasks have been typically regarded with mixed feelings, ranging from ambivalence to disdain (Moore, 1992). Police officers hold varying opinions of the importance of each of the roles, and they do not undertake these three functions with equal degrees of enthusiasm. They are given considerable autonomy and independence in carrying out their law enforcement roles and are allowed to place greater or lesser importance on a given role depending on their assigned patrol area and individual circumstances. In a reading in this section, Susan Guarino-Ghezzi recommends that police reexamine the order maintenance and law enforcement roles as they pertain to juvenile offenders and victims.

✉ **Police–Juvenile Relations**

Police officers encounter a wide variety of deviant and delinquent behavior among children and youth, ranging from minor status offenses to serious crimes. The majority of police

encounters with juveniles are in response to minor offenses that involve an order maintenance function of law enforcement (Friedman, Lurigio, Greenleaf, & Albertson, 2004). Regardless of the seriousness of the behavior, however, the nature of the police–juvenile encounter can make a significant difference on police–juvenile relations. Sherman (1997) noted that police themselves often create a risk factor for crime by using “bad manners.” Research evidence indicates that when police are less respectful toward suspects and citizens in general, then citizens also tend to have less respect for police officers and for the law (Sherman, 1997, pp. 8–58). Juveniles are critical of police practices such as stopping and questioning them, asking them to “move on” and not loiter on street corners, parking lots, or in front of stores. African American and Hispanic youth, and those living in urban areas, are more critical of police than white students or those living in suburban or rural areas (Taylor, Turner, Esbensen, & Winfree, 2001). Students often have ambivalent or mixed feelings about police. Taylor et al. (2001) found that a majority of students in their study believed that police are friendly and hard working, but they also believed that officers are racially prejudiced and dishonest. They did *not* believe that police officers contribute directly to the negative feelings, however. The reasons for juveniles’ negative attitudes toward police are likely the inevitable result of police officers’ fair but unpopular restrictions on young peoples’ behaviors (Taylor et al., 2001). Lieber, Nalla, and Farnsworth (1998) suggested that community policing practices and problem-oriented policing can positively influence youths’ perceptions of police, but Hurst and Frank (2000) have noted that attempting to involve youths in community-oriented policing is a challenge because of their negative views and disapproval of many police functions. Friedman and his associates (2004) have noted that both police and youth’s demeanors affect the perceived nature and outcomes of their encounters, so there is reason to believe that juveniles’ negativity toward the police might have triggered officer disrespect, which in turn feeds juveniles’ negative attitudes. In short, they believe that police–juvenile interactions are a two-way street. Young people react to how police officers treat them, and officers often respond in kind to juveniles’ disrespectful behavior. Working with juveniles is a challenge, and police departments do well to provide officers with cultural awareness training to enhance their skills in working and interacting with juveniles (Friedman et al., 2004). Schools can also educate students about police responsibilities and procedures, and the appropriate responses when interacting with police. D.A.R.E. and School Resource Officers have an opportunity to improve juvenile and police relations through better understanding of police roles and functions. A description and evaluation of a D.A.R.E. program by Dennis Rosenbaum and his associates is included as a reading in this section.

The service functions of policing take on a special emphasis in relation to juveniles. Police are expected to *protect children* and to *prevent delinquency* (Sanborn & Salerno, 2005). Child protection may involve intervening in suspected cases of child neglect (being left at home alone, or left inside a vehicle in cold or hot weather conditions); of endangering a child’s safety (failure to use a car seat or seat belts); or of child abuse such as physical punishment that may involve serious injury or even death. Child neglect and abuse have been shown to have a relationship with status offenses such as running away, which in turn often lead to more serious delinquency. The primary reason for the inclusion of status offenses in all juvenile statutes in fact is for child protection and delinquency prevention. Laws giving police the authority to intervene in noncriminal behaviors such as running away, truancy, and curfew violations are intended to protect juveniles and prevent worse delinquent behavior.

Many cities have implemented curfew laws in an effort to get children and youth off the streets at night, reduce their opportunities to get into trouble, and therefore prevent delinquency.

122 JUVENILE JUSTICE

Curfew laws generally apply only to youth under the age of 16, and the hours during which youth are required to be off the streets may vary according to the age of the youth (the limit may be 10:00 p.m. for those under 14, and 11:00 or midnight for youth aged 15 or 16, for example). Violation of curfew laws is a status offense, illegal only for those of juvenile age, and not punishable by referral to juvenile court. Police responses to curfew violations vary, but may include a warning to get home, telephoning the parents, delivering the youths to their homes in a patrol car, or bringing them to a shelter where parents are asked to come to pick them up. Evidence of the effectiveness of curfew laws varies, with some researchers claiming that juvenile crime is reduced (McDowell, Loftin, & Wiersema, 2000), while others found no evidence of crime reduction that could be explained by the curfew (Reynolds, Seydlitz, Jenkins, 2000). Curfew laws may have little effect on juvenile crime because there is evidence that a significant proportion of juvenile crimes occur immediately after school hours (3:00 p.m.) and before 6:00 p.m. (Sickmund, Snyder, & Poe-Yamagata, 1997). Some cities have therefore attempted to enforce daytime, after-school curfews, but these present countless problems in affecting youth who are not engaging or would not engage in criminal activity (Bannister, Carter, & Shafer, 2001).

The child protection and delinquency prevention roles are service and order maintenance functions of police but are essential in supporting law enforcement with juveniles, particularly in a community policing context. We have included readings at the end of this section that address the special roles of police and curfew laws, truancy, gang suppression, and firearm possession and violations. These problems present police officers with demanding challenges when it comes to combining their order maintenance and law enforcement roles on a regular basis in cities throughout the country.

Police Roles and Discretion

Police are permitted to exercise a great deal of discretion in their duties. That is, they have the ability to choose between different courses of action, depending on their particular assignment. Individual autonomy and discretion are not unique to the police role, but tend to get more attention than in other professions. Employees in many organizations are given some discretionary authority and flexibility in carrying out job functions. In most organizations, however, discretion among personnel at the lower levels is very limited, and flexibility in decision making expands as one moves farther up organization levels. In police organizations the opposite is true. Discretionary authority among police is greater at the lowest levels of the organization, giving the line-level officer on patrol a considerable amount of discretion in carrying out and discharging his or her duties (Goldstein, 1977). In other organizations, the actions of line-level personnel are under close scrutiny. In police organizations, officers on patrol are out of sight of their superiors, and the low visibility means they are frequently beyond the commanding officers' control. Because of the considerable amount of discretion, much research and writing has been devoted to studying and understanding police discretion.

The nature of police discretion varies with the different police roles. In law enforcement situations, police must resolve whether a crime occurred: whether there is sufficient evidence to justify stopping a suspect for questioning, taking into custody, or making an arrest. Officers receive extensive training in the *law enforcement* function, including thorough education on the legal statutes and the appropriate legal interventions they are authorized to make for law violations. *Order maintenance* situations leave more room for police discretion, as "public

order” and “disorderly conduct” are not so clearly defined. It is difficult or even impossible to determine, for example, whether a loud exchange of words on the street, in a public gathering, or in a home amounts to a violation of the “public order.” It may depend on the context and circumstances of the verbal exchange. Police decisions and discretion in the *service function* are equally difficult. The police role in service situations has generally not been discussed in police training manuals or in books and research articles on policing (Moore, 1992). Many police regard calls for service, such as rendering first aid or helping a stranded motorist, as a waste of time and an interference with the real job of policing. Some police would maintain that calls for service can be better handled by other agencies and individuals.

A number of arguments have been made for reevaluating the negative attitude toward the service function of police: (1) police response to requests for service might result in more effective law enforcement; (2) response to such calls may prevent a crime later; (3) response to service calls helps establish a positive community presence; and (4) response to service helps enhance the flow of information from community sources and aids in crime detection and prevention (Moore, 1992). The emergence of community policing has diminished to a great extent some of the earlier sense of frustration and resistance of police officers in fulfilling service functions. Community policing includes emphases on police–community relations, citizen input, team policing, crime problem solving, and crime prevention (Cordner, 2005). With the emergence of community policing, officers have more readily come to accept that order maintenance and service functions are important functions of law enforcement. Police agencies that have adopted a community policing perspective accept and recognize that all three functions are equally important in carrying out effective police operations.

Juvenile Offending and Police Discretion

Police have considerable discretionary power in handling juvenile matters, ranging from reprimand and release, to transporting a juvenile to detention and referral to juvenile court. Discretion is important in police work, for the officer’s decision to intervene in any suspected law violation is the first stage in the juvenile justice process. Officers use their discretion in deciding whether or not to take official actions with offending juveniles or simply order them to “move on,” “break it up,” or “get on home.” Most police contact with juveniles is nonofficial, and police make an arrest and take juveniles into custody in only a small percentage of cases. In a study of police responses with juveniles in two cities, Myers (2002) found that police took juveniles into custody in only 13% of their encounters with juveniles. Most of the police–juvenile encounters involved noncriminal matters, such as public disorder (22%), traffic offenses (14%), nonviolent conflicts (9%), and suspicious situations (7%); and about one fourth (27%) involved violent or nonviolent crimes (Myers, 2002, p. 123). In 2003, 20% of juvenile arrests were handled within law enforcement agencies, 71% were referred to juvenile court, and 7% were referred directly to criminal court. The remaining 2% were referred to a welfare agency or to another police agency. The proportion of arrests referred to juvenile court increased from 1980 to 2003, from 58% to 71% (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006, p. 152).

Police discretion has been criticized because some believe that police abuse their broad discretionary powers, and that they base their decisions on extralegal factors other than the offense. Extralegal factors such as sex, race, socioeconomic status, and individual characteristics of the offender have been shown to make a difference in police officers’ decisions of whether or not to take official actions. Girls are less likely than boys to be arrested and referred

124 JUVENILE JUSTICE

to juvenile court, but they are often referred more than boys for status offenses such as running away or disobeying parents (Armstrong, 1977; Chesney-Lind, 1977). Researchers have reported differing results on the importance of race in police discretion. Some studies report few differences when controlling for offense seriousness and prior record. African American and other minority youths seem to be involved in more frequent and serious offenses than whites, so it is difficult to determine whether they are singled out more by police for official action. There is some evidence of racial bias, however, as minority youths have often been targeted more by police for official intervention (Wolfgang, Figlio, & Sellin, 1972, p. 252). Some critics of police discretion also contend that lower-class youths are processed into the justice system for the same offenses for which middle- or upper-class juveniles are simply reprimanded and released to their parents. Police and juvenile officers justify this use of discretion on the basis that middle- and upper-class youth are more likely to be corrected without referral to the justice system because their parents have the resources to provide their children with the necessary supervision and corrective services. Merry Morash (1984) found that an older juvenile with a prior record and who fits the image of a serious delinquent is more likely to be referred by police to the juvenile court. A juvenile's demeanor and attitude make a difference in a police officer's use of discretion. A youth who is polite and respectful is more likely to get off with a reprimand, while a negative and hostile attitude is likely to result in a court referral (Lundman, Sykes, & Clark, 1990; Piliavin & Briar, 1964).

Race as a Factor in Juvenile Arrests

The issue of race is a major concern in the criminal and juvenile justice systems. It is an undisputed fact that racial and ethnic minorities (especially African Americans) are disproportionately represented at each stage of the system: in police arrests, in jails and detention centers, in courts, and in correctional facilities. Research studies are mixed, however, as to whether that disproportionate representation is a result of racial bias in police arrest, prosecutors' decisions, and judicial sentencing (Conley, 1994; Wordes, Bynum, & Corley, 1994). African American youth are overrepresented in juvenile arrests when compared to their proportion of the population. Black youth, who accounted for 17% of the juvenile population in 2005, were involved in a disproportionate number of juvenile arrests for robbery (68%), murder (54%), motor vehicle theft (43%), and aggravated assault (42%) (Snyder, 2007, p. 9).

The question is whether the overrepresentation of black juveniles in police arrest rates is due to racial bias, or to the greater involvement of black youth in violent crimes. Violent crimes are more likely to be reported, detected, and result in a police arrest. To answer this question, Pope and Snyder (2003) analyzed National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data from law enforcement agencies in 17 states, with a large sample of 102,905 juvenile offenders. They found no significant effects of race in police arrest decisions, and they were able to identify some characteristics that differentiated the crimes of white and nonwhite juvenile offenders. Compared to nonwhites, white juvenile offenders were:

- Less likely to have multiple victims
- More likely to act alone
- More likely to commit crimes indoors
- Less likely to possess a nonpersonal weapon (firearm, knife, or club)
- Less likely to offend against adults



▲ **Photo II-2** Police arrest a suspected juvenile offender for drug dealing. (© CORBIS)

- Less likely to offend against members of another race
- More likely to commit crimes against family members; equally likely to commit crimes against acquaintances; but less likely to commit crimes against strangers (Pope & Snyder, 2003, p. 4).

The findings revealed that the crime incident characteristics that increased the odds of arrest for violent crimes were largely the same for white and nonwhite offenders, with one important exception: Victim's race was correlated with arrest probability for nonwhite juvenile offenders, but *not* for white offenders. A nonwhite juvenile offender therefore was more likely to be arrested if the victim was white than if the victim was nonwhite. More research must be conducted on police arrest patterns, using larger samples that are more representative of the nation. Arrest patterns may differ among states and within regions of states and of the nation.

Race and ethnic background may be a factor in police decisions to arrest juvenile offenders, but based on research evidence it is clear that several other factors influence officers' decisions. In summary, the factors that may affect police officers' decisions to arrest a juvenile or to take less formal actions without court referral include factors relating to the:

- Offense (seriousness, type, time of day, gang related, use of weapon)
- Youth's record or status (prior police contact or arrest, school record, probation status)
- Offender (age, gender, race, social class, demeanor)
- Complainant (present at the scene, desire to prosecute, age, gender, and race)
- Location of the offense (type of neighborhood, low- or high-crime area)

126 JUVENILE JUSTICE

- Parents (attitude, present at the scene or at home, concern, and ability to supervise)
- Officer (training and experience, view of justice system and diversion, workload)
- Police department (enforcement policies, community policing, or problem-solving emphasis) (Sanborn & Salerno, 2005, pp. 137–139).

Police discretion is necessary, and the juvenile justice system could not function without some use of discretion. Juvenile courts in urban areas have a backlog of cases, probation officers' caseloads are too high for them to provide adequate supervision, and correctional facilities are becoming overcrowded. The system must concentrate on those juvenile offenders who pose the greatest risk and need official intervention to prevent further offending.

Alternatives to Police Arrest and Custody

A police officer may refer a minor offender to a youth services bureau, a community agency such as a Big Brother Big Sister program, or a similar delinquency prevention program. In the majority of cases where police have reason to believe that a juvenile has committed an offense, the youth will be taken to the police department juvenile bureau for questioning, may be fingerprinted and photographed, and then will be taken to the intake unit of the juvenile probation department where a decision will be made to detain the youth or release to the parents.

- *Questioning, warning, and release in the community.* The least severe sanction is when an officer questions a youth for a possible minor offense, and gives a warning and reprimand on the street without taking formal actions.

- *Station adjustment.* Police may take a youth into custody and to the station, record the alleged minor offense and actions taken, give the youth an official reprimand, and release the youth to the parents. The parents are generally contacted first and may be present when the youth is reprimanded. In smaller cities the youth may be placed under police supervision for a short period of time.

- *Referral to a diversion agency.* Police may release and refer a juvenile to a youth service bureau (YSB), Big Brother Big Sister program, runaway center, or a mental health agency. Diverting minor offenders from the juvenile justice system to a YSB that provides counseling and social services is considered preferable for many first-time offenders and troubled youth.

- *Issuing a citation and referring to juvenile court.* The police officer can issue a citation and refer the youth to juvenile court. The intake probation officer accepts the referral, contacts the parents if the police have not already done so, and releases the youth to the parents on the condition that they will report to the court when ordered to do so. The intake officer then determines whether a formal delinquency petition should be filed. In some states the decision is made by the prosecuting attorney assigned to the juvenile court.

- *Taking to a detention center or shelter home.* The police officer can issue a citation, refer the youth to the juvenile court, and take him or her to a detention center. The intake officer at the detention center then decides whether to hold the juvenile or release him or her to the parents. Juveniles are detained when they are considered dangerous, when there is a lack of parental supervision, or when there is a high probability that they will not report to the court when ordered to do so. If a detention center is felt to be too restrictive, and an appropriate parent or foster home is not available, the youth may be placed in a shelter care facility that

might be either a private home or a group home. Most states now provide for a detention hearing within a day after the youth's referral in which a judge or referee must determine whether there is sufficient reason to continue to detain the juvenile. In cities without a separate juvenile detention center, juveniles who cannot be released to their parents are confined in a separate section of the county jail, or may be transported to a juvenile facility in another county. There has been a national effort to remove juveniles from adult jails. Removing juveniles from their homes and detaining them in juvenile centers is considered a last resort.

SUMMARY

- The police role with juvenile offenders is especially important because young persons' views and attitudes toward law enforcement are shaped by their first encounter with a police officer.
- Police face special challenges when dealing with juvenile offenders, because they must enforce noncriminal (status) offenses in addition to criminal violations; because of youths' immaturity; and because of youths' vulnerability to group influence.
- Police officers actually perform three roles in fulfilling their law enforcement responsibilities: law enforcement, order maintenance, and service functions.
- Police agencies attempt to improve relations with juveniles through cultural awareness training to enhance their skills in working and interacting with juveniles, and programs such as D.A.R.E. and School Resource Officers.
- Police discretion is a normal and necessary part of the law enforcement decision-making process that sometimes appears to be influenced by extralegal factors and that results in disproportionate processing of racial and ethnic minorities.
- Research findings on police discretion show mixed results as to whether disproportionate representation of minorities is due to racial discrimination in decision making, or to the greater involvement of minorities in offenses that are more likely to result in court processing and sentencing.
- Police officers have a number of alternatives to arrest and custody of offenders, and using these alternatives appropriately benefits the offender, the community, and the justice system.

KEY TERMS

Law enforcement role
Order maintenance
Police discretion
Police roles

Service function
Status offenses
Racial disparity

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Can you think of any experiences as a teenager when you or any of your friends had any encounters with a police officer that were negative and/or created poor relations with the police? Give an example.
2. Do you think police should spend much of their time responding to status offenses of juveniles? Explain why or why not. Do you think there is any relationship between status offenses and more serious juvenile crime?

128 JUVENILE JUSTICE

3. Can you think of any examples when you, your friends or family, or any neighbors were affected or benefited by the police roles of order maintenance and service functions? Give an example.
4. Have you had a personal experience with a D.A.R.E. program or with a School Resource Officer? Explain the effects of that program from your perspective.
5. Have you or an acquaintance ever experienced police discretion, such as getting a warning rather than a citation or arrest; or getting a citation or arrest when you believe a warning was more appropriate?

WEB RESOURCES

The following Web sites provide information and discussion on the role of police in the juvenile justice system:

Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report: <http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf>

Community-oriented policing: <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/>

D.A.R.E. Web site: <http://www.dare.com/home/default.asp>

READING

Cops In the Classroom

A Longitudinal Evaluation of Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE)

**Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Robert L. Flewelling,
Susan L. Bailey, Chris L. Ringwalt, Deanna L. Wilkinson**

National public opinion surveys in the late 1980s consistently identified drugs as “the most important problem facing this country today” (Bezilla and Gallup 1990). Despite recent changes in public opinion and debates about the nature and magnitude of the drug problem in the United States, a substantial “drug war” continues to be waged on a variety of fronts. In communities and cities across the nation, residents have fought

back and demanded more government action against drug users and dealers (Davis, Lurigio, and Rosenbaum 1993). Hundreds of communitywide, multiagency partnerships have formed to develop new antidrug strategies, including a wide range of enforcement, education, and treatment initiatives (Cook and Roehl 1993).

Although a variety of solutions have been proposed to the drug problem, the primary

thrust of local, state, and federal policy has been to promote aggressive enforcement programs designed to eradicate illegal drug activity. Drug laws have been created or strengthened to “get tough” on drug offenders, thousands of law enforcement agents have been hired at various levels to enforce these laws, and the criminal justice system has been primed to give priority attention to the prosecution of drug cases. As a result, drug enforcement statistics (such as arrests, asset seizures, prosecutions, convictions, and incarcerations) have risen dramatically in recent years (Timrots, Byrne, and Finn 1991).

The cost-effectiveness of these antidrug policies has been the subject of considerable debate. The available evidence suggests that enforcement programs have been oversold (Moore 1988; Weisheit 1990). Research documenting the effectiveness of police crackdowns, sweeps, and related enforcement programs at the neighborhood level is quite limited and shows mixed results (see Hayeslip 1989; Kleiman, Barnett, Bouza, and Burke 1988; Sherman 1990). Meanwhile, U.S. prisons and jails are grossly overcrowded and courts are severely backlogged with drug cases. In addition, the cost of these aggressive tactics to civil liberties and police-community relations can be substantial (see Rosenbaum 1993).

Recognizing the limits of this approach, pressure has continued to mount on the federal government to shift additional resources to drug education and treatment (Treaster 1992; White House 1992). In theory, the most cost-effective strategy to reduce future demand for drugs is primary prevention. If youths can be prevented from using drugs, the long-term savings to society should be substantial. One of the easiest ways to reach most youths is through school-based education programs.

School-Based Drug Education Programs

Cognizant of the importance of primary prevention, governments at all levels are now promoting and even requiring school-based drug education.

In 1986, the U.S. Congress passed the Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act to promote drug abuse education and prevention programs across the country. The federal contribution to drug prevention at the state and local level has grown precipitously from \$189 million in fiscal year 1987 to \$463 million in fiscal year 1990. In addition, state and local contributions to drug education have been significant, creating a substantial combined effort to prevent drug abuse among America’s youth. In many states, schools are required by law to have drug education programs in place, and educational institutions that receive funds from the federal government must first show evidence that they have implemented a comprehensive drug prevention program.

In the face of this rapidly growing support for school-based drug education, the question remains as to whether existing programs, as currently delivered, are changing attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors with respect to the use of tobacco, alcohol, and other drugs. Given the massive onslaught of drug education programs in recent years, as well as the expansion of aggressive local enforcement programs, one would hypothesize that overall levels of drug use would decline. Indeed, recent trends are consistent with this prediction. The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, for example, showed a 46% drop between 1985 and 1991 in the number of Americans over age 26 who reported using any illicit drug in the past month (National Institute on Drug Abuse [NIDA] 1993). Similarly, the use of drugs and alcohol among our nation’s youth has declined over the past decade. The High School Senior Survey indicates that use of marijuana, alcohol, crack, and cocaine continues to decline. In 1992, 29% of all high school seniors reported they had used at least one illicit drug during the past year, compared to a peak of 54% in 1979 (Johnston, Bachman, and O’Malley 1992).¹

The factors contributing to these national trends are difficult to isolate. Enforcement efforts have been strong in recent years, but American youth still perceive many drugs as widely available. Johnston and his colleagues who direct the High School Senior Survey argue that a reduction

130 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

in demand among youth rather than a reduction in supply offers the most compelling explanation of these trends (Institute for Social Research [ISR] 1991). This position is based on the observation that the supply of drugs to American youth has remained fairly constant despite intensive law enforcement programs, while educational antidrug messages have never been more widespread. Also, recent data from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse show that rates of current drug use have declined more sharply among adolescents than adults (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration [SAMHSA] 1993). In spite of these encouraging trends, explanations that favor antidrug education remain speculative in the absence of controlled experimentation.

If school-based drug prevention has played an important role in the decline of drug abuse, the nature and extent of this impact is important to document. Knowing the effectiveness of specific educational interventions would help local, state, and federal government to move beyond the current shotgun approach to drug education and commit resources to programs that have known effects on students' attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. However, because controlled longitudinal evaluations of school-based drug education are extremely rare, our knowledge of what works under what conditions is quite limited.

Seeing encouraging trends in drug use is a far cry from claiming that the drug problem has been solved in the United States. Current rates of drug use among U.S. youth are very high in comparison to other industrialized nations (Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman 1988). Alcohol and tobacco remain the most prevalent and costly problems for American youth. Although recent (30-day) use of alcohol among persons under 21 years of age has dropped from 72% in 1980 to 57% in 1990 (Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman 1991), this figure still constitutes a majority of American youth. Most importantly, the consequences of drinking and driving are well-documented in traffic fatality statistics (see Donelson 1988 for a review).

Data on cigarette smoking among youth reveal the most troubling drug trend. Although smoking rates have continued to decline in the general population over the past decade, the smoking rate among youth has failed to show a corresponding decrease (Johnston et al. 1991). From 1981 to 1990, the percentage of high school seniors who reported smoking in the past month was unchanged (29% at both points), and the rate of daily smoking dropped only 1% during this period (from 20% to 19%). Given the lethal consequences of cigarette smoking (i.e., hundreds of thousands of preventable deaths each year), the reduction of tobacco use among youth remains an important objective of many drug education initiatives.

The DARE program. DARE is the most widely disseminated school-based drug prevention program in the United States. It represents a cooperative venture between education and law enforcement and involves the use of trained, uniformed police officers in the classroom to teach a highly structured drug prevention curriculum. Created in 1983 by the Los Angeles Police Department in collaboration with the Los Angeles Unified School District, DARE has spread to all 50 states and six foreign countries. The primary DARE curriculum targets youth in their last year of elementary school (usually the fifth or sixth grade) and is based on the assumption that children at this age are the most receptive to antidrug messages and are entering the drug experimentation phase where intervention could have maximum benefit.

Unlike most school-based drug education programs, DARE is highly structured and uniformly administered across sites. Typically, DARE officers are given 80 hours of instructor training in classroom management, teaching strategies, communication skills, adolescent development, drug information, and instruction of the DARE lessons. The performance of DARE officers in the classroom is monitored closely by each classroom teacher and by visits from an experienced DARE officer to ensure the integrity and consistency of

program delivery. The police agency responsible for the program provides all instructional materials, student workbooks, visual aids, and graduation certificates. Thus, law enforcement agencies pay the officer's salary and provide the materials, whereas schools provide the classroom time to present the DARE curriculum.

Police officers teach the DARE curriculum in hourly sessions over the course of 17 weeks, using a variety of techniques including lectures, workbook exercises, question and answer sessions, audiovisual materials, and role-playing sessions. The primary objective of the DARE curriculum is to teach peer resistance skills by offering students a variety of strategies to say "no" to drugs. However, DARE is clearly a comprehensive program in that it includes a number of other curriculum objectives, as summarized in Table 1. The DARE curriculum includes elements of several major drug prevention approaches, namely cognitive, affective, and social skills, with the greatest emphasis placed on the latter.

Theory and Evaluation of School-Based Drug Prevention

Several literature reviews and meta-analyses have been conducted to assess the theoretical underpinnings and behavioral impact of school-based drug prevention programs (see Botvin 1990; Hansen 1990; Bangert-Drowns 1988; Bruvold and Rundall 1987; Tobler 1986; Battjes 1985). Although each of these reviews provides a somewhat different scheme for classifying programs, prevention curricula generally fall into one of four major categories:

- *Cognitive strategies:* Designed to increase knowledge about the nature and effects of alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs.
- *Affective or intrapersonal strategies:* Designed to enhance personal growth through improved self-esteem, self-awareness, and/or values clarification without reference to drugs.

- *Social skills and influence strategies:* Designed to strengthen interpersonal skills and equip youth with the behavioral strategies needed to resist peer pressure to use drugs.
- *Comprehensive programs:* Designed to enhance cognitive, affective, and social skills through the provision of a comprehensive curriculum.

Beginning in the 1970s, school-based programs emphasized cognitive and information strategies—approaches that have since been largely discredited in the evaluation literature. The evidence suggests that although such programs tend to increase students' knowledge of drugs, they are unlikely to engender positive changes in attitudes or behaviors. In fact, researchers have found that these approaches, by themselves, can lead to undesirable changes in attitudes (Bruvold and Rundall 1988) and even increased drug use (Howard et al. 1988), which may indicate that students become more sophisticated consumers as a result of these information-focused curricula.

Even the affective strategies have not performed well in previous evaluations. Hansen, Johnson, Flay, Graham, and Sobel (1988) found that students who received an affective education program reported significantly more drug use than students in the control group, and these differences increased over time. Although psychological factors may contribute to drug abuse (Shedler and Block 1990), the affective interventions to correct these psychological states have not fared well (Tobler 1986).

What currently is considered to be the most promising approach is based on the social skills/social influence model. Programs designed to help youth recognize and respond appropriately to peer pressures have shown some positive effects for preventing drug abuse (Botvin 1990; Clayton, Cattarello, Day, and Walden 1991; Flay 1985; Tobler 1986). Based on the notion that youth use drugs for social reasons, these programs are derived from interventions targeting

132 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Table 1 DARE Curriculum

<i>Session</i>	<i>Topic</i>	<i>Description</i>
1	First Visit/Personal Safety	Introduction of DARE and law enforcement officer safety practices; discussion of personal rights
2	Drug Use and Misuse	Harmful effects from misuse of drugs
3	Consequences	Consequences of using and choosing not to use alcohol, marijuana, and other drugs
4	Resisting Pressures	Sources of pressure, types of pressure to use drugs
5	Resistance Techniques	Refusal strategies for different types of peer pressure
6	Building Self-Esteem	Identifying positive qualities in oneself; giving/receiving compliments, importance of self-image
7	Assertiveness	Personal rights/responsibilities discussion; situations calling for assertiveness skills
8	Managing Stress Without Drugs	Identification of sources of stress; when stress can be helpful or harmful; ways to manage stress; deep breathing exercise
9	Media Influences	Media influences on behavior; advertising techniques
10	Decision Making and Risk Taking	Risk-taking behaviors; reasonable and harmful risks; consequences of various choices; influences on decisions
11	Drug Use Alternatives	Reasons for using drugs; alternative activities
12	Role Modeling	Meet older student leaders/role models who do not use drugs
13	Forming Support Systems	Types of support groups; barriers to friendships; suggestions for barriers to forming friendships
14	Ways to Deal with Gang Pressures	Types of gang pressure; how gangs differ from groups; consequences of gang activity
15	DARE Summary	DARE review
16	Taking a Stand	Taking appropriate stand when pressured to use drugs
17	DARE Culmination	Award assembly; recognition of participants

cigarette smoking (Flay, D'Avernas, Best, Kersall, and Ryan 1983) and give special attention to the recognition of social norms and the development of social skills (Hansen 1990). The use of role playing to model social skills, especially resistance to peer pressure, is based on Bandura's (1977a, 1977b) social learning theory. Students

are taught to recognize peer pressure, to resist it, and to gain confidence from knowing that others have been successful in using these skills.

As Botvin (1990) notes, a variety of strategies can be characterized as part of this psychosocial approach, but they generally fall into three categories: psychological inoculation, resistance skills

training, and personal and social skills training. DARE is often considered a psychosocial approach because of its emphasis on resistance skills, but it also includes a cognitive component (e.g., information on drug use, misuse, and consequences; media influences, drug use alternatives) and an affective or intrapersonal component (e.g., self-esteem building, managing stress, decision making, and role modeling). Thus, the DARE curriculum can be distinguished from many drug education programs because of its comprehensive nature.

Previous evaluations have documented the positive effects of programs that emphasize social skills and behavioral strategies for coping with peer pressure. Hansen and his colleagues (1988) report significant delays in the onset of tobacco, alcohol, and marijuana use among students exposed to Project SMART, and Ellickson and Bell (1990) report reductions in the use of cigarettes and marijuana among students exposed to Project ALERT. However, in the latter case, the program had a boomerang effect on confirmed cigarette smokers and gains in alcohol use disappeared within 12 months. Despite a few examples of success, doubts remain about the strength and duration of these effects and about whether refusal skills are the key to drug prevention (cf. Moskowitz 1989).

In sum, although positive findings have been reported in some evaluations, taken as a whole, the literature leaves considerable doubt regarding the effectiveness of school-based drug prevention initiatives. Many researchers have expressed skepticism about program effectiveness, arguing that long-term reductions in drug use have yet to be demonstrated (e.g., Botvin 1986; Bruvold and Rundall 1988; Howard et al. 1988; Moskowitz 1989).

Prior DARE evaluations. There have been several evaluations of the DARE program, and the scientific rigor of these assessments varies considerably. The most widely publicized evaluation has yielded the most favorable results (DeJong 1987). The findings suggest that DARE in Los Angeles produced significant short-term reductions in

students' use of alcohol, cigarettes, and other drugs, despite having no effects on their knowledge or attitudes about drugs. The methodological shortcomings of this evaluation, however, were substantial and included the absence of a pretest and nonrandom assignment to experimental conditions.

This problem underscores the difficulty of reviewing the literature on DARE evaluations. The sizable variation in methodological rigor, if not recognized, can lead to false conclusions about the effectiveness of this drug education program. A number of evaluations have sought to estimate the impact of DARE on fifth- and sixth-grade students (e.g. Agopian and Becker 1990; Aniskiewicz and Wysong 1987; Clayton, Cattarello, Day, and Walden 1991; DeJong 1987; Evaluation and Training Institute 1990; Faine and Bohlander 1988, 1989; Manos, Kameoka, and Tanji 1986; Nyre 1985, 1986; Ringwalt, Ennett, and Holt 1991; Walker 1990). Generally speaking, the methodological weaknesses have been substantial and include the use of nonrandomized designs, the absence of pretest measurement, small sample sizes, unreliable measurement, and a lack of statistical controls in the analysis (for a discussion of these problems in drug education research, see Ellickson and Bell 1992 and Moskowitz 1989). Only two previous DARE evaluations have addressed the most common and critical threats to validity (cf. Cook and Campbell 1979), and this has been achieved primarily through the use of randomized experimental designs. The results of these studies are summarized below.

Ringwalt et al. (1991) conducted a randomized experiment in 20 schools in North Carolina and found that DARE had significant effects in the desired direction on general attitudes toward drugs, attitudes toward specific drugs, awareness of media influences regarding drug use, assertiveness, perceptions of peer attitudes about using drugs, and the perceived costs of drug use. DARE had no significant impact, however, on drug use, intentions to use drugs, perceived benefits of drug use, or self-esteem. In this study,

134 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

measurement was taken immediately after students completed the 17-week DARE program, and hence, the persistence of these observed effects beyond this time period is unknown.

Clayton, Catterello, and Walden (1991) employed a randomized experiment in 31 schools to initiate a 5-year longitudinal evaluation of DARE in Lexington, Kentucky. Results from the immediate posttest showed desirable effects on general drug attitudes, attitudes toward specific drugs, and perceived popularity. No significant differences were found for drug use, resistance to peer pressure, and self-esteem. A follow-up was conducted after 1 and 2 years (Clayton, Catterello, and Walden 1991). After 1 year, students exposed to DARE reported significantly less use of marijuana than the control group, but this effect disappeared by the second year. Also, the initial attitudinal effects were apparently lost after 1 year because they were not reported. Some of these null results may be due to the fact that the control group was exposed to a standard health curriculum that included a unit on drug use.

To summarize, there have been few rigorous evaluations of DARE, and the best studies have left important questions unanswered. The consistent findings suggest that DARE has an immediate impact in the expected direction on general and specific attitudes toward drugs, but beyond this, the short-term results are inconsistent. Furthermore, program effects that extend beyond the immediate postintervention measurement period remain uncertain. In the one longitudinal study that employed random assignment to experimental conditions, the control group was contaminated to some degree by a standardized drug education program in the second year.

The present DARE evaluation. The present evaluation was designed to overcome some of the main shortcomings of previous evaluations of school-based drug education programs in general and DARE in particular. To accomplish this, the evaluation used a randomized longitudinal design for most of the sample, measures having known psychometric properties, and procedures

that would ensure a high retention rate and high-quality data in the second year.

The selection of the knowledge, attitudinal, and behavioral outcome measures for this impact evaluation was derived from the general objectives of the DARE program and prior theories of drug prevention. Through the use of cognitive, affective, and social skills strategies, DARE was hypothesized to increase students' awareness of influence attempts by peers and the media, correct misperceptions about drug use norms, increase awareness of the adverse consequences of drug use, strengthen negative attitudes about drug use, build students' self-esteem, improve their decision making and assertiveness in social settings, and strengthen their ability to resist peer pressure to use drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes. By influencing these intervening variables, the assumption is that the use of alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs will be, in turn, prevented or reduced. Thus, by testing the impact of DARE on these mediating variables, this research offers some feedback about the efficacy of this highly standardized intervention for affecting key psychological and social processes considered theoretically important for the prevention of drug use. As a secondary objective, DARE was expected to produce more positive attitudes about police officers among fifth and sixth graders—a consequence that may have larger benefits for police-community relations in the future.

By evaluating the effects of DARE, this research also represents a test of the comprehensive model of drug prevention as articulated by Hansen (1990) and Botvin (1990). These authors suggest that a combination of approaches to drug education is often more effective than any individual approach. As noted earlier, the DARE curriculum is an excellent example of the comprehensive model and is based on the multifaceted theory-based SMART curriculum (see DeJong 1987). DARE would seem to be a good opportunity to test this model because of the breadth of the curriculum and the integrity of its implementation. Unlike most other drug prevention programs, instructors receive a highly standardized training

program, the DARE curriculum is believed to be administered in a highly consistent manner across sites, and the performance of DARE instructors is monitored and evaluated.

However, testing a comprehensive program is problematical for evaluation research and theory assessment. When effects are observed, they suggest support for the overall model, but researchers are hard-pressed to isolate specific causal factors involved because of “multiple treatment interference” (Cook and Campbell 1979). Greater theoretical precision is often desirable. Although the various components of the DARE curriculum are based in theory, the objective of this study is not to test specific theories regarding the causes and prevention of adolescent substance use. Rather, this study evaluates the impact of a standardized and widely disseminated application of several theoretical perspectives. Because measures were employed that tap constructs specific to certain theoretical positions, the study does provide a means of assessing discrete components of the DARE program. For example, assertiveness and the ability to resist peer pressure are measurable objectives of the social skills component, enhanced self-esteem is a goal of the affective education component, and knowledge regarding the consequences of drug use is an important aim of the cognitive skills component. To the extent that change is registered on any one of these variables, it suggests that the corresponding curriculum lessons may have been responsible for this effect, and it provides the opportunity to determine whether drug use is consequently reduced in connection with this change.

Methodology

Research Design

This DARE evaluation was designed as a randomized field experiment with one pretest and multiple planned posttests. Eighteen pairs of elementary schools were identified that were

representative of urban, suburban, and rural areas in the northern half of the state of Illinois. Schools were matched in each pair by school type, ethnic composition, number of students with limited English proficiency, and the percent of students in that school from low income families.² None of the selected schools had previously received DARE. Twelve pairs of schools (six urban and six suburban) that matched exceptionally well were selected from a larger group of schools that had expressed a willingness to participate in the trial. For each of these 12 pairs, one school was randomly assigned to receive DARE in the spring of 1990 while the other served as a control.³ In each of the remaining six pairs, all of which serve rural communities, a nonrandom assignment process was required because of substantial travel times in the very large geographic areas served by the DARE officers. Schools were selected from areas in which DARE officers were assigned, and comparison schools were then selected from nearby counties. Comparison schools were selected if they were a good match to DARE schools on ethnic composition, percent of students with limited English, and percent of students from low income families.

Recruitment of Schools and Students

Thirty-six schools were recruited for participation in the DARE evaluation in the fall of 1990. Schools in the experimental condition were offered the DARE program, whereas control schools were offered a financial incentive to participate. In each school, eligible students were those in their final year of elementary school (either fifth or sixth grade), and all classrooms at that level were included. Passive consent forms were mailed to parents requesting their child's participation. The letter informed parents of the purpose and content of the project, stressed the confidentiality of the information to be collected,⁴ and invited parents to return the form in a stamped envelope if they did not wish their child to participate. Parents declined such permission in 2.7% of the cases.

136 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

In the second year, when students had left these elementary schools and entered approximately 150 middle schools, the recruitment process was repeated in order to track participating students. Cooperation was obtained through letters and telephone calls to all school superintendents and principals. Financial inducement to participate in the evaluation was offered to middle schools with a substantial number of students from the study.

Data Collection

The initial student questionnaire was administered to intact classrooms during the month of February 1991, immediately prior to DARE's implementation. The evaluation staff instructed students to write their name and address on the cover sheet of the questionnaire. Questionnaires were precoded with identification numbers and student names so that each student's pretest and posttest responses could be matched. Staff were careful to inform students that answers would be kept confidential and would never be shown to then-teachers, parents, police, or anyone else. Students were instructed to detach the cover sheet and pass it to the front of the room where project staff sealed them in an envelope, thus providing additional visual assurances to students of the confidentiality of their responses. The only remaining identifying information on the body of the instrument was the same precoded identification number as that which appeared on the cover sheet.

The research staff attended a training session to ensure that the data collection procedures remained consistent over time and across surveyors. The instrument was self-administered and took approximately 35 minutes to complete. Staff remained at the front of the room to avoid influencing student responses to sensitive questions.

Questionnaires for students who were absent were given to school counselors with the request to administer the survey within the next several days.

Extensive procedures were employed to protect the confidentiality of data received from

these absentee respondents. For those missing, letters were sent to transfer schools asking administrators to verify enrollment of the students in question. Additional tracking methods included contact with a wide variety of persons and agencies, such as truant officers, school counselors, former classroom teachers, and postal inspectors. The tracking efforts generated an additional 226 surveys.

Characteristics of the Sample and Attrition Analysis

The analysis sample consisted of students surveyed both at the pretest and again during the following school year. The characteristics of this longitudinal sample are presented in Table 2. Pretest differences between the DARE and control students on background sociodemographic characteristics were small and in most cases not significant. Furthermore, there were no significant pretest differences between the DARE and control students on any of the drug use measures.

Of the 1,800 students surveyed at the pretest, 1,584 (88%) were surveyed again in the second year; the study thus experienced only 12% attrition between the two waves. Most of the attrition in the second year was due to three factors: students transferring to unknown locations outside the state, chronic absenteeism, and (to a lesser extent) refusals to participate.

To assess the impact of attrition on the results presented in this article, variables used in subsequent analyses were used to predict attrition in logistic regression models. Students who were lost to the study were coded one (1) on the dependent measure of attrition. Results of the regression reported in Table 3 show that only metropolitan status had a statistically significant effect on study attrition. More specifically, urban students were about three times more likely than rural students to be lost to the study. However, any bias in the estimates of DARE effects due to this condition are likely to be slight because of the relatively low levels of attrition even among urban students and the fact that attrition was not significantly different between the two experimental conditions.

Table 2 Characteristics of the Longitudinal Sample ($N = 1,584$)

<i>Characteristics</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Characteristics</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
<i>Sex</i>		<i>Population Density</i>	
Male	50.3	Urban	39.1
Female	49.7	Suburban	35.8
<i>Race/Ethnicity</i>		Rural	25.1
White	49.9	<i>Exposure to DARE</i>	
African American	24.7	DARE	54.2
Hispanic	8.9	No DARE	45.8
Other ^a	16.5	<i>Lifetime Alcohol Use at Wave 1</i>	
<i>Grade at Wave 1</i>		Used	55.1
Fifth	33.5	Never used	44.9
Sixth	66.5	<i>Lifetime Cigarette Use at Wave 1</i>	
<i>Family Composition</i>		Used	20.2
Both parents	64.7	Never used	79.8
Other	35.3		

a. This category includes a significant number of African American students who were self-defined as "other."

Furthermore, any program effects that vary across metropolitan status will be reported separately for each category.

Description of Student Instrument

The impact of DARE was assessed using multiple outcome measures. Whenever possible, the reliability and validity of measurement was enhanced by using standardized scales and indices from previous research. The following constructs were measured.

Use of substances. Students were asked two sets of questions about their use of various drugs, including tobacco, alcohol, and other substances. The format for these questions was originally devised by Moskowitz, Schaeffer, Condon, Schaps, and Malvin (1981) for their Drug and Alcohol Survey. Students indicated whether they had used these substances in "their whole life" and "during the last month (30 days)." Summary

measures were constructed by combining responses to items regarding beer, wine, wine coolers, and hard liquor. These measures were used to calculate three dependent variables measuring changes in use status between waves for both alcohol and cigarette use. The three types of changes in drug use are (1) initiation, (2) increase in use, and (3) cessation (see Analysis Strategy for computations).

School performance. Measures of school performance and behavior included self-reported grades, number of times students reported being in trouble at school, and the number of times they reported skipping class. Self-reported grades ranged from 1 (less than Ds) to 8 (mostly As). Earlier analyses of these data indicated that the self-reported measure is acceptably valid (i.e., the correlation coefficient between self-reported grades and official grades abstracted from school records was 0.60). The number of times in trouble and the number of times skipped classes were skewed; therefore, the

138 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Table 3 Logistic Regression Model Predicting Study Attrition

<i>Predictor Variables^a</i>	<i>Odds Ratio Predicting Attrition</i>
<i>Sex</i>	
Female	1.00
Male	1.33
<i>Race/Ethnicity</i>	
White	1.00
African American	1.26
Hispanic	0.81
Other	0.82
<i>Grade at Wave 1</i>	
Fifth	1.00
Sixth	0.79
<i>Family Composition</i>	
Both parents	1.00
Other	1.08
<i>Metropolitan Status</i>	
Urban	1.00
Suburban	0.86
Rural	0.32***
<i>Exposure to DARE</i>	
No DARE	1.00
DARE	0.93
<i>Lifetime Alcohol Use at Wave 1</i>	
Never used	1.00
Used	1.02
<i>Lifetime Cigarette Use at Wave 1</i>	
Never used	1.00
Used	1.19
(N)	(1,698)

a. For each predictor, the first subgroup is the reference group to which the other subgroups are compared.

*** $p < .001$

natural log transformations of these variables were used for statistical analysis.

General attitudes toward drugs. Students indicated their level of agreement with five statements concerning drug use, which Moskowitz and associates (1981) originally developed for the Drug and Alcohol Survey. After reversing the scores of positively worded items, a five-item scale was computed by summing student responses (Alpha = .87).

Attitudes toward the use of specific drugs. These questions, also extracted from the Drug and Alcohol Survey, assess attitudes toward specific types of alcohol that youth are most likely to use. As with the index of 30-day alcohol use, responses to questions concerning their attitudes toward beer, wine coolers, and wine were summed (Alpha = .85).

Perceived benefits and costs of using drugs. Students were asked questions about the perceived benefits as well as the perceived costs of smoking cigarettes and drinking beer and wine coolers (Moskowitz et al. 1981). By adding student responses, four indices were created to assess the perceived costs and benefits of using cigarettes and alcohol (Alpha = .86, .92, .90, .92).

Perceived peer attitudes toward and use of substances. Answering questions derived from the Drug and Alcohol Survey (Moskowitz et al. 1981), students reported their perceptions concerning what most students in their class thought about using a variety of substances. Students' beliefs concerning their peers' use of cigarettes, alcohol (i.e., beer, wine, and wine coolers), and marijuana were measured with questions adapted from the University of Southern California Student Survey (Graham et al. 1984). Responses were then summed to create a three-item perceived peer attitudes index (Alpha = .82).

Perceptions of the media's influences on smoking and beer drinking. Two measures were employed to assess whether students recognized commercial

media attempts to make beer drinking and cigarette smoking look attractive (Bauman 1985). Students reported what they thought the media made beer drinking and cigarette smoking "look like"—a "good" thing to do, a "bad" thing to do, both, or neither (Alphas = .67 and .73).

Self-esteem. This construct was measured by combining seven items extracted from Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem scale, which was developed for use with adolescents. Questions were modified slightly to make the language more appropriate for contemporary sixth and seventh graders. (Alpha = .78).

Assertiveness. Students responded to an abbreviated four-item version of the Children's Assertive Behavior Scale (Michelson and Wood 1982), which was developed for use with children in the fourth through sixth grades. Response options vary with each question and reflect varying levels of assertiveness. A total assertiveness index was calculated following the authors' scoring instructions (Alpha = .78).

Attitudes toward police. Students rated nine items extracted from the Attitudes Toward Police scale developed by Faine and Bohlander (1989). The items were then summed (Alpha = .82).

Peer resistance skills. Students responded to four hypothetical situations in which either their best friend or an acquaintance offered them either cigarettes or alcohol (Hansen 1990). They then rated their ability to "say no" on a 4-point scale ranging from "not sure at all" to "very sure." The four items were summed (Alpha = .87).

Analysis Strategy

The assessment of DARE's impact on drug use was limited to alcohol and cigarettes because the prevalence of use for other substances was too low (1–3% lifetime use) to support definitive analysis. The outcome measures for alcohol and cigarette use were indicators of initiation, increased use, and quitting between the pretest

140 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

and the follow-up. Students who had *initiated use* were those who reported no lifetime use at the pretest but did report lifetime use during the second year; they were compared to students who reported no lifetime use at both waves. Students were considered to have *increased their use* of alcohol and cigarettes if they reported no current use (i.e., use in the past 30 days) at the pretest but did report such use during the second year; they were compared to students who reported no current use at both waves. Students who *ceased or quit their use* of alcohol and cigarettes were those who reported current use at the pretest and no current use during the second year; they were compared to students who reported current use at both waves. The measures for initiation, increased use, and quitting were constructed as dummy-coded variables. Thus, initiation was coded 1, and continued abstinence was coded 0; increased use was coded 1, and continued nonuse on a current basis was coded 0; and quitting use since the pretest was coded 1, and continued use from the pretest to the second year was coded 0. Note that the samples for the analyses of increased use and quitting were mutually exclusive. The sample for the initiation analyses was a subset of the sample used to assess increased use.

The first set of analyses examined the main effect of DARE on each of the six dependent variables defined above. Because the research design did not completely control for pretest differences at the individual level, a multiple regression approach was employed to control for possible differences on the following antecedent covariates: race/ethnicity, sex, year in school, family structure, and metropolitan status (urban, suburban, or rural). These variables were selected either because of their established link to drug use in prior research or because of their importance to the sampling design.

Multiple logistic regression analysis was used to assess the effect of DARE exposure on the initiation, increased use, and cessation of alcohol and cigarettes. The effects of DARE on the drug use measures are expressed in terms of adjusted odds ratios, which reflect the likelihood of a given behavior among students exposed to DARE

relative to that for the nonexposed students, controlling for the other variables in the model. Thus, for models predicting initiation or continued use, odds ratios of less than 1.0 represent a beneficial program effect whereas odds greater than 1.0 represent a detrimental effect. For measures predicting cessation, a beneficial effect is indicated by an odds ratio greater than 1.0. Odds ratios for specific subgroups of students are interpreted in an identical manner.

The same analytic approach was also used to assess DARE impacts on hypothesized intervening variables and on school performance. However, because these measures were continuous rather than dichotomous, ordinary least squares regression was employed. DARE effects are expressed as unstandardized regression coefficients, which represent the mean difference in the values of the dependent measure between the DARE group and the control group, adjusted for other variables in the model. Attitude and belief measures were recoded as necessary so that higher values indicate more desirable outcomes.

Additional post hoc analyses went beyond the question of whether DARE had a main effect on measured outcomes and focused instead on whether DARE might have different effects across sociodemographic subgroups. For each dependent variable an expanded model was assessed that included interaction terms for DARE by a dichotomous indicator of each sociodemographic control variable. Because nonsignificant interaction terms unduly complicate the interpretation of the models and may be due to chance rather than true subgroup variations in DARE effects, they were subjected to a backwards selection procedure. Thus, only interaction terms that were significant at the $p < .05$ level were retained in each model. Significant interaction terms indicate that DARE had differential impacts on outcome measures with respect to the categories of the interacting variables.

Most published evaluations of school-based programs use the individual as the unit of analysis and treat exposure/nonexposure to the program as the key independent variable of interest. Typically, however, schools rather than individuals are

assigned to the experimental conditions. Failure to account for the nesting of individuals within experimental units will generally lead to an overestimation of the statistical significance of treatment effects. Methodologists now argue that the proper strategy for assessing treatment effects in this type of design is a nested (or hierarchical) analysis procedure that adjusts for the intraclass correlations within schools. (Murray and Hannon 1990; Hedeker and Gibbons forthcoming; Hedeker, Gibbons, and Davis 1991). Analyses for both logistic and linear regression models were conducted using SUDAAN (Survey Data Analysis software [Shah, Barnwell, Hunt, and Lavange 1992]), which was specifically developed to accommodate designs with nested error structures.

Results

Effects of DARE on Alcohol and Cigarette Use

Odds ratios showing the effects of DARE on alcohol and cigarette use measures are presented in Table 4. Results of the logistic regression models show that DARE exposure had no statistically significant main effects on the initiation of alcohol or cigarettes, increased use of the substances, or quitting behavior. All odds ratios were relatively close to 1. However, it is noteworthy that

five of the six effects were in the direction favorable to DARE. The only outcome measure not suggestive of a favorable DARE effect was increased use of alcohol.

Effects of DARE on Attitudes and Beliefs

To determine the effects of DARE on attitudes and beliefs, linear regression models—incorporating a nested design structure—were analyzed using the second-year scale measures as dependent variables. Results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 5. The findings indicate that the only statistically significant main effect of DARE was on perceived media influences regarding the portrayal of beer drinking. That is, students exposed to DARE were significantly more likely than students in the control group to recognize the media's portrayal of beer drinking as desirable. Although no other effects were statistically significant, the differences were in the direction favorable to DARE for 10 of the 13 measures examined.

Effects of DARE on School Performance and Behavior

To determine the effects of DARE on school performance and behavior, linear regression models were tested in which school grades, number of times in trouble at school, and number of times skipped class were dependent variables. As the

Table 4 Logistic Regression Models Testing the Effects of DARE on Alcohol and Cigarette Use

<i>Outcome Measures</i>	<i>Odds Ratio^a</i>	(n)
Alcohol initiation	.93	673
Cigarette initiation	.89	1,181
Alcohol increase	1.27	1,092
Cigarette increase	.93	1,331
Alcohol quitting	1.13	372
Cigarette quitting	1.33	117

a. All main effects of DARE were nonsignificant at the $p < .05$ level.

142 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Table 5 Linear Regression Models Testing the Effects of DARE on Attitudes and Beliefs

<i>Outcome Measures</i>	<i>Coefficients</i>	(n)
General attitudes toward drugs	.01	1,521
Attitudes toward alcohol	.03	1,521
Perceived benefits of using alcohol	.01	1,524
Perceived benefits of using cigarettes	-.01	1,519
Perceived costs of using alcohol	-.01	1,525
Perceived costs of using cigarettes	.02	1,517
Perceived peer attitudes toward alcohol	.04	1,500
Perceived media influence (beer)	.05*	1,513
Perceived media influence (cigarettes)	.03	1,515
Self-esteem	.03	1,518
Assertiveness	-.01	1,502
Resistance to peer pressure	.03	1,509
Attitudes toward police	.01	1,519

* $p < .05$

results in Table 6 indicate, DARE had no statistically significant main effects on any of the school performance and behavior measures.

Subgroup Effects of DARE

Post hoc analyses revealed several significant interactions between DARE and various sociodemographic characteristics. These interactions suggested a positive impact of DARE for some subgroups and a negative impact for others. Consequently, the overall or average effect of DARE across subgroups where significant interactions

occurred was typically small and nonsignificant. Results of the subgroup analyses, based on the regression models that included interaction terms for DARE by background characteristics, are presented in Table 7. Only interaction effects that were statistically significant at the .05 level are reported in the table.

One noteworthy finding is that DARE appears to have different effects on the cessation of alcohol for different gender groups. Specifically, females exposed to DARE were twice as likely as females without DARE to cease their use of alcohol. Males exposed to DARE, however,

Table 6 Linear Regression Models Testing the Effects of DARE on School Performance and Behavior

<i>Outcome Measures</i>	<i>Coefficients^a</i>	(n)
Grades	-.08	1,468
Number of times in trouble at school	.03	1,393
Number of times skipped school	.01	1,477

a. All main effects of DARE were nonsignificant at the $p < .05$ level.

Table 7 Subgroup Analyses of DARE Effects

<i>Outcome Measures</i>	<i>Subgroup</i>	<i>Parameter Estimates^a</i>
Alcohol quitting	Males	.69
	Females	2.10
Perceived benefits of using cigarettes	Hispanic	.16
	Non-Hispanic	-.03
Perceived costs of using alcohol	"Other" race	-.18
	White/African American/Hispanic	.02
Perceived peer attitudes toward alcohol	Intact family	.11
	Non-intact family	-.08
Perceived media influence (beer)	Urban	.13
	Rural/suburban	.01
Perceived media influence (cigarettes)	Urban	.11
	Rural/suburban	-.02
Self-esteem	Intact family	-.01
	Non-intact family	.11

NOTE: Only statistically significant ($p < .05$) interactions are reported. Variables considered for the subgroup analyses were race/ethnicity, gender, year in school, family structure, and metropolitan status.

a. Indicates adjusted odds ratios for alcohol quitting measure and multiple regression coefficients for all other outcome measures.

were less likely than males without DARE to quit using alcohol. Thus, relative to the control condition, DARE appears to encourage females to quit using alcohol but to have the opposite effect for males. DARE also appears to have been more successful with urban (than rural or suburban) students in terms of increasing their understanding of media influences regarding beer and cigarettes. The program also appears to have had a more favorable impact on Hispanics with regard to perceiving fewer benefits of smoking than other racial/ethnic groups.

Discussion

Contrary to popular belief and theory-based prediction, the DARE program had no statistically

significant overall impacts on students' use of alcohol or cigarettes by the spring of the following school year (i.e., approximately 1 year after the completion of the DARE program). Furthermore, only 1 of the 13 intervening attitudinal/cognitive variables showed a significant program effect.

Several competing explanations may be offered for the failure of this evaluation to generate firm support for the DARE program or the comprehensive model of drug education. One concern commonly voiced relates to the potential inadequacy of measures used to assess study constructs. In this study we employed established measures with documented reliability and internal consistency. Although construct validity is more difficult to demonstrate (see Nunnally 1978), the items used to assess behavioral outcomes measures were similar in content and

144 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

format to those used in the major national surveys on youth substance abuse (SAMHSA 1993; Johnston et al. 1991). Youth self-reports of alcohol and drug use have generally been shown to have high levels of reliability and validity (Barnea, Rahav, and Teichman 1987; Martin and Newman 1988; Nurco 1985), but the possibility of biased or inaccurate self-reporting should not be entirely discounted (Bailey, Flewelling, and Rachal 1992; Mensch and Kandel 1988) and could be, in part, responsible for biasing the results in favor of the null hypothesis. Unfortunately, biochemical measurement or validation of self-report measures is rarely a viable option for school-based prevention programs.

A second putative reason for the failure of this evaluation to yield significant positive results may be a function of insufficient power to detect small differences. Although the number of youths participating in the evaluation is substantial, the behaviors measured are relatively rare, and thus the opportunity to detect a statistically significant impact of DARE is less than if the behavioral outcomes were more prevalent. The rationale for administering DARE in the final grade of elementary school is that youth at that age have not yet begun to experiment with drugs, so that strategic preventive measures will have the greatest impact. Following this logic, the effects of DARE should become more detectable over time as the prevalence of drug use increases.

Empirical evidence, however, suggests that just the opposite is true; any immediate positive impacts of drug prevention education tend to become less discernible over time (Battjes 1985). Based on our prior analysis of immediate follow-up data, this appears to be true for the DARE program as well, as several immediate effects on attitudes and perceptions were observed (Ringwalt, Curtin, and Rosenbaum 1990). This effect may be due in part to the prevalence of other drug education programs to which youth are exposed. This evaluation faced the difficulty of detecting and measuring the effects of one of many complementary signals. Fortunately, the DARE curriculum is delivered in a unique fashion, and our survey data from school teachers

suggest that it is considerably more intensive than most other school-based programs. Nevertheless, it is possible that chances for observable programmatic impacts of DARE could be enhanced if the program was extended to include middle school grades. Other studies have supported the potential efficacy of booster sessions in years following the initial program (Ellickson and Bell 1990). DARE booster curricula have been implemented in some middle schools and high schools (none in the current study), but their impact has yet to be formally assessed.

Although the results do not demonstrate the superiority of DARE over other drug education programs already in place at the control schools, five of the six behavioral outcome measures were indicative of a positive impact of DARE, despite being nonsignificant. Similarly, the direction of the effect of DARE was positive for 10 of the 13 intervening variables examined. In an era of many both complementary and competing messages about drug use prevention, it is possible that no single prevention program will produce dramatic effects on preventing or reducing drug use.

Aside from methodological considerations, a third potential explanation of the null findings focuses on the nature of the comprehensive model and its ability to withstand empirical scrutiny. Although researchers and policymakers have encouraged this approach with the argument that it will maximize the chances of program impact (despite the difficulties that it creates for theory testing), DARE may be an example of how this approach can undermine itself. Almost by definition, a comprehensive curriculum focuses on breadth of coverage rather than depth. By giving limited attention to any one theoretical perspective, this curriculum may have lowered the chances that any one component will be strong enough to change students' attitudes or behavior. The social skills model received the most attention in the program (and showed no effects on skills-related outcomes), but even here, only a few lesson plans were devoted to this approach. The fundamental assumption of the comprehensive model is that the different approaches somehow work together,

in a synergistic manner, to strengthen program impact. This assumption is certainly challenged by the present findings.

Although several significant interactions were identified between exposure to DARE and various social and demographic characteristics, it is prudent to exercise caution in interpreting such results. Given the number of statistical tests performed, the subgroup differences reported here should be considered exploratory and the programmatic implications of such effects should await confirmation by future research (cf. Friedman, Furberg, and DeMets 1985). Nevertheless, the gender difference in cigarette cessation may indicate that girls are more receptive to DARE than boys, but more research in this area is needed. A few positive gains for urban and Hispanic students, although limited, are encouraging. Evaluations of community-based prevention programs typically show the least success in reaching inner-city populations (Skogan 1990), who are at highest risk of arrest for drug offenses and other crimes (Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy 1990; Sullivan 1990). In any event, previous evaluations have tended to report that drug education programs either work or don't work and pay little attention to the conditions under which these programs yield positive or negative results (MacKinnon, Weber, and Pentz 1989). This concern may be especially relevant to DARE because of its highly standardized curricula and the uniform manner in which the program is presented.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The results of this study suggest both a number of topics for future research and implications for the DARE program. First, the study provides relatively little empirical support for the comprehensive model of school-based drug education, of which DARE is a prime exemplar. This broad-based smorgasbord approach may water down rather than enhance alternative influence strategies. In particular, previous studies and reviews suggest that social skills approaches have exhibited the greatest potential for preventing adolescent drug use. Although the DARE curriculum

emphasizes the acquisition of both general and specific skills required to resist inducements to use drugs, the efficacy of this strategy within the context of a comprehensive curriculum such as DARE remains to be demonstrated.

Second, the results of this study serve as a reminder to researchers and program advocates alike that positive outcomes are not guaranteed simply because a program is prosocial in nature and widely supported. In the case of DARE, the goal of preventing drug and alcohol use is highly laudable, the program itself is distinctive, and the investment of resources comes from the good intentions of so many individuals. Nevertheless, the present evaluation reminds us that measurable impacts of even very popular programs are sometimes difficult to attain and may vary across subgroups of the target population.

Third, the results of this evaluation, taken in conjunction with others relating both to DARE and other drug education programs, clearly suggest the need to review the various lessons that constitute the DARE curriculum. Although the curriculum does address some important causal or protective factors with regard to drug use, such as peer influence, resistance skills, and personal control, considerable time is spent on other issues that are not directly related to preventing substance use.⁵ We recognize that some of these may represent important educational objectives by themselves (e.g., self-esteem building). On the other hand, we believe that it would be productive to give more attention to factors known to be powerful in predicting drug use. For example, attention should be given to changing what are often students' inaccurate perceptions concerning the extent to which drugs are both used and sanctioned by peers. This normative approach has been suggested by drug prevention researchers (Hansen et al. 1988; Moskowitz 1989). Generally speaking, if drug prevention programs (and school policies) would devote more resources to other known protective factors evident from current theory and research on delinquency and drug use (see Hawkins, Catalano, and Miller 1992), this should increase the probability of program impact. Concentrating on a few protective

146 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

factors may yield greater benefits than giving insufficient attention to a wide range of factors, unless theory can provide guidance regarding interactive effects in the latter case.

At this stage, there is a need for more research on the processes involved in the delivery of school-based drug education programs. In addition to the messages that are being communicated, little is known about the impact of differences in teacher characteristics, teaching style, characteristics of the student population, or the educational environment. There is some debate, for example, about whether DARE is sufficiently interactive and involves peers enough in the curriculum compared to other social influence programs. In any event, most teachers would agree that the method of teaching is often as important as the content.

The inability to demonstrate significant impacts of school-based drug prevention programs on drug use behaviors has been the rule, rather than the exception, among carefully controlled evaluation studies (Bangert-Drowns 1988). The lack of demonstrable results for specific school-based programs contrasts with the dramatic declines over the past 13 years in the overall prevalence of drug use, especially illicit drugs, among the school-age population. Thus, we are faced with the question of whether factors other than school-based education are primarily responsible for the observed trend, or if our evaluations of school-based programs are simply not sensitive enough to detect the relative effectiveness of individual programs.

Although comparative reviews of school-based drug education programs suggest that programs based on the psychosocial model and which focus on social skills have shown some positive results, it seems unlikely that this select and relatively new subset of programs could be largely responsible for the recent declines in adolescent drug use. If Johnston et al. (1991) are correct in arguing that these declines are a result of greater awareness of the health risks of drug use, less social acceptance of drug use, and the greater credibility with which such messages are presented, then the overall lack of demonstrable

impacts for specific programs relative to standard comparisons may not be so surprising. Most drug education programs present information on the health risks of drug use (Tobler 1986). These messages are amplified through many additional sources, including the media, parents, family members, and peers, and indeed seem to reflect a general societal change not limited to youth alone (SAMHSA 1993). Apparently we, as a society, are doing something right in preventing drug abuse among youth, but the specific impact of school-based drug education is not clearly discernible.

Notes

1. Although no change was detected in use of illicit drugs by adults between 1990 and 1991, the downward trend among youth has continued.
2. Aggregate family income was estimated by the percent of students at that school who were eligible for the free or reduced price lunch program of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
3. Without the full cooperation of the Illinois State Police who run the program, this evaluation would not have been possible.
4. We have received a Confidentiality Certificate from the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), which provides broad legal protections against efforts to breach the confidentiality of our records.
5. The DARE curriculum has recently undergone a major review and revision in response to feedback from practitioners and evaluators. This new program will soon be implemented.

References

- Agopian, M. W. and H. K. Becker. 1990. *Evaluation of Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) in the Long Beach Unified School District: Final Report*. Long Beach: California State University, Criminal Justice Department.
- Aniskiewicz, R. E. and E. E. Wysong. 1987. *Project D.A.R.E. Evaluation Report: Kokomo Schools*. Kokomo: Indiana University at Kokomo, Department of Sociology.
- Bailey, S. L., R. L. Flewelling, and J. V. Rachal. 1992. "The Characterization of Inconsistencies in

- Self-Reports of Alcohol and Marijuana Use in a Longitudinal Study of Adolescents." *Journal of Studies on Alcohol* 53:636-47.
- Bandura, A. 1977a. *Social Learning Theory*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- . 1977b. "Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change." *Psychological Review* 84:191-215.
- Bangert-Drowns, R. L. 1988. "The Effects of School-Based Substance Abuse Education—A Meta-analysis." *Journal of Drug Education* 18:243-65.
- Barnea, Z., G. Rahav, and M. Teichman. 1987. "The Reliability and Consistency of Self-Reports on Substance Use in a Longitudinal Study." *British Journal of Addiction* 82:891-98.
- Battjes, R. J. 1985. "Prevention of Adolescent Drug Abuse." *International Journal of the Addictions* 20:1113-24.
- Bauman, K. 1985. "A Study of Cigarette Smoking Behavior Among Youth: Adolescent Questionnaire." Chapel Hill: Department of Maternal and Child Health, School of Public Health, University of North Carolina.
- Bezilla, R. and G. Gallup. 1990. "How Drugs Became the Public's Most Important Problem Facing the Country." Paper presented at the American Association for the Public Opinion Research, Lancaster, PA.
- Botvin, G. J. 1986. "Substance Abuse Prevention Research: Recent Developments and Future Directions." *Journal of School Health* 56:369-74.
- . 1990. "Substance Abuse Prevention: Theory, Practice, and Effectiveness." In *Drugs and Crime*, edited by M. Tonry and J. Q. Wilson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bruvold, W. H. and T. G. Rundall. 1988. "A Meta-analysis and Theoretical Review of School-Based Tobacco and Alcohol Intervention Programs." *Psychology and Health* 2:53-78.
- Clayton, R. R., A. Cattarello, L. E. Day, and K. P. Walden. 1991. "Persuasive Communication and Drug Abuse Prevention: An Evaluation of the D.A.R.E. Program." Pp. 295-313 in *Persuasive Communication and Drug Abuse Prevention*, edited by L. Donohew, H. Sypher, and W. Bukoski.
- Clayton, R. R., A. Cattarello, and K. P. Walden. 1991. "Sensation Seeking as a Potential Mediating Variable for School-Based Prevention Interventions: A Two-Year Follow-Up of DARE." *Journal of Health Communications* 3:229-39.
- Cook, R. F. and J. A. Roehl. 1993. "National Evaluation of the Community Partnership Program: Preliminary Findings." In *Drugs and the Community*, edited by R. Davis, A. J. Lurigio, and D. P. Rosenbaum. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas.
- Cook, T. D. and D. T. Campbell. 1979. *Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Davis, R., A. J. Lurigio, and D. P. Rosenbaum, eds. 1993. *Drugs and the Community*, Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas.
- DeJong, W. 1987. "A Short-Term Evaluation of D.A.R.E.: Preliminary Indications of Effectiveness." *Journal of Drug Education* 17:279-94.
- Donelson, A. C. 1988. "The Alcohol-Crash Problem." In *Social Control of the Drinking Driver*, edited by M. D. Laurence, J. R. Snortum, and F. E. Zimring. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ellickson, P. L. and R. M. Bell. 1990. "Drug Prevention in Junior High: A Multi-Site Longitudinal Test." *Science* 247:1299-1305.
- . 1992. "Challenges to Social Experiments: A Drug Prevention Example." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 29:72-101.
- Evaluation and Training Institute. 1990. *D.A.R.E. Evaluation Report for 1985-1989*. Los Angeles, CA: Author.
- Faine, J. R. and E. Bohlander. 1988. *Drug Abuse Resistance Education: An Assessment of the 1987-1988 Kentucky State Police D.A.R.E. Program*. Bowling Green: The Social Research Laboratory, Western Kentucky University.
- . 1989. *D.A.R.E. in Kentucky Schools 1988-1989: An Evaluation of the Drug Abuse Resistance Education Program*. Bowling Green: The Social Research Laboratory, Western Kentucky University.
- Flay, B. R. 1985. "Psychosocial Approaches to Smoking Prevention: A Review of Findings." *Health Psychology* 4:449-88.
- Flay, B. R., J. R. D'Avernas, J. A. Best, M. W. Kersall, and K. B. Ryan. 1983. "Cigarette Smoking: Why Young People Do It and Ways of Preventing It." In *Pediatric and Adolescent Behavioral Medicine*, edited by P. McGrath and P. Firestone. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Friedman, L. M., C. D. Furberg, and D. L. DeMets. 1985. *Fundamentals of Clinical Trials*, 2nd ed. Littleton, MA: PSG.
- Graham, J. W., B. R. Flay, C. A. Johnson, W. B. Hansen, L. Grossman, and J. L. Sobel. 1984. "Reliability of

148 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

- Self-Report Measures of Drug Use in Prevention Research: Evaluation of the Project Smart Questionnaire via the Pretest-Posttest Reliability Matrix." *Journal of Drug Education* 14:175-93.
- Hansen, W. B. 1990. *School-Based Substance Abuse Prevention: A Review of the State of the Art in Curriculum, 1980-1990*. Report submitted to the National Institute of Drug Abuse. Winston-Salem, NC: Bowman-Gray School of Medicine, Department of Public Health Sciences.
- Hansen, W. B., C. A. Johnson, B. R. Flay, J. W. Graham, and J. L. Sobel. 1988. "Affective and Social Influences Approaches to the Prevention of Multiple Substance Abuse Among Seventh Grade Students; Results from Project SMART." *Preventive Medicine* 17:135-54.
- Hayeslip, D. W. 1989. "Local-Level Drug Enforcement: New Strategies." *NIJ Reports* No. 213 (March/April).
- Hawkins, J. D., R. F. Catalano, and J. Y. Miller. 1992. "Risk and Protective Factors for Early Alcohol and Other Drug Problems in Adolescence and Early Adulthood: Implications for Substance Abuse Prevention." *Psychological Bulletin* 112:64-105.
- Hedeker, D., and R. D. Gibbons. Forthcoming. "A Random-Effects Ordinal Regression Model for Multilevel Analysis." *Biometrics*.
- Hedeker, D., R. D. Gibbons, and J. M. Davis. 1991. "Random Regression Models for Multicenter Clinical Trials Data." *Psychopharmacology Bulletin* 27:73-77.
- Hirschi, T. 1969. *Causes of Delinquency*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Howard, J., J. Taylor, M. Ganikos, H. D. Holder, D. F. Godwin, and E. D. Taylor. 1988. "An Overview of Prevention Research: Issues, Answers, and New Agendas." *Public Health Reports* 103:674-83.
- Institute for Social Research. 1991. "Drug Awareness Rises." *ISR Newsletter* 17:3-4.
- Johnston, L. D., J. G. Bachman, and P. M. O'Malley. 1992. Press Release. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
- Johnston, L. D., P. M. O'Malley, and J. G. Bachman. 1988. *Illicit Drug Use, Smoking, and Drinking by America's High School Students, College Students, and Young Adults* (DHHS Publication No. ADM 89-1602). Rockville, MD: National Institute of Drug Abuse.
- . 1991. *Drug Use Among American High School Seniors, College Students, and Young Adults, 1975-1990*, Vol. 1, High School Seniors (DHHS Publication No. ADM 91-1813). Rockville, MD: National Institute of Drug Abuse.
- Kleiman, M., A. Barnett, A. Bouza, and K. Burke. 1988. *Street-Level Drug Enforcement: Examining the Issues*. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
- MacKinnon, D. P., M. D. Weber, and M. Pentz. 1989. "How Do School-Based Drug Prevention Programs Work and For Whom?" *Drugs and Society* 3:125-43.
- Manos, M. J., C. F. Kameoka, and J. H. Tanji. 1986. *Evaluation of Honolulu Police Department's Drug Abuse Resistance Education Project*. Manoa, Hawaii: The Youth Development and Research Center, School of Social Work, University of Hawaii, Manoa.
- Martin, G. L. and I. M. Newman. 1988. "Assessing the Validity of Self-Reported Adolescent Cigarette Smoking." *Journal of Drug Education* 18:275-84.
- Mensch, B. S. and D. B. Kandel. 1988. "Underreporting of Substance Use in a National Longitudinal Youth Cohort." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 52:100-24.
- Michelson, L. and R. Wood. 1982. "Development and Psychometric Properties of the Children's Assertive Behavior Scale." *Journal of Behavioral Assessment* 4:3-13.
- Moore, M. 1988. "Drug Trafficking." In *Crime File Study Guide*. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
- Moskowitz, J. M. 1989. "The Primary Prevention of Alcohol Problems: A Critical Review of the Research Literature." *Journal of Studies on Alcohol* 50:54-88.
- Moskowitz, J. M., G. A. Schaeffer, J. W. Condon, E. Schaps, and J. Malvin. 1981. *Psychometric Properties of the "Drug and Alcohol Survey"*. Washington, DC: NIDA.
- Murray, D. M. and P. J. Hannon. 1990. "Planning for the Appropriate Analysis in School-Based Drug Prevention Studies." *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 58:458-68.
- National Institute on Drug Abuse. 1993. *National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Highlights* (DHHS Publication No. SMA 93-1979). Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
- Nunnally, J. C. 1978. *Psychometric Theory*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Nurco, D. N. 1985. "A Discussion of Validity." In *Self-Reported Methods of Estimating Drug Use: Meeting Current Challenges to Validity*, edited by B. A. Rouse, N. J. Kozel, and L. G. Richards. NIDA Research Monograph No. 57 (DHHS Publication

- No. ADM 85-1402). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Nyre, G. F. 1985. *Final Evaluation Report, 1984-1985: Project DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education)*. Los Angeles: Evaluation Training Institute.
- Nyre, G. F. 1986. *Final Evaluation Report, 1985-1986: Project DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education)*. Los Angeles: Evaluation Training Institute.
- Reuter, P., R. MacCoun, and P. Murphy. 1990. *Money from Crime: A Study of the Economics of Drug Dealing in Washington D. C.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
- Ringwalt, C. L., T. R. Curtin, and D. P. Rosenbaum. 1990. *A First-Year Evaluation of D.A.R.E. in Illinois*. Report to the Illinois State Police.
- Ringwalt, C. L., S. T. Ennett, and K. D. Holt. 1991. "An Outcome Evaluation of Project D.A.R.E." *Health Education Research: Theory and Practice* 6:327-37.
- Rosenbaum, D. 1993. "Civil Liberties and Aggressive Enforcement: Balancing the Rights of Individuals and Society in the Drug War." In *Drugs and the Community*, edited by R. Davis, A. Lurigio, and D. Rosenbaum. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas.
- Rosenberg, M. 1965. *Society and Adolescent Self-image*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Shah, B. V., B. G. Bamwell, P. N. Hunt, and L. M. Lavange. 1992. *SUDAAN Users Manual: Release 6.2*. Research Triangle Park, NC: Research Triangle Institute.
- Shedler, J., and J. Block. 1990. "Adolescent Drug Use and Psychological Health: A Longitudinal Inquiry." *American Psychologist* 45:612-30.
- Sherman, L. 1990. "Police Crackdown: Initial and Residual Deterrence." In *Crime and Justice*, Vol. 12, edited by M. Tonry and N. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Skogan, W. 1990. *Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Cities*. New York: Free Press.
- Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. 1993. *National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Main Findings 1991* (DHHS Publication No. SMA93-1980). Rockville, MD: Author.
- Timrots, A., C. Byrne, and C. Finn. 1991. *Fact Sheet: Drug Data Summary*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.
- Tobler, N. 1986. "Meta-analysis of 143 Adolescent Drug Prevention Programs: Quantitative Outcome Results of Program Participants Compared to a Control or Comparison Group." *Journal of Drug Issues* 16:537-67.
- Treaster, J. B. 1992. "Some Think the 'War on Drugs' Is Being Waged on Wrong Front." *New York Times*, July 28, Sec. 1, p. 1.
- Walker, S. G. 1990. *The Victoria Police Department Drug Abuse Resistance Education Programme (D.A.R.E.)* (Programme Evaluation Report No. 2). Victoria, British Columbia.
- Weisheit, R., ed. 1990. *Drugs, Crime, and the Criminal Justice System*. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson.
- White House. 1992. *National Drug Control Strategy: A Nation Responds to Drug Use*. Washington, DC: Office of National Drug Control Policy.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What actions have been taken by the U.S. Congress that may explain the increase in school-based drug education programs?
2. What is the D.A.R.E. program, and what is the primary objective?
3. Based on the research design of this study, would you say that the results may be quite reliable, valid, and generalizable beyond the original study sample? Explain why or why not.
4. According to this study, is D.A.R.E. effective in students' use of alcohol, cigarettes, or other substances? Does D.A.R.E. have any positive effects on student behavior? If so, explain.
5. What is your personal reaction to the authors' findings and conclusions? Can you compare any personal experiences with D.A.R.E. or similar drug education?

READING

The author of this article addresses the issue of police control of disorder and crime in inner-city neighborhoods. Current police tactics are often ineffective, they fail to protect inner-city youths, and police fail to take advantage of helpful interagency relationships with juvenile corrections agencies. The author proposes a model called reintegrative surveillance, which is an integration of community-based corrections and community policing. Neither community-based corrections nor community policing is designed to handle serious, repeat offenders who are returning to high-crime neighborhoods. Guarino-Ghezzi believes that police need to reexamine their roles to ensure that (a) policies of maintaining order and consequences of disorder are not ambiguous or misleading to youths, and (b) order maintenance and law enforcement practices do not interfere with police ability to protect youths as victims of crime. Both tendencies are clearly widespread problems, and neither will be addressed as long as the “worst” neighborhoods and youths are considered beyond salvation. Correctional programs need to reevaluate police as a pivotal community resource. Reintegrative surveillance must include a gradational, consistent criminal justice response, protection, vigilance, interagency goal setting, and agency coordination.

Reintegrative Police Surveillance of Juvenile Offenders

Forging an Urban Model

Susan Guarino-Ghezzi

This policy essay examines how police should alter their procedures for dealing with juvenile offenders in inner-city neighborhoods. The recommendations are based on extensive literature about police work as well as a recent study of communication patterns between Boston police officers and juvenile offenders (Guarino-Ghezzi 1993). The Boston study specifically explored the intended and unintended messages that police communicate to youths through their words, actions, and inactions.¹ The article develops a model for policing juveniles that follows both from community policing and correctional philosophies.

The topics reviewed in this article are organized into the following segments. The first section examines the implications of police

policies of controlling disorder among inner-city youths. Section 2 considers the lack of protection that police provide to inner-city youths. The third component focuses on the service gap for youths in transition from correctional programs to the community. The final segment considers how the police role needs to be reexamined to reduce the communication of messages that are inconsistent and self-defeating.

Order and Disorder Among Inner-City Youths

The control of disorder is a goal of policing that is believed by certain key experts (Skogan 1990; Wilson and Kelling 1982), but not all (Taylor and

Gottfredson 1986), to be directly linked to the control of crime. Loitering, public drunkenness, trespassing, vagrancy, prostitution, malicious destruction of property, graffiti, and even littering are believed to create neighborhood vulnerabilities that increase disorder and eventually lead to more serious crime. However, for several reasons, procedures used by police to respond to disorder are often ineffective. One reason is the ambiguity of disorderly conduct rules. That ambiguity unintentionally reinforces the very behavior those rules proscribe (Skolnick 1966).

Skogan (1990) summarized the particular ambiguities linked to the formal control of disorderly conduct: statutes are vaguely worded, and they may proscribe conduct that is constitutionally protected. In addition, the context in which behavior occurs is critical in evaluating its “disorderly” characteristics, including the location and circumstances of the activity, the person’s intent, and how others react to it. Some evidence shows that police, responding to the lack of clarity in disorderly conduct laws, rely on factors unrelated to the legal elements of the offense, including cues from fellow officers, perceptions of how others view disorderly behaviors, and past experience (Brown 1993). Legal and normative subtleties can create myths of conduct rules among youths who congregate in public places, corresponding to the police rituals that have become familiar to them. For example, youths in the Boston study (Guarino-Ghezzi 1993) believed that an obviously visible no trespassing sign was a necessary precondition to being arrested for trespassing on private property and were surprised to learn otherwise.

A second problem of controlling disorder is that aggressive police tactics, such as saturation patrol and suspicion stops, may actually increase disorder. Skogan (1990) warned that without a problem-solving model for low-resource inner-city neighborhoods, police inevitably err on the side of mechanistic coercion rather than negotiation with community residents, fueling long-term resentment and frustration. Skolnick (1966) observed that the use of law enforcement to

achieve order subordinates the ideal of conformity to the ideal of legality, highlighting the gap between normative and legal boundaries. Interviews with Boston youths suggested that “stop and frisk” policies used by police in high-crime neighborhoods to confiscate weapons did not produce organized rebellion, but did increase defiance and frustration, weakening police-youth relations (Guarino-Ghezzi 1993).

Perhaps because of the difficulties of enforcing disorderly conduct laws through arrest, the use of formal authority by police in disorderly conduct cases has declined in large cities (see Figure 1).² However, the informal handling of disorder—police procedures that do not lead to arrest—makes it difficult to monitor harassment and encourages police to operate outside the law to punish people they dislike or to settle past accounts (Skogan 1990; Wolff 1993). In Boston, despite internal shielding of police for misconduct charges, the number of citizen complaints nearly tripled between 1981 and 1990, and the most common complaints were of physical abuse of citizens filed by Black residents of inner-city neighborhoods (Boston Police Department Management Review Committee 1992).

The effect of order maintenance on juveniles is an area of particular concern because of the frequency of order-maintenance contacts with inner-city juveniles, as well as issues raised by their age. Lundman, Sykes, and Clark’s (1978) replication of Black and Reiss’s (1970) study of police encounters supported the findings that police contacts with juveniles usually resulted from matters of minor legal significance initiated by citizens, they generally were handled informally, and sanctioning decisions strongly reflected the preferences of citizen complainants. Similarly, Muir (1977) found that police felt uncomfortable enforcing “nuisance” laws unless they were goaded by a citizen, and even then they felt resentment toward the citizen complainant. The probability that order-maintenance contacts are citizen initiated and are dealt with informally has been strengthened by organizational and legal trends, including radio dispatch, reduction of foot patrol, cars responding

152 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS


based on proximity, personnel rotation, large new districts, removal of vague disorder statutes, and the termination of “sweep” arrest policies, which were declared unconstitutional by the mid-1970s (Skogan 1990).

Reactive-only responses, which are usually prompted by citizen-initiated complaints, create haphazard patterns of control from the point of view of street youths. In the Boston study (Guarino-Ghezzi 1993), youths were surprised to learn that police interruption of their public “hanging-out” time was based on citizen-initiated complaints. Youths had interpreted the erratic nature of police reaction—chasing them off the steps of a building one day, ignoring them the next—as harassment, designed to inflate the egos of particular police officers by waging a war of unpredictability against them.

In the youths’ view, police behavior was out of their control because it was independent of their actions. The youths’ inability to link behavior to official consequences resulted from the self-imposed limitation of police, who generally interacted with youths only in narrow, selective contexts. Unfortunately, citizen-initiated order maintenance, which is particularly ineffective in connecting behavior to consequences, has been the most frequent context in which police interact with juvenile offenders on the streets. Matza’s (1964) early work on delinquency and “drift” is particularly relevant in understanding that the weakness of law in controlling street crime and disorder is reinforced to youths through their everyday observations in high-disorder and/or high-crime neighborhoods.

Oddly, little concern has been expressed about the effect on juveniles of inconsistent

Figure 1 City Arrest Trends for Disorder—1971–1991



Note: Based on UCR arrest data.

official reactions to public behavior, although studies have demonstrated that certainty of official response is more influential than severity in dealing with adolescents (Paternoster 1989; Schneider and Ervin 1990). Cognitive development factors also tend to be overlooked or crudely interpreted by police, particularly when compared to their importance in juvenile courts and corrections. The lack of police attention to developmental differences between juveniles and adults may have resulted, in part, from recent trends, including Supreme Court rulings in the 1960s and 1970s that granted adult protections to juveniles,³ as well as the increased seriousness of offenses that juveniles commit (Kelling 1987). Moreover, police organizations do not need to subscribe to a separate model for juveniles as a legitimizing philosophy, as do juvenile courts and youth service agencies.

Current police practices with juveniles stand in stark contrast to August Vollmer's 1930s vision of police work, which included an expansive philosophy based on the goal of providing moral education (Kelling 1987). Instead, a variety of narrowly specialized units have proliferated in police departments, some of which relate to juveniles but with far less penetrating goals than Vollmer conceived. For instance, Needle and Stapleton (1983) observed that a prominent feature of gang control programming in the United States was its similarity to general police programming. Gang units consisted of recreation programs, preventive patrol, and other traditional suppression activities, school-based crime prevention programs, and street work oriented to suppression and prevention of gang activity. Standard patrol, investigation, and dispositional procedures were used to apprehend and process gang members in most cities. In some cities, special "gang-breaking" strategies were implemented, which targeted gang leaders for arrest, prosecution, and incarceration, based on the assumption that removing leaders weakens gangs for at least some period of time. It appeared that cities that employed gang-breaking strategies used a youth services model with younger

adolescents, and a more aggressive gang-breaking approach with older teenagers. This suggests that services were used as the "carrot" for compliance with one population and gang breaking as the "stick" of control with the other. However, dividing strategies in that way has received neither empirical support (Spergel 1990) nor the endorsement of the National Youth Gang Suppression and Intervention Program, which recommends a combination of surveillance and services (Spergel et al. 1993).

As juvenile correctional practitioners are well aware, juvenile offenders with service needs should not be expected to embrace services without a measure of control, nor should services be omitted from control strategies. For example, in well-run correctional programs, services, controls, and surveillance augment one another (Gendreau and Ross 1991; Guarino-Ghezzi and Byrne 1989; U.S. Department of Justice 1993). Moreover, the impersonality of police encounters, caused in part by centralized, reactive management, has placed practical limits on the perceived legitimacy of police authority (see Hummel 1977; Lipsky 1980).

In part as a result of the failures of over-centralized, reactive police management, many jurisdictions have been rapidly implementing community policing or problem-oriented policing models. Among the theoretical advantages of community policing is that police goals incorporate the values and needs of community residents. As a means to control inner-city youths, however, this advantage is equivocal. Heterogeneous, fragmented areas, as Skogan (1990) points out, defy consensus and result in conflicting definitions of conduct. Dominant definitions emerge, based on the social, political, and demographic advantages of certain groups within communities, that result in the alienation of other groups.

If, instead of trying to find common interests in this diversity, the police deal mainly with elements of their own choosing, they will appear to be taking sides. The police will get along best with those who share their outlook, and the "local

154 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

values" they represent will be those of some in the community, but not all (Skogan 1990, p. 167).

The experience of police-citizen contacts demonstrates how those contacts are susceptible to demographic influences. Although the general citizenry has positive feelings toward police, members of racial minority groups tend to have more negative opinions (Jamieson and Flanagan 1987; McGarrell and Flanagan 1985). That is not surprising, given the evidence of differential treatment depending on the race of the officer, complainant, and victim that disfavors Black suspects, particularly when the complainant and officer are both White (Black 1980), and the routine questioning and detention to which teenagers, African Americans, and lower-income persons are subjected (Boston Police Department Management Review Committee 1992; Wilson 1975). A number of studies have documented inner-city Blacks' hostility toward the police and the police's negative attitude toward Black inner-city dwellers (e.g., Reuss-Ianni 1984).

Age seems to aggravate already strained relationships between police and inner-city residents. Bynum, Cordner, and Greene (1982) studied the hierarchy of victim status according to age of the victim, and they found that the probability of police follow-up investigation of a reported crime is lower for victims under age 21. An additional problem for improving policies for inner-city youths is that police seem to hold a one-dimensional, negative perception of youth gangs (Hagedorn 1988), which impedes their communication with youths, despite numerous studies identifying the varied social, psychological, and economic functions of gangs (Cohen 1955; Jankowski 1991; Miller 1976; Moore 1978; Thrasher [1927] 1963). One critic of the police has charged that the criminal image of Chicano gangs was exaggerated mainly to justify applications for federal grants to support specialized gang units in police departments (Zatz 1987).

Ironically, the reputations of inner-city youths and inner-city police are not dissimilar. Miller's (1958) description of lower-class focal concerns, which he applied to youth gangs

(trouble, toughness, smartness, excitement, fate, and autonomy) is at least partially applicable to police, suggesting a mutual pattern of escalating hostilities. Trouble equals fighting; evidence of police causing trouble comes from police informants, citizen complaints, and encoded rap messages. Toughness equals fearlessness, which is the classic heroic facade of police. Smartness is the ability to con people to get them to do what you want; the Charles Stuart investigation in Boston produced allegations about strong-arm and coercive techniques used to pressure residents into cooperating in the search for the phantom Black killer (Murphy and Ellement 1992). Excitement is defined as fun and thrills; Price (1992) suggests that making arrests gives police an emotional "high"; the Rodney King incident can be described as an example of "police wilding." Fate means having no control over one's life or destiny; police are often described as cynical and fatalistic, believing that nothing will change the status quo (Wilson 1968). Autonomy means freedom from responsibility; the neglect to properly handle citizen complaints and police resistance to change reveal their autonomy from external forces. Stereotypical images of lower-class youths may have helped justify police in targeting them as a threat (Cashmore and McLaughlin 1991). Similarly, stereotypes of police have rapidly spread through the influential medium of rap music.

In Boston, numerous wedges have been driven between the Boston Police Department and inner-city youths. Philosophically, the Boston Police Department has used a reactive model for which it was lambasted recently by a mayoral committee known as the "St. Clair Commission" (Boston Police Department Management Review Committee 1992). Among the problems cited by the commission was the immobilizing fear of residents of the most crime-ridden communities to report crimes to the police. Also cited was a pattern in which a small number of officers with a long record of alleged misconduct, including physical abuse of citizens, remained on the force largely unidentified and unsupervised. The commission called for an overhaul of the Internal

Affairs complaint review process, including the creation of a community appeals board.

Adolescents' fears of police retaliation are of central importance. Inner-city youths in the Boston study reported being beaten by police, citing housing police in particular for their aggressive behavior (Guarino-Ghezzi 1993). A local rap song, "One in the Chamba," by the Almighty RSO, describes an incident in which James ("Sonny") Hall, a Boston police officer outside of his patrol area but within his own neighborhood, shot a male youth who was hiding under a car, and then began to leave the scene. Two years later Hall was convicted of manslaughter, but by then he had been dismissed from the force for an unrelated incident. The Boston Police Patrolman's Association is suing the Almighty RSO for recording a song about cop killing because the refrain advises listeners to keep one bullet in the chamber for corrupt cops like James Hall (Grant 1992).

It has been widely observed (Cohen 1955; Cohen and Short 1958) that many young offenders have difficulty showing deference to authority figures. It appears also that police are likely to react formally, with an arrest, if youths demonstrate either too little or too much deference to police, as both responses are viewed by police as abnormal and hence arouse their suspicions (Lundman, Sykes, and Clark 1978). Yet, for reasons in part relating to their methods of distancing themselves from juveniles, police lack consistency as a means for controlling the perceived legitimacy of their authority, unlike their counterparts in residential correctional facilities. Part of youths' defiance may well be rooted not merely in the impersonal control of police, but in its inconsistency. In addition, part of it stems from the lack of protection that police provide to youths when matters indeed become serious.

Lack of Protection of Inner-City Youths

The current reactive model of police protection, which is generally considered to be a failed model

by experts in policing, is particularly unresponsive to the needs of young people of color. There is a growing sentiment that high-crime communities are beyond the point where they can benefit from police investment (Wilson and Kelling 1982). In Bynum, Cordner, and Greene's (1982) study of a medium-sized Midwestern city, 82% of reported serious crimes that were brought to detectives' attention actually received little or no investigative effort. Indeed, the rate of homicide cases resulting in arrest in large cities has fallen considerably over the past two decades. Clearance rates for murders and nonnegligent manslaughters in the nation's largest cities, in which approximately half of all such crimes occur, are shown in Figure 2. The clearance rate for murders and nonnegligent manslaughters in cities with populations of 250,000 and over declined by nearly one fourth between 1971 and 1991, from 82% to 63% (U.S. Department of Justice 1972–1992a). The clearance rates for such crimes in smaller cities and rural areas declined by only a few percentage points, indicating that large city murders have become increasingly difficult to solve due to factors present in major urban areas.⁴ The mayor of Washington, D.C., believes that violent crime levels have surpassed the authority of police and that responsibility for controlling violent crime may be escalated to the National Guard (Berke 1993).

A dangerous adaptive style of retaliation against acquaintance aggressors, rather than cooperation with police, has emerged among inner-city youths (Garbarino, Dubrow, Kostelny, and Pardo 1992). Prison researchers have studied a similar relationship between victimization and offending within institutional walls, where inmates are in fear of one another due to reactive intervention (or no intervention) by correctional officers. Lockwood (1991) coined the term *target aggression* to explain how inmates who sense they are probable future victims of sexual assault learn to initiate physical aggression against others as a form of defense. Like prison inmates, inner-city children and adolescents learn to adapt to patterns of unprotected victimization by defining themselves not as victims, but as aggressors (Bell 1991;

156 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS


Bandura 1973). This may be, in part, a result of youths' perceptions that police are indifferent to the chronic danger of their environments.

A related possibility contributing to violence in communities is the growing number of ex-prison inmates in crime-prone neighborhoods, brought about by the explosion of adult offenders sentenced to prison (see Spergel 1990, pp. 246–47). In the mid-1980s, 33 state prison systems reported the presence of gangs, but in only 21 states did prison gangs originate in the cities within the same states (Camp and Camp 1985), which implies that gangs spread through prisons faster than they do through cities. Prison subcultures have grown increasingly violent in the last two decades (Braswell, Dillingham, and Montgomery 1985; Irwin 1980), and ever larger

segments of inner-city communities are spending ever more time than before incarcerated in violent settings. The learned aggressiveness in such settings may well be following these offenders when they return to their communities, feeding already violence-prone subcultures. Thus the prison system may not only import the values and culture of incoming inmates, as many sociologists of the prison have observed, but may also export a more severely retaliatory and aggressive adaptation to violence back into the community. These possibilities give urgent new meaning to Palmer's (1984) call for "socially-centered treatment" in correctional facilities.

Virtually no comparative research exists on police handling of crime victims when they are also known or suspected offenders. However, a

Figure 2 Clearance Rates for Homicide—1971–1991



Note: Based on UCR arrest data.

large literature suggests that police portray themselves as the “thin blue line” that separates the “good people” (nonoffenders, who are crime victims or potential victims) from the “public enemies” (offenders, delinquents, and suspected preelinquents), much as Whyte (1943) observed in his now classic study of “Eastern City” versus “Cornerville.” However, communities more accurately contain a third category of residents who are “dual status” (i.e., current victims but prior offenders), and who may well comprise a substantial segment of high-crime communities. For example, an important study demonstrates a strong overlap of adolescent offenders and victims, such that previous victimization is a predictor of subsequent offending and previous offending is a predictor of subsequently being victimized (Lauritsen, Sampson, and Laub 1991).

The symbolic distinction between public enemies and victims superficially serves police (and other criminal justice agencies) in critical ways. The blue-line metaphor seems, at first, to validate police in their law enforcement role by implying that law violators are diligently controlled by police. In addition, the blue line serves a boundary maintenance function which, in theory, may appear to deter illegal behavior. Yet, as observers of the police have found (Skolnick 1966; Whyte 1943), instead of a strict law enforcement model operating, most offenses are handled informally, without sanctions, unless they arouse the concern of the good people in the community. Stated somewhat differently, as more and more residents of a community involve themselves in some type of illegal activity, the line must become ever more inclusive of illegality and hence ever less controlling. In high-crime areas, the gap between the law and its enforcement undoubtedly sends a message that certain crimes are tolerated. It is troubling when certain characteristics of victims (e.g., victims who are young, African American, dual status, or all three) create a predisposition against official intervention. The variability of police tolerance of crime creates ambiguity for juvenile offenders, who may then formulate attitudes that police are incompetent, uncaring, or both (Matza 1964).

Youthful offenders in the Boston study (Guarino-Ghezzi 1993), all of whom occupied the netherworld of dual status, believed that police were often incapable of performing what they perceived as a fundamental task of policing—distinguishing law-abiding from illegal behavior. That belief was expressed in three ways. Youths were angry at having been “harassed” by police while obeying the law, typically while walking, standing on the street, or waiting at a bus stop. Indeed, the primary way that youths saw themselves as crime victims was as victims of police harassment. On the flip side, youths also relished their belief that they could outsmart police by concealing illegal behaviors, disguising them within normal, routine activities. The youths seemed to be challenged by the “game” of outmaneuvering police. Finally, residents of juvenile correctional facilities were concerned about police overreacting to their behavior, resulting in unwarranted rearrests following their return to the community.

The apparent frequency of dual-status victims, particularly among adolescents, raises questions about whether the lifestyle of the juvenile offender denies him or her the right to be treated in the same way as law-abiding victims. In general, criminal justice agencies grew more attentive to the rights and needs of victims during the 1980s, which restored at least some credibility to processes that were constantly charged with insensitivity to victims of crime (Karmen 1990). However, chronically delinquent youths who become victims of crime are unlikely to reap the advantages of the victims’ rights movement due to police failure to acknowledge their victim status. Indeed, a variety of victims’ groups in the United States discovered that considerable organizational clout is a necessary ingredient for recognition. Groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving, along with rape victims’ advocates, have achieved favorable changes in police procedures, but only after lengthy political battles (Lawrence, Snortum, and Zimring 1988; Karmen 1990).

Adolescent offenders, when they are victimized, are likely to remain at or near the bottom of the victims’ social hierarchy unless broad-based changes are forced onto police. Pressure for

158 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

police to acknowledge these dual-status victims as victims is unlikely to come from the youths themselves, particularly after they become proficient at “self-help” retaliatory behaviors. Youths in the Boston study did not trust the criminal justice system to protect them from crime, choosing to leave town if their lives were in danger rather than contact police (Guarino-Ghezzi 1993). However, until youths feel that the legal establishment adequately protects them from the dangers of their communities, they have no interest in validating criminal justice agencies by reporting crimes, testifying in court, and so on.

The Missing Link Between Corrections and Police

Results from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s (OJJDP) controlled study of treatment and reintegration of violent juvenile offenders concluded that recidivism was primarily a function of weak reintegration and transition strategies (Fagan 1990). Similarly, Altschuler and Armstrong (1991) noted that the central—and unmet—challenge for juvenile correctional programs is to forge mutually beneficial partnerships with community social institutions.

Examining the role of police in offender reintegration is critical for fully understanding the gaps in surveillance and services. The link between reintegration and police is particularly important when considering repeat offenders because selective incapacitation theory not only instructs police to focus their investigative efforts on repeat offenders, but has led to the development of Repeat Offender Projects (ROPs) in many police jurisdictions (Gay and Bowers 1985; Martin and Sherman 1986; Moore, Estrich, McGillis, and Spelman 1984). However, in selectively targeting repeat offenders, police may be working at cross-purposes with juvenile corrections agencies, which are most likely attempting to maximize the rehabilitative potential of the correctional experience and to minimize the labeling effect on the offender once he or she has been discharged. In particular,

the independent effect of police labeling on future offending has been underscored by labeling theorists and empirical research (see, for example, Hagan and Palloni 1990).

Further justification for an interagency approach to crime control comes from the ineffectiveness of classic bureaucratic turf lines, which have divided police from corrections. Police finger pointing at correctional release decisions is common.⁵ Related to the turf obstacle is the tendency that police are offended by special work models that threaten their ongoing objectification of inner-city youths. Early demonstration projects that united social work and policing models into teams (e.g., Treger 1975) were extremely promising, but generally have been resisted by police. Police rarely take advantage of the correctional setting as a more comprehensive source of knowledge about offenders’ motivations compared to the volatile and desperate setting of the street, where police ordinarily draw their conclusions about human behavior.

The importance of coordinating the goals of correctional agencies and police was demonstrated in a Madison, Wisconsin, study of repeat sexual offenders (Goldstein and Susmilch 1982). The study found that there was little trust or communication between Madison police and the probation and parole officers employed by the Wisconsin Division of Corrections. The void in communication produced negative stereotypes by members of both the police and correctional agencies. However, those stereotypes dissolved after the agencies agreed to conduct joint supervision of repeat sexual offenders, who indeed had caused similar behavioral management problems for both agencies. Strategies for serious offenders advanced by the U.S. Department of Justice’s (1993) OJJDP include the creation of neighborhood resource teams, composed of community police officers, social workers, health care workers, housing experts, and school personnel. In high-crime communities, it would be logical to add a youth correctional representative to the team as well.

Despite obvious differences in setting, it is quite likely that police can learn a great deal from

observing correctional staff whose behavioral control techniques are tailored to youthful offenders. According to Altschuler and Armstrong (1991), a key component of juvenile offender reintegration is providing “consistent, clear, swift and graduated sanctions for misconduct” (p. 69), along with developing new resources and supports, working with existing supports, providing opportunities for youths to achieve, and preparing youths for gradually increased responsibility and freedom in the community. Similarly, Gendreau and Ross (1991) identified “authority—where rules and or formal legal sanctions are clearly spelled out” (p. 319) as a central component of community corrections, along with anti-criminal modeling and reinforcement, problem solving, use of community resources, and quality of interpersonal relationships. OJJDP recommendations for serious offenders (U.S. Department of Justice 1993, pp. 18–19) emphasized the importance of an immediate response to misbehavior, gradational sanctions, and coordination among police, courts, and corrections.

However, political support for reintegrative correctional programs is difficult to achieve and maintain, despite evidence of increased public safety (LeClair and Guarino-Ghezzi 1991). Precisely for that reason, the trend toward community policing may provide opportunities for correctional systems to reexamine their own reintegrative models and consider ways in which police knowledge of offenders in inner-city communities could provide needed support. Additional opportunities for developing a reintegrative role for police may come from a variety of states that are expanding their correctional mandate for community-based settings for juvenile offenders. For example, Alabama, Oregon, Delaware, New Hampshire, Maryland, Virginia, North Dakota, and potentially Georgia and Arizona are reducing their reliance on institutions and increasing the number of youths in non-secure community-based programs overseen by youth correctional agencies. Those changes are occurring primarily because of actual or threatened lawsuits that allege that the

institutional model has failed to provide adequate protection and services for youths (Guarino-Ghezzi and Loughran 1993).

Developing A Model of Reintegrative Surveillance

Police need to examine how their actions are interpreted, or misinterpreted, by the individuals whom they seek to control. In particular, police are insensitive to the irrational appearance of intermittent control of disorder. In addition, youths perceive that police authority to enforce laws is unjustified when police are unable to protect or defend them. Police in Boston reported that sessions with incarcerated juvenile offenders helped them to identify communication problems and they strongly recommended that all officers have regular contact with juvenile correctional programs as part of their regular duty (Guarino-Ghezzi 1993). Potentially, further interaction with juvenile correctional programs could lead to sharing of effective mechanisms to control behavior. Rule enforcement within correctional programs (the analog to order maintenance on the street) is improved considerably with graduated, predictable sanctions (loss of privileges) for violators, staff training, and close supervision of staff and youths. Teaching residents that behavior has consequences has become a centerpiece for many correctional programs, and considerable time and effort is devoted to that simple lesson—in part because staff must undo the messages learned from parents, schools, and perhaps police that consequences following misbehavior are unpredictable and often avoidable.

A model for moral education is embedded in Braithwaite’s (1989) theory of “reintegrative shaming,” which has as its objective the reduction of recidivism. Braithwaite argues that the unintended consequence of attaching stigma to punishment—as is common in Western societies—is the increased attractiveness of criminal subcultures after the punishment has been imposed. This assumption is consistent with an

160 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

established body of research (e.g., Schwartz and Skolnick 1962) on the long-term adverse effects of stigma on ex-offenders, and with labeling theory in general. In Braithwaite's model of crime control, a period of punishment is followed not by stigma, but by reintegrative shaming. When offenders are both shamed and reintegrated, their family and community express strong disapproval of the criminal act, pressuring genuine remorse, but at the same time agreeing to accept the offender back into the community. The ex-offender label is therefore not a "master status" that perpetuates criminality. The offender's expectation of the community response is essential to his or her decision to either reform or rebel once released to the community.

Several aspects of the theory of reintegrative shaming are applicable to the relationship between police and corrections and underscore the need for frequent interpersonal contact between police and juvenile offenders. First, the greater the social distance between the ex-offender and other individuals, including police, the higher the probability of a stigmatic reaction impeding reform (see Erickson 1977). Second, evidence suggests that when police know and can communicate with neighborhood residents, they are more effective in defusing violent confrontations (Fridell and Binder 1992). Third, in theory, police have a vested interest (albeit generally unacknowledged) in assisting with the moral education of youths. The most important consequences of successfully communicating law-abiding values to adolescents would be enhanced police authority, a less dangerous work environment, and gratification in accomplishing societal goals of crime reduction. As Garbarino et al. (1992) observe in their comparison of children in actual war zones (Mozambique, Cambodia, and the Middle East) with children in inner cities in the United States:

One of the most important domains of concern we have discovered is the domain of moral development, particularly as it is played out in alternative conceptions of revenge. All too often, this is a neglected dimension in efforts to understand and

ameliorate the problem of community violence. In war zones around the world, we have seen children helped to find a way through the moral minefield of negative revenge to a positive moral consciousness in which being a good person becomes a child's revenge. We see precious little of this in the urban war zone. (p. 226)

To initiate the process of positive moral development, professionals who deal with children and adolescents must first establish trust, which requires continued personal interactions in which people are viewed as people, rather than "cases" (Hummel 1977; Polier 1989). Personal interaction is not easily accomplished because bureaucratic agencies place strong, "rationalizing" (Weber 1946) pressure on workers to fragment people into problems and characteristics, which maximizes the energy invested in bureaucratic procedures but minimizes attention to the outcome (success or failure) of their efforts. It follows that in police work, successful personal relationships between police and residents must be grounded in personalized community service rather than law enforcement (Morrison 1992) to counteract the bureaucratic tendency to dehumanize clientele. Research on the Community Organizing Response Team (CORT) in Houston, that city's version of storefront policing, suggested that even though storefronts increased the frequency of informal contacts with residents, they were not as effective as more aggressive door-to-door contacts (Skogan 1990). Just as important, service to low-resource communities is crucial to managing the disorder that perpetuates fear and crime (Wilson and Kelling 1982). It is now recognized that police services improve law enforcement, not the other way around (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy 1990). Bureaucratic distance among police, courts, corrections, and communities may be rooted in the interpretation of police roles as servicing short-term organizational rather than long-term societal needs.

Specific recommendations for police and inner-city youths may be drawn from pockets of

innovation that involve aggressive outreach efforts by police. Several model programs for juveniles were reviewed and described by the United Conference of Mayors (U.S. Department of Justice 1992b). For example, in Aurora, Colorado, a community-based gang-prevention effort includes a victim/witness program established to support victims and witnesses of gang-related crimes and train police officers in assisting them. Gang intervention unit police officers wear modified uniforms so that they are not perceived as traditional police officers. They generally contact between 10 and 30 gang members on a daily patrol (from 4 P.M. to 2 A.M., 7 days a week). The unit attempts to give the gangs the impression that the police are constantly watching them. Indeed, the gang members and intervention unit members have gotten to know each other on a first-name basis, and reportedly, gang members have developed into information sources about rival gangs.

Another police program in Carlsbad, California, administers punishment to juveniles who have committed misdemeanors, on the theory that youths often learned it was “acceptable” to commit a minor crime because they received a “slap on the wrist” penalty. Youths often lost respect for society’s institutions and the personnel who served the community, such as court and police officials. Also, victims of crime felt frustrated that the courts and police department did not adequately punish or prevent youths from committing such crimes. First-time offenders were slipping through the courts, with no certainty of punishment. The new program oversees a tribunal composed of community members to determine guilt or innocence and assign from 8 to 40 hours of community service and/or counseling (U.S. Department of Justice 1992b).

The innovative School Resource Officer (SRO) Program in St. Petersburg, Florida, is also being implemented in over 40 of Florida’s 67 school districts and in many cities in the United States. Police officers in uniform (with a firearm) are stationed in secondary schools, where they serve as law enforcers, counselors, and instructors. In addition to helping maintain a safe school environment, the SRO program is designed to promote

a positive relationship between students and police officers and to provide 200 hours per year of classroom instruction in law-related topics. Officers also counsel students who seek assistance, who are referred by teachers, and who are involved in the juvenile justice system. Officers may call on parents or make referrals to other school or community resources. Strategically, SROs figure prominently in city-sponsored youth activities. For example, they help organize “pool parties,” which are particularly popular among youths and therefore provide the kind of reward for involvement with police that is often missing in communities. The (free) admission tickets are in demand, but only SROs and other uniformed police officers can distribute them, so young people who want to attend need to interact with the officers to obtain the tickets (U.S. Department of Justice 1992b).

The Police Citizens Youth Clubs in New South Wales, Australia, evolved in the late 1980s as a crime prevention program. The clubs arrange dozens of sports activities, music classes, and other lessons for youths, and they also work with police in several ways. Police conduct lectures on law and police roles during “law week,” they offer crime prevention workshops, they provide transportation to youths under court order to attend substance abuse counseling, and they supervise court-referred youths who perform community service work at the youth clubs. Court-involved youths become familiar with youth club activities and learn from the positive involvement of other youths (Carter 1989). This model seems to be a significant improvement over other community-service sentencing programs supervised by police, such as the Newark program, which was lacking in positive alternative activities for youths or provision of role models (for a description of the program, see Skolnick and Bayley 1986).

The City of Boston’s police department has recently begun to design a community-policing approach and has appointed a new chief of police. Among the department’s pilot programs that are being replicated city wide is a witness-to-violence program, which brings psychiatrists in to counsel young children who have experienced or witnessed violent crime in their communities.

162 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Another program to enhance community relations is the Neighborhood Information Post, a mobile trailer stationed in an accessible location within each neighborhood to provide support and retrieve information when critical incidents occur. However, an impediment to implementing inter-agency models between police and juvenile corrections is the absence of a juvenile unit in the Boston Police Department, despite the presence of such units in 89% of large U.S. cities (Reaves 1992). It should be noted, however, that specialized units can pose different obstacles at later stages of policy development by insulating regular patrol officers from procedural changes.

Although those programs represent advances in police-community relations and may have some positive impact on relationships with youths, they have several drawbacks: They are single-unit, as opposed to departmentally oriented; few of the programs focus on the marginal youths who can be reached only in the streets, and who need the most highly structured attention; and virtually no police programs are tied into correctional programs. For "marginal status" youths, the most frequent contact is with regular patrol officers, who are also the most likely to encounter ex-offenders returning to the community. Therefore, attention must be paid to patrol officers' approaches for handling juveniles so that an increasingly punitive system of alternatives to arrest is available, as well as rewards for interacting with police in some regular way. Youths returning from correctional programs must be reintegrated with familiar and personal encounters, and surveillance must be reinforced with certainty of response.

A comprehensive model for gang control that contains many of those principles, the Community-Based Youth Authority (CBYA) approach proposed by the National Youth Gang Information Center, would provide specialized training to CBYA staff, community residents, and representatives of schools and justice system agencies. The model would increase the frequency and quality of contacts between gang members, "wannabes," and trained workers. The CBYA mission would consist of six objectives: (a) socialization,

(b) education, (c) family support, (d) training and employment, (e) social control, and (f) community mobilization and agency coordination. CBYA staff, based in communities, would perform both a case management and a surveillance function, and they would be responsible for consistent rule enforcement, as well as for the protection of youths, to demonstrate their authority as legitimate. CBYA workers would also serve as intermediaries between criminal justice agencies, schools, and neighborhood groups (Spergel et al. 1993).

At the same time, specially trained police officers would be required to cooperate with probation and parole regulations by reporting technical violations, and they would develop close liaisons with schools and service agencies (Ehrensaft and Spergel 1993). The primary strength of the model is the unification of diverse agencies under a common philosophy. The model limits police involvement to particular officers, a condition that may enhance interagency cooperation in the initial phases. Specialized training and supervision are provided only to the gang unit or detail. However, by excusing the majority of patrol officers from participating under its philosophy, the model does not anticipate long-term conflict between the trained and untrained officers that would produce contradictions in police handling of youths.

In reality, retraining field patrol officers requires, at a minimum, an understanding of how to apply gradational sanctions to minor offenses, the provision of adequate resources to devise such responses, the elimination of unnecessary harassment, and close monitoring of police by trained supervisors. One subject of a case study by Muir (1977) of a moderate-sized urban police force seemed to embody a long-term, humanizing approach to juveniles at a teenage hangout where juveniles played pinball instead of going to school. Officer Douglas devised his own gradational approach, which reflected the kind of consistency, predictability, and continual surveillance that, combined with his caring that youths go to school and his provision of an alternative activity, resembled the approach used in successful correctional settings:

In each encounter with juveniles Douglas anticipated miscalculation on their part and made allowance for it, giving them psychological room to readjust their initial estimates of matters. When Douglas walked into Caesar's, he allowed for the probability that they would misjudge him. He also concentrated on purposefully using time to dispel any irrationality. "So the next few days I walk into Caesar's, and I get myself about fifty names, and I tell each one, 'You do not play the machines. You go to school, and if you don't, I'll run you in.' So the first time down goes their name in my book. The second time I catch them, I make a little check right beside their name, just as big a gesture as I can. And the third time, I tell them 'they go to jail.' Well, I only locked up one. And I had no more trouble." (Muir 1977, p. 131)

In short, the police role needs to be reexamined as an important resource for juvenile offender reintegration and crime prevention, particularly in high-crime neighborhoods where other vital supports are lacking and disorder is prevalent. Systematically structuring the control of disorder will force police to orchestrate encounters with juveniles in a variety of contexts. Equally important are policies specific to inner-city youths that increase their protection from victimization. Present policies are dumbfounding to youths, as would be any administration of authority that appears haphazard and ineffective in performing fundamental objectives. Innovative police programs that combine reintegration with surveillance, along with training not only to increase communication with youths but to avoid the communication of unintended messages through the exercise of routine police work, are vital components for improving police effectiveness with juveniles.

Notes

1. Adolescents were all adjudicated for "street crimes"—drug dealing and property offenses—and were residents of the Judge Connelly Secure Treatment

Program in the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services. Details of the study are available from the author.

2. The average annual rate of change based on least squares analysis of UCR arrest data for crimes involving disorder for 1971–1991 was –4.1% for drunkenness, –3.2% for vagrancy, –2.5% for curfew/loitering, +0.3% for disorderly conduct, and +3.7% for prostitution. For 1982–1991, all such crimes reflected rates of decrease: –5.9% for drunkenness, –0.3% for vagrancy and curfew/loitering, –2.4% for disorderly conduct, and –4.1% for prostitution.

3. For example, although the findings of *In re Gault* (387 U.S. 1, 1967) did not specifically address police investigative procedures, in making the privilege against self-incrimination applicable to juvenile court proceedings, the Supreme Court also made the procedural safeguards developed in *Miranda v. Arizona* (384 U.S. 436, 1966) applicable to juveniles. Following the Gault decision, virtually all of the courts that have considered the applicability of the *Miranda* requirements for juveniles have concluded that the requirements do indeed apply (Davis 1991).

4. The average annual rate of change based on least squares analysis of UCR clearance rates by type of jurisdiction for 1971–1991 was –1.1% for large cities, –0.9% for suburban areas, and –0.6% for rural counties. A slightly greater rate of decrease for 1982–1991 occurred in large cities: –1.5% for large cities compared to –0.9% for suburban areas and –0.5% for rural counties.

5. Ineffective communication and lack of problem-oriented teamwork across public service agencies are universal problems of bureaucratic myopia (Hummel 1977). However, criminal justice organizations may be successful in outwardly portraying a unified image by use of the metaphor "criminal justice system" (Kelling 1991). The term *system* implies interaction, interdependence, and the performance of vital functions; the various organizations comprising this self-proclaimed system are in fact rarely held to such standards.

References

- Altschuler, David M. and Troy L. Armstrong. 1991. "Intensive Aftercare for the High-Risk Juvenile Parolee: Issues and Approaches in Reintegration and Community Supervision." Pp. 45–84 in *Intensive Interventions With High-Risk Youths: Promising Approaches in Juvenile Probation and*

164 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

- Parole*, edited by T. Armstrong. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.
- Bandura, Albert. 1973. *Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Bell, Carl. 1991. "Traumatic Stress and Children in Danger." *Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved* 2:175-88.
- Berke, Richard L. 1993. "Politicians Feel a Crime-Induced Chill in the Air." *The New York Times Week in Review*, October 24, p. 1.
- Black, Donald J. 1980. *The Manners and Customs of Police*. New York: Academic Press.
- Black, Donald J. and Albert J. Reiss, Jr. 1970. "Police Control of Juveniles." *American Sociological Review* 35:63-77.
- Boston Police Department Management Review Committee. 1992. *Report of the Boston Police Department Management Review Committee*. Boston, MA: City of Boston.
- Braithwaite, John. 1989. *Crime, Shame and Reintegration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Braswell, Michael, Steven Dillingham, and Reid Montgomery, Jr. 1985. *Prison Violence in America*. Cincinnati: Anderson.
- Brown, David. 1993. "Dealing With Public Disorder: Enforcement of New Police Powers in England and Wales." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Phoenix, AZ.
- Bynum, Tim S., Gary Cordner, and Jack Greene. 1982. "Victim and Offense Characteristics." *Criminology* 30:301-18.
- Camp, George M. and Camille Graham Camp. 1985. *Prison Gangs: Their Extent, Nature and Impact on Prisons*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Carter, Percy. 1989. "The New-Look Police Club." Pp. 45-58 in *Preventing Juvenile Crime*, edited by J. Vernon and S. McKillop. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.
- Cashmore, Ellis and Eugene McLaughlin. 1991. "Out of Order?" Pp. 10-41 in *Out of Order*, edited by E. Cashmore and E. McLaughlin. London: Routledge, Chapman and Hall.
- Cohen, Albert. 1955. *Delinquent Boys*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Cohen, Albert and James F. Short, Jr. 1958. "Research on Delinquent Subcultures." *Journal of Social Issues* 14:20-35.
- Davis, Samuel M. 1991. *Rights of Juveniles*. New York: Clark Boardman.
- Ehrensaft, Kenneth and Irving Spergel. 1993. *Police Model*. Arlington, VA: National Youth Gang Information Center.
- Erickson, Richard V. 1977. "Social Distance and Reaction to Criminality." *British Journal of Criminology* 17:16-29.
- Fagan, Jeffrey A. 1990. "Treatment and Reintegration of Violent Juvenile Offenders: Experimental Results." *Justice Quarterly* 7:233-63.
- Fridell, Lorie A. and Arnold Binder. 1992. "Police Officer Decision Making in Potentially Violent Confrontations." *Journal of Criminal Justice* 20:385-99.
- Garbarino, James, Nancy Dubrow, Kathleen Kostelny, and Carole Pardo. 1992. *Children in Danger: Coping With the Consequences of Community Violence*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967): 1431-2.
- Gay, William G. and Robert A. Bowers. 1985. *Targeting Law Enforcement Resources: The Career Criminal Focus*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.
- Gendreau, Paul and Robert R. Ross. 1991. "Correctional Treatment: Some Recommendations for Effective Intervention." Pp. 316-29 in *The Dilemmas of Corrections*, 2d ed., edited by K. Haas and G. Alpert. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland.
- Goldstein, Herman and Charles E. Susmilch. 1982. "The Repeat Sexual Offender in Madison: A Memorandum on the Problem and the Community's Response." Vol. 3 of the Project on Development of a Problem-Oriented Approach to Improving Police Service. Madison: University of Wisconsin Law School.
- Grant, Traci. 1992. "Police Plan to Sue Boston Rappers." *Boston Globe*, August 5, p. 43.
- Guarino-Ghezzi, Susan. 1993. *Project Reinforcement: Program Description and Findings*. Boston, MA. Mimeo.
- Guarino-Ghezzi, Susan and James Byrne. 1989. "Developing a Model of Structured Decision Making in Juvenile Corrections: The Massachusetts Experience." *Crime & Delinquency* 35:270-302.
- Guarino-Ghezzi, Susan and Edward J. Loughran. 1993. *Juvenile Justice in a Web of Change*. Boston, MA. (mimeo)
- Hagan, John and Alberto Palloni. 1990. "The Social Reproduction of a Criminal Class in Working-Class London, Circa 1950-1980." *American Journal of Sociology* 96:265-99.

Section II ▼ Reintegrative Police Surveillance of Juvenile Offenders 165

- Hagedorn, John M. 1988. *People and Folks*. Chicago: Lake View Press.
- Hummel, Ralph. 1977. *The Bureaucratic Experience*. New York: St. Martin.
- Irwin, John. 1980. *Prisons in Turmoil*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Jamieson, Katherine M. and Timothy Flanagan, eds. 1987. *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics—1986*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.
- Jankowski, Martin Sanchez. 1991. *Islands in the Street*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Karmen, Andrew. 1990. *Crime Victims*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Kelling, George L. 1987. "Juveniles and Police: The End of the Nightstick" Pp. 203–18 in *From Children to Citizens, Volume II, The Role of the Juvenile Court*, edited by F. Hartmann. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- . 1991. "Crime and Metaphor: Toward a New Conception of Policing." *NY The City Journal*, Autumn, pp. 65–72.
- Lauritsen, Janet L., Robert J. Sampson, and John H. Laub. 1991. "The Link Between Offending and Victimization Among Adolescents." *Criminology* 29:265–92.
- Lawrence, Michael D., John R. Snortum, and Franklin E. Zimring. 1988. *Social Control of the Drinking Driver*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- LeClair, Daniel P. and Susan Guarino-Ghezzi. 1991. "Does Incapacitation Guarantee Public Safety? Lessons From the Massachusetts Furlough and Prerelease Programs." *Justice Quarterly* 8:8–36.
- Lipsky, Michael. 1980. *Street-Level Bureaucracy*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Lockwood, Daniel. 1991. "Target Violence." Pp. 87–104 in *The Dilemmas of Corrections*, edited by K. Haas and G. Alpert. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland.
- Lundman, Richard J., Richard E. Sykes, and John P. Clark. 1978. "Police Control of Juveniles: A Replication." Pp. 158–68 in *Juveniles in Justice: A Book of Readings*, edited by T. Rubin. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Martin, Susan E. and Lawrence K. Sherman. 1986. *Catching Career Criminals: The Washington, D.C., Repeat Offender Project*. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.
- Matza, David. 1964. *Delinquency and Drift*. New York: Wiley.
- McGarrell, Edmund F. and Timothy J. Flanagan, eds. 1985. *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1984*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.
- Miller, Walter. 1958. "Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency." *Journal of Social Issues* 14:5–19.
- . 1976. "Youth Gangs in the Urban Crisis Era." Pp. 91–122 in *Delinquency, Crime and Society*, edited by J. F. Short. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
- Moore, Joan. 1978. *Homeboys*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Moore, Mark H., Susan R. Estrich, Daniel McGillis, and William Spelman. 1984. *Dangerous Offenders: The Elusive Target of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Morrison, Micah. 1992. "Cops Get Up-Close and Personal." *Insight*, August, p. 7.
- Muir, William K. 1977. *Police: Street Corner Politicians*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Murphy, Sean P. and John Ellement. 1992. "Internal Police Probe Discounts Most Allegations of Misconduct." *Boston Globe*, August 20, p. 1.
- Needle, Jerome A. and William Vaughan Stapleton. 1983. *Police Handling of Youth Gangs*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Palmer, Ted. 1984. "Treatment and the Role of Classification: A Review of the Basics." *Crime & Delinquency* 30:245–68.
- Paternoster, Raymond. 1989. "Decisions to Participate in and Desist From Four Types of Common Delinquency: Deterrence and the Rational Choice Perspective." *Law and Society Review* 23:7–40.
- Polier, Justine Wise. 1989. *Juvenile Justice in Double Jeopardy: The Distanced Community and Vengeful Retribution*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Price, Richard. 1992. *Clockers*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Reaves, Brian A. 1992. *State and Local Police Departments 1990*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
- Reuss-Ianni, Elizabeth. 1984. *Two Cultures of Policing: Street Cops and Management*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Schneider, Anne and Laurie Ervin. 1990. "Specific Deterrence, Rational Choice, and Decision Heuristics: Applications in Juvenile Justice." *Social Science Quarterly* 71:585–601.
- Schwartz, Richard D. and Jerome H. Skolnick. 1962. "Two Studies of Legal Stigma." *Social Problems* 10:133–42.

166 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

- Skogan, Wesley. 1990. *Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods*. New York: Free Press.
- Skolnick, Jerome H. 1966. *Justice Without Trial*. New York: Wiley.
- Skolnick, Jerome H. and David H. Bayley. 1986. *The New Blue Line*. New York: Free Press.
- Sparrow, Malcolm, Mark Moore, and David Kennedy. 1990. *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing*. New York: Basic Books.
- Spergel, Irving. 1990. "Youth Gangs: Continuity and Change." Pp. 171–276 in *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, vol. 12, edited by M. Tonry and N. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Spergel, Irving, Ron Chance, Kenneth Ehrensaft, Thomas Regulus, Candice Kane, Robert Laseter, Alba Alexander, and Sandra Oh. 1993. *National Youth Gang Suppression and Intervention Program—Program Models*. Arlington, VA: National Youth Gang Information Center.
- Taylor, Ralph B. and Stephen Gottfredson. 1986. "Environmental Design, Crime and Prevention." Pp. 387–416 in *Communities and Crime*, edited by A. J. Reiss and M. Tonry, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Thrasher, Frederick. [1927] 1963. *The Gang*. Abridged ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Treger, Harvey. 1975. *The Police-Social Worker Team*. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas.
- U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 1972–1992a. *Uniform Crime Reports for the United States*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.
- U.S. Department of Justice. 1992b. *On the Front Lines: Case Studies of Policing in America's Cities*. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, The United States Conference of Mayors.
- . 1993. *A Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Weber, Max. 1946. "Bureaucracy." Pp. 196–244 in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited by H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Whyte, William F. 1943. *Street Corner Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wilson, James Q. 1968. *Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 1975. *Thinking About Crime*. New York: Basic Books.
- Wilson, James Q. and George L. Kelling. 1982. "The Police and Neighborhood Safety." *The Atlantic*, March, pp. 29–38.
- Wolff, Craig. 1993. "Tales of Police Corruption Not Surprising, 46th Precinct Residents Say." *The New York Times*, October 10, p. 35.
- Zatz, Marjorie S. 1987. "Chicano Youth Gangs and Crime: The Creation of a Moral Panic." *Contemporary Crises* 11:129–58.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. According to the author's findings, what are some reasons police are not effective in controlling crime and disorder in inner-city neighborhoods?
2. Explain what the author means by the police failure to protect inner-city youths. Give an example from your own city or one near you, based on your observation or from a newspaper or television report.
3. Explain the "missing link" between corrections and the police, and give an example of how corrections agents and police could work together to reduce crime in your community.
4. Explain what the author means by "reintegrative surveillance" and give an example of how that approach might work in your city.

READING

Throughout history, during periods of disorder and criminal activity, or when any groups of people are perceived to be out of control and inclined toward criminal behavior, curfews have been used as a means of social control. Most recently in many cities, juveniles have been the subject of curfew ordinances. The authors of this article examine the constitutional ramifications and current status of curfew laws in the United States; they discuss the appropriate standard of constitutional review for cases involving curfews and examine the major state and federal cases addressing the constitutionality of juvenile curfew laws and their legal implications.

Juvenile Curfews and the Courts

Judicial Response to a Not-So-New Crime Control Strategy

Craig Hemmens, Katherine Bennett

A perception that juvenile crime is out of control is shared by the public, legislatures, and many criminal justice policy makers. Although the empirical evidence indicates that this perception is incorrect (Howell 1997), it has led to the adoption of a get tough approach to juvenile offenders. Legislatures and other government agencies are implementing a number of measures intended to reduce juvenile crime, including more liberal provisions for waiver to adult court (Fritsch and Hemmens 1995), increased use of incarceration as a sanction for serious juvenile offenders (Jeffs and Smith 1996), and modification of the goals of the juvenile justice system to align it more closely with the criminal justice system (Hemmens, Fritsch, and Caeti 1997).

Juvenile curfews are another currently popular approach to the problem of juvenile crime and delinquency. Although it is unclear whether they are effective in reducing crime, it is clear that they are being embraced by communities across the country (Conference of Mayors 1997). This article examines the constitutional ramifications and

current status of juvenile curfew laws in the United States. The history, purpose, and form of juvenile curfews are first presented, followed by a discussion of the appropriate standard of constitutional review for cases involving curfews. Finally, the major state and federal cases addressing juvenile curfew constitutionality are examined and categorized.

A Brief History of Juvenile Curfews

Curfews, or laws requiring people to vacate public areas and streets, have existed for centuries. Early curfews were aimed at all inhabitants of a town, not just juveniles, and were used as a means of social control of the citizenry (Hall 1957; Ward 1956). In this country, curfews were used in the antebellum South to control when slaves and free Blacks could be on the streets (Federle 1995). Curfews have also been used during times of local or national emergency, such as

168 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

during World War II (Freitas 1996). Curfews have occasionally been used to proscribe a particular activity during certain time periods. For instance, at least 18 states have a night-driving curfew for young drivers and permit holders (Williams and Lund 1986).

Juveniles have been the most common curfew target in this country. Juvenile curfews began to gain popularity during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The first juvenile curfew ordinance was enacted in Omaha, Nebraska, in 1880 (Schwartz 1985). In 1884, juvenile curfews were endorsed as a panacea by President Harrison (Note 1958). By 1900, there were more than 3,000 juvenile curfew ordinances in this country (Mooney 1977). Progressive era reformers, largely responsible for the creation of a separate juvenile justice system, saw curfews as a means to control as well as to protect unsupervised and neglected children, an increasingly common phenomena in the new urbanized, industrial society (Platt 1969).

Although many cities have had curfew ordinances on the books for the better part of a century, enforcement has been sporadic. Police departments have frequently asserted that they were too busy investigating “serious” crimes to be bothered with enforcing a curfew or that they lacked the resources to enforce the curfew (Scherf 1992). Enforcement of juvenile curfews increased in this country during World War II, when juvenile delinquency again became a national concern. After the war, America experienced a population boom, leading to a tremendous increase in the number of teenagers by the late 1950s. Cities responded by enacting juvenile curfews. As of 1957, a little more than half of the 109 cities with populations in excess of 100,000 had juvenile curfew ordinances (Note 1958).

The 1970s saw the discarding of the rehabilitative ideal and adoption of the “justice” or “just deserts” model in criminal justice. Juvenile crime was perceived as spiraling out of control. One result was the get tough on juvenile crime movement and increased sanctions for youthful offenders (Boland and Wilson 1978; Fritsch,

Caeti, and Hemmens 1998; Fritsch and Hemmens 1995). These sanctions include juvenile curfews, which seem to some practitioners and legislators to be an ideal means of dealing with new problems such as juvenile street gangs and violent juvenile crime. Indeed, some commentators assert that the recent spate of curfew adoptions is directly attributable to gun violence committed by (and on) urban juveniles (Ruefle and Reynolds 1995).

A recent study reveals that 59 of the 77 (77 percent) American cities with a population in excess of 200,000 have juvenile curfew ordinances (Ruefle and Reynolds 1995). It has been estimated that approximately 1,000 local juvenile curfew ordinances have been adopted since 1990 (Sheperd 1996). President Clinton has endorsed juvenile curfews, and the 1996 Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Act provides \$75 million for support of local initiatives such as curfews and antitruancy ordinances (Department of Justice 1996). Cities with curfew ordinances already on the books are suddenly enforcing them, while other cities are enacting curfew laws (Feldmann 1996; Sharp 1996; Smith 1994).

Purpose, Form, Effectiveness, and Opinion of Juvenile Curfews

Proponents of juvenile curfews provide four major justifications for such ordinances: protecting juveniles from crime, reducing juvenile crime, protecting society, and reinforcing parental authority (Carmen, Parker, and Reddington 1997). Curfew laws are a manifestation of the twin goals of the juvenile justice system of the Progressive era—seeing to the best interests of the child while, at the same time, imposing stricter social controls on unruly youth (Platt 1969; Rothman 1980).

The vast majority of juvenile curfews are acts of local municipal legislation. Municipalities are free to enact regulatory ordinances in the exercise of their police powers as long as those ordinances

do not unduly restrict or impair a constitutional right. The terms of juvenile curfews vary by city (see, e.g., Bilchik 1996). Many ordinances require that juveniles be off of the streets late at night, whereas others focus on preventing truancy by limiting their access to the streets or certain businesses during school hours. Most curfews are set at later hours on weekends and during the summer. Most of them also provide a number of exceptions to the general rule, allowing juveniles out past curfew for emergencies or to go to work or to a legitimate social function.

Different police responses to curfew violators are also permitted: Some cities require police officers to arrest juvenile curfew violators and bring them to a detention center; others permit them to take the child home; still others allow them to simply issue a ticket to the juvenile. Sanctions also vary by city. For example, many cities divert first offenders, whereas others permit the imposition on them of fines and/or community service (Bilchik 1996). Parents may also be held responsible in more egregious cases (Kalvig 1996).

There is strong support for juvenile curfews. Law enforcement and city officials applaud them as an effective tool for crime prevention (Conference of Mayors 1997; Trollinger 1996). A number of city residents also favor curfews. For example, a 1994 survey found that 92 percent of Cincinnati residents supported that city's curfew, whereas a survey of juveniles in the District of Columbia found that 77 percent of them supported the citywide curfew enacted in 1995 (Crowell 1996).

Although curfew opponents sometimes raise the specter of racist motivation for such laws, support for curfews is not limited to White citizens. Of Black residents living in Mobile, Alabama, 75 percent who were surveyed in 1994 supported a proposed curfew ordinance (Crowell 1996). Blacks comprise a majority of the District of Columbia city council, which enacted a juvenile curfew in 1995. The New Orleans juvenile curfew was proposed by a Black mayor, enacted by a majority Black city council, and enforced by a police department headed by a Black chief (Ruefle and Reynolds 1996).

From the beginning, there has been opposition to curfews. An 1896 critic voiced concerns echoed today: Juvenile crime occurs mainly during the day rather than at night when the curfew is in force, and there are a number of legitimate reasons for juveniles to be afoot at odd hours (Buck 1896). Other critics have argued that curfews do not foster family harmony and parental authority; rather, they damage family relations by interposing the authority of the state between parent and child (Chen 1997).

Another criticism is that law enforcement does not always enforce the curfew equitably (National Council on Crime and Delinquency 1972; Ruefle and Reynolds 1995). A belief held by some is that police officers target minority youth and use the curfew as an excuse to harass those youth. In jurisdictions in which juvenile curfews were enforced in the past, citizen complaints and claims of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement were not uncommon.

There is remarkably little empirical research on the impact of curfews on either juvenile crime or the overall crime rate; thus, it is unclear how effective they are at reducing crime. Several cities that have begun vigorously enforcing curfew ordinances insist that doing so has resulted in a marked reduction in juvenile crime; juvenile victimization; and, in some instances, the overall crime rate (Bilchik 1996; Sharp 1996). Although these studies are incomplete, it is apparent that vigorous curfew enforcement has certainly had an impact on the lives of juveniles—almost 6,000 children have been arrested in New Orleans since the city began enforcing a curfew ordinance in June 1994 (Sheperd 1996).

Other studies suggest that curfews may simply cause temporal or geographic crime displacement. A study of the effects of a juvenile curfew that was adopted by Detroit in 1976 in response to a rash of crimes involving juveniles found that although juvenile crime dropped 6 percent during curfew hours, it actually increased by 13 percent in the curfews and antitrancy ordinances mid-afternoon hours (Hunt and Weiner 1977). Nationally, violent crimes committed by

170 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

juveniles are most frequent between the hours of 3 P.M. and 4 P.M., and approximately 33 percent of all juvenile violent crime takes place between 3 P.M. and 7 P.M. Less than 20 percent of violent juvenile crime occurs during normal curfew hours (Snyder, Sickmund, and Poe-Yamagatta 1996). Although most juvenile curfews proscribe the presence of juveniles in public areas during the late night and early morning hours, less than 8 percent of all violent juvenile crime occurs between 11 P.M. and 1 A.M. (Fox and Newman 1997). These statistics suggest that reliance on curfews to substantially reduce juvenile crime may be misplaced, at best.

Constitutional Rights and Judicial Standards of Review

Juvenile curfews have been challenged as violating several different provisions of the constitution, including the First and Fourteenth Amendments. First Amendment freedoms restricted by juvenile curfews include those of association and assembly. Fourteenth Amendment rights affected by juvenile curfews include equal protection and due process. Claims involving violations of enumerated constitutional rights are often coupled with challenges based on overbreadth or vagueness (Toth 1995).

Although most challenges to juvenile curfews have centered on impairment of the rights of juveniles, from the beginning there have been challenges based on the infringement of the parents' rights to raise their children. The Supreme Court has historically accorded parents the authority to raise their children as they see fit, without state interference. In addition, most states have statutes expressly holding parents responsible for their children.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that the constitution and the protections found in the Bill of Rights apply to juveniles. It has also held on numerous occasions that states and municipalities may place restrictions on the constitutional rights of juveniles, which would be per se unconstitutional if applied to adults. This section

discusses the differing standards of constitutional review that are applied to juvenile curfews.

Judicial Standards of Review

Often in constitutional law, the outcome of a case is determined as much by the standard of review that the court employs as by the facts of the case. Not all of the individual protections set forth in the Bill of Rights are accorded the same respect—rather, there is a hierarchy of rights. The court employs either strict scrutiny or rational basis review, depending on whether a fundamental right is implicated or a suspect classification is affected (Tribe 1988).

Fundamental rights are those freedoms that are essential to the concept of ordered liberty; they are rights without which neither liberty nor justice would exist. Examples include virtually all of the various provisions of the Bill of Rights. Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection are also included in the list of fundamental rights. Such rights are fundamental for adults, but juveniles have traditionally been accorded fewer rights based on their youthful status; therefore, rights deemed fundamental for adults may not be seen as fundamental for juveniles.

To date, the Supreme Court has held that only race and religion are suspect classifications in all circumstances, although gender, illegitimacy, and poverty have occasionally been treated as suspect classifications by the high court (Tribe 1988). Although discrimination on the basis of a suspect classification is considered presumptively irrational and constitutionally invalid, age is not a suspect classification (Chen 1997). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from treating citizens in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, but this does not mean that all disparate treatment is unconstitutional, only that the state may not treat people differently without a valid reason.

Strict Scrutiny Review

Under strict scrutiny review, the state may not enact legislation that abridges a fundamental

right unless (1) it has a compelling interest that justifies restricting a fundamental right and (2) the legislation is narrowly tailored so that the fundamental right is not abridged any more than absolutely necessary to effectuate the state's compelling interest. In addition, the Supreme Court requires that for legislation to be narrowly tailored, there must exist a sufficient nexus between the legislative body's stated interest and either the classification drawn or the means chosen to advance the state's compelling interest. This standard of review is referred to as the strict scrutiny test because the court looks closely at the purpose and the effect of the legislation rather than merely accepting the claims of the legislature that the legislation is needed or accepting the legislation as presumptively valid. The reason for employing a higher standard of review when legislation affects a fundamental right or suspect classification is that closer analysis is required when individual liberties are threatened.

Rational Basis Review

If neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is implicated, a state may enact legislation abridging that right or affecting that class so long as there is a rational basis for the legislation. This standard of review is generally referred to as the rational basis test because under it, the court will not strike down legislation that appears to have some rational basis. The court does not look closely at the effects of the legislation, unlike the strict scrutiny test. Under this standard of review, state actions are presumptively valid (Tribe 1988). This standard of review is obviously a much easier one to pass. The legislature need not choose the best possible means; it must merely appear that it has chosen means that are not wholly unrelated to achievement of the legislative purpose.

The determination of whether a right is fundamental is the key to the outcome of many cases. The question for juvenile curfews, then, is do curfews impinge on any fundamental rights? If so, courts must apply strict scrutiny review and the curfew ordinance is likely to be invalidated. If, on

the other hand, courts determine that juvenile curfews do not abridge any fundamental rights, the ordinance need pass only rational basis review and, consequently, it is likely to be upheld.

Supreme Court Cases Affecting the Constitutional Rights of Juveniles

Early Supreme Court cases involving regulation of juveniles treated the issue as a conflict between the interests of the state and the authority of the parents rather than as a conflict between the child and the state. In 1923, the court struck down a state law that prohibited the use of any language other than English in schools; in so doing, the court held that such a law infringed on the parents' "right of control" over their children by limiting who they could hire as a teacher (*Meyer v. Nebraska* 1923). Two years later, in *Pierce v. Society of Sisters* (1925), the court struck down an Oregon state law requiring children younger than age 17 to attend public, rather than private, schools. The court determined that such a law constituted an unreasonable interference with the authority of parents to determine the path of their child's education. The language of these cases suggested that children did not possess rights independent of their parents.

The Supreme Court continued to follow the approaches of *Meyer v. Nebraska* (1923) and *Pierce v. Society of Sisters* (1925) to juvenile rights for several decades. In *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, decided in 1972, the court struck down a state compulsory education statute as applied to members of the Amish religious order. The court focused not on how the law restricted children's religious freedoms but rather on how it limited parents' First Amendment rights.

The idea that juveniles were second-class citizens, subordinate to their parents, began to lose favor, however, during the 1960s. In *Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District* (1969), the court determined that a school policy banning the wearing of black armbands to protest the Vietnam conflict violated the minor's

172 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

fundamental right to freedom of speech. In doing so, it made no distinction between the rights of children (students) and adults (teachers and/or parents).

During the 1960s, the Supreme Court decided on a series of cases extending specific due process rights to juveniles involved in juvenile court proceedings. These rights included the right to counsel at a juvenile hearing, the right to notice of the charges, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a waiver hearing, and the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (Manfredi 1998). Although the court's extension of a number of rights is notable, also notable is its refusal to treat juveniles the same as adults. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the state has greater authority over children than it has over adults. In *Ginsberg v. New York* (1968), the Supreme Court held that juveniles do not have the same First Amendment rights as do adults; thus, the state could prohibit the sale of sexually explicit magazines to juveniles. In *McKeiver v. Pennsylvania* (1971), the Supreme Court declined to provide the right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings. The rights accorded to juveniles by the court during this period were largely procedural in nature—states were required to process juveniles in the juvenile justice system in much the same manner as they processed adults in the criminal justice system. However, these decisions did not prevent states from enforcing laws that affected juveniles differently than they affected adults.

The Bellotti v. Baird Test

In *Bellotti v. Baird* (1979), the Supreme Court clearly illuminated its rationale for denying juveniles the protection of some fundamental rights while extending the protection of others to the same degree as enjoyed by adults. In striking down a Massachusetts statute requiring pregnant women younger than age 18 to obtain the consent of both parents before undergoing an abortion, the Supreme Court first noted that children are not without some constitutional protections. The court also acknowledged that children are different than adults and that the state has a special

duty to protect children. Consequently, although juveniles generally possess the same constitutional rights as do adults, the state may adjust its legal system to take into account the special vulnerability of children. From this, the court enunciated three considerations that provided states with the authority to infringe on the rights of a juvenile to a greater degree than on an adult's rights: (1) the "peculiar vulnerability of children"; (2) the inability of children to make important decisions in a mature, intelligent manner; and (3) the importance of the parent in child rearing.

This three-part test has been applied by federal and state courts to determine when the state may restrict fundamental rights of juveniles in contexts other than the decision whether to have an abortion. A number of courts faced with challenges to juvenile curfew ordinances have used the *Bellotti* test to determine the validity of the curfew, although the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the applicability of the *Bellotti* test to such curfews. Commentators have suggested that reliance on *Bellotti* by the lower courts is misplaced because that case dealt with the extremely sensitive and complex issue of abortion and the concerns expressed in that case may not extend to curfews (Toth 1995).

Cases Involving Juvenile Curfews

Although juvenile curfews have existed since the latter part of the nineteenth century, there are relatively few cases involving challenges to these ordinances. All of the early cases are state court decisions because no federal court considered a juvenile curfew case until 1975. This section reviews the leading state and federal cases dealing with juvenile curfews.

Early Juvenile Curfew Cases

Courts deciding early challenges to juvenile curfews did not look to the Fourteenth Amendment or the provisions of the Bill of Rights for guidance because the Supreme Court

had not yet begun the process of incorporating the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. Instead, courts relied on general legal principles, such as vagueness and overbreadth.

The first case involving a juvenile curfew was decided in 1898. In *Ex parte McCarver* (1898), a Texas state court held unconstitutional a curfew ordinance that prohibited persons younger than the age of 21 from being on the public streets after 9 P.M. unless accompanied by a parent or seeking medical attention. The court criticized the curfew as "paternalistic," "an invasion of the personal liberty of the citizen," and an "attempt to usurp the parental functions."

In *Baker v. Borough of Steelton* (1912), a Pennsylvania court upheld as a lawful exercise of police power a municipal ordinance prohibiting those persons younger than age 16 from being on the streets after 9 P.M. unless accompanied by a parent or guardian or unless in possession of a note indicating that there was an emergency. The court noted that the city had a legitimate interest in protecting children from possible harm, determining that the curfew was related to this legitimate end and employing what is today referred to as the rational basis test.

In *People v. Walton* (1945), a California appellate court upheld a Los Angeles curfew prohibiting juveniles younger than age 16 from "remaining" or "loitering" on the street after 9 P.M. unless approval was obtained from the police. The court distinguished *McCarver* by noting that the Texas ordinance prohibited being on the streets altogether, whereas the Los Angeles ordinance prohibited the more narrow activities of "remaining" and "loitering." The court went on to say that juveniles are not accorded the same rights as adults, precisely because of their status as juveniles. As in *Baker*, the court used a rational basis standard of review.

Recent Juvenile Curfew Cases

Although the Supreme Court has not dealt directly with the issue of juvenile curfews, an increasing number of lower federal courts and state courts have done so in recent years. These

courts have focused on the constitutionality of juvenile curfews and whether a fundamental right is implicated or a suspect classification exists. The crucial factor in these recent cases is whether the court applies rational basis or strict scrutiny review.

Many courts apply the rational basis standard of review. They do this (1) because they believe that the state has a heightened interest in the regulation of children's behavior, (2) because they believe that children possess lesser rights than adults and that no fundamental right is implicated, or (3) because children may be treated differently and are not a suspect classification.

Other courts have applied strict scrutiny analysis. Those doing so have generally found that the higher level of review is required because curfews implicate rights of minors similar to those of adults and, hence, are fundamental. Although strict scrutiny analysis often results in state legislation being invalidated, such is not always the case. Courts applying strict scrutiny analysis to juvenile curfews have struck down some curfews while upholding others. Courts striking down the curfews have done so because the state failed to establish a compelling state interest or because the means of achieving the state interest were not sufficiently narrowly tailored. Courts upholding juvenile curfews while applying strict scrutiny analysis have done so because the state established both a compelling state interest and the curfew ordinance appears to be sufficiently narrowly tailored.

State cases involving juvenile curfews. There have been a number of recent state court decisions involving juvenile curfews. These are presented in Table 1 and discussed below.

Several state courts have upheld juvenile curfews. In *People v. Chambers* (1976), the Illinois statewide curfew law was upheld by the state supreme court. The curfew was unusual in that it was enacted by the state legislature and covered the entire state, including rural and urban areas. The bulk of curfew laws are enacted at the local level in response to local problems. In upholding the law, the court

174 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

acknowledged both the state's legitimate interest in reducing juvenile crime, which was increasing at the time, and the state's traditional authority to protect children. These interests permitted the state to infringe on the juvenile's rights. The fact that the law extended statewide was not a problem but rather a benefit because it indicated that the law did not discriminate in its application, at least in regard to geography.

In *In re J. M.* (1989), the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a local ordinance that made it unlawful for a person younger than age 18 to loiter in any public or private area between the hours of 10 P.M. and 6 A.M. unless accompanied by an adult. The court determined that the ordinance was a legitimate means by which the state could reinforce parental authority and that the curfew actually encouraged parents to take an active role in supervising their children. The court saw curfews as a necessary support mechanism for parents who were unable to adequately supervise and to be responsible for their children. In addition, the court determined that the city ordinance was narrowly drawn, thus achieving its goals without unduly infringing on the liberty interests of juveniles.

In *Panora v. Simmons* (1989), the Iowa Supreme Court upheld a juvenile curfew ordinance that prohibited juveniles younger than age 18 from being in a public place between the hours of 10 P.M. and 5 A.M. The state court determined that no fundamental rights or suspect classifications were implicated by the ordinance and therefore applied a rational basis standard of review. Under this level of analysis, the city met its burden of demonstrating that the juvenile curfew ordinance was rationally related to the legitimate state interest in protecting society.

The Arizona Court of Appeals, in *In re Maricopa County* (1994), upheld a 10 P.M. juvenile curfew enacted in 1993 by the city of Phoenix. The curfew provided an exception for juveniles "on reasonable, legitimate and specific business or activity directed or permitted by his parent." The court held that the juvenile curfew was a valid means by which the state could support parents and aid in supervising children in the "many cases [where] the traditional family unit . . . has dissolved." Using the three part *Bellotti* test in its analysis, the court determined that the peculiar circumstances of childhood dictated a heightened interest held by the state in

Table 1 Significant State Cases Challenging Juvenile Curfews

Case	Alleged Violation	Basis for Review	Violation Found
<i>People v. Chambers</i> , 360 N.E.2d 55 (Illinois, 1976)	First, Fourteenth Amendments	Real and substantial relation to government interests	No
<i>In re J. M.</i> , 768 P.2d 219 (Colorado, 1989)	Freedom of movement, overbroad	Rational basis	No
<i>Panora v. Simmons</i> , 445 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa, 1989)	Vagueness, right to travel	Rational basis	No
<i>City of Maquoketa v. Russell</i> , 484 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa, 1992)	First Amendment, overbroad	Strict scrutiny	Yes, not narrowly tailored to achieve state interests
<i>In re Maricopa County</i> , 887 P.2d 599 (Arizona, 1994)	First Amendment	Rational basis	No

protecting children, thus justifying the limitation on a fundamental right.

Few state courts have struck down juvenile curfews. Just three years after the decision in *Panora v. Simmons* (1989) to uphold a curfew, the Iowa Supreme Court in *City of Maquoketa v. Russell* (1992) struck down an ordinance modeled after the one upheld in *Panora*. The city ordinance prohibited juveniles from being outside after 10 P.M., unless accompanied by a parent or going directly to or from work or a “parentally approved supervised activity.” Justice Lavorato, who dissented in *Panora*, wrote the majority opinion. He asserted that juvenile curfew laws implicated fundamental rights of juveniles, including First Amendment freedoms of religion, speech, and association. Therefore, strict scrutiny, rather than rational basis, was the proper standard of review. Under this level of analysis, the juvenile curfew fell for not being narrowly tailored to achieve the state interests.

Federal cases involving juvenile curfews. Prior to 1975, no federal court had decided a case involving a juvenile curfew ordinance. Since the first decision in *Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown* (1975), at least six cases have been decided in federal courts. These are presented in Table 2.

Several federal courts have upheld juvenile curfews, either under rational basis review or strict scrutiny. The juvenile curfew ordinance at issue in *Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown* (1975) prohibited minors younger than age 18 from being on the street between the hours of 10 P.M. (younger than age 12), 10:30 P.M. (age 12 or 13), or 11 P.M. (age 14 to 17) and 6 A.M. unless one or more of several stated exceptions applied. Exceptions included being accompanied by a parent, in the case of an emergency, or if returning home from a legitimate social activity such as a school or church event.

The ordinance was challenged by the plaintiff mother on behalf of her 12-year-old son. No curfew violation had occurred; rather, the plaintiff sought an injunction and declaratory relief.

The plaintiff contended that phrases in the ordinance were impermissibly vague, violated First Amendment rights of minors, violated minors’ right to travel, infringed on parents’ right to control the upbringing of their children, and denied minors equal protection.

The district court determined that portions of the ordinance that gave virtually unfettered discretion to the mayor were too vague, but the court held that with the deletions of the impermissibly vague words and phrases, the ordinance as an entity was not unconstitutionally vague. The court also held that juveniles’ constitutional rights may be regulated to a greater extent than adults without violating the Constitution. The court determined that although the curfew restricted freedom of movement, such freedom was personal rather than absolute and was subject to “reasonable regulations.” The court thus ruled that freedom of movement was neither a fundamental right nor a First Amendment right. The court further concluded that there was a rational relationship between the ordinance and the interests of the city. Governmental interests in advancing and protecting the general community’s welfare and safety outweighed the minor’s freedom of movement interest.

The court did agree with plaintiffs that the minor’s First Amendment right to freedom of association for social purposes was infringed. It held, however, that this right was outweighed by legitimate government interests furthered by the ordinance. The First Amendment right to free speech was not violated at all because the ordinance did not regulate speech, only “noncommunicative conduct.”

Courts and commentators have argued that the *Bykofsky* court misapplied the process by which it is determined whether a fundamental right is implicated (Chen 1997; Tribe 1988). The proper method is to first determine the nature of the right that was restricted and then to select the appropriate standard of review. The *Bykofsky* court, however, reversed the process, first determining that the state had a heightened interest in the welfare of children and then concluding that

176 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Table 2 Significant Federal Cases Challenging Juvenile Curfews

Case	Alleged Violation	Basis for Review	Violation Found
<i>Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown</i> , 401 F. Supp. 1242 (1975)	First, Fourteenth Amendments, right to travel, parental rights of child rearing, vagueness	Rational basis	Yes to vagueness; no to all other allegations
<i>Naprstek v. City of Norwich</i> , 545 F.2d 815 (Second Circuit, 1976)	First, Fourteenth Amendments, vagueness	Rational basis	Yes, voided curfew for vagueness
<i>Johnson v. City of Opelousas</i> , 658 F.2d 1065 (Fifth Circuit, 1981)	First, Fourteenth Amendments, right to travel, vagueness, overbroad	Strict scrutiny	Yes, unconstitutionally overbroad
<i>McColleston v. City of Keene</i> , 586 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H., 1984)	First, Fourteenth Amendments, overbroad	Strict scrutiny	Yes, facially overbroad
<i>Waters v. Barry</i> , 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C., 1989)	First, Fourth, Fifth Amendments, overbroad	Strict scrutiny	Yes to First, Fifth Amendments and overbreadth
<i>Qutb v. Strauss</i> , 11 F.3d 488 (Fifth Circuit, 1993)	First, Fifth, Fourteenth Amendments, vagueness, overbroad	Strict scrutiny	No
<i>Hutchins v. District of Columbia</i> , 942 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C., 1996)	First, Fourth, Fifth Amendments, vagueness, overbroad	Strict scrutiny	Yes to Fifth Amendment violation of equal protection and due process
<i>Nunez v. City of San Diego</i> , 1997 WL304747 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)	First Amendment, vagueness, parental rights of child rearing	Strict scrutiny	Yes to vagueness, First Amendment, and parental rights

minors' freedom of movement was not a fundamental right.

In 1994, a court for the first time upheld a juvenile curfew while applying strict scrutiny review. In *Qutb v. Strauss* (1993), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Dallas curfew that prohibited persons younger than age 17 "from remaining in a public place or establishment from 11 P.M. until 6 A.M. on week nights and from 12 midnight until 6 A.M. on weekends." The curfew provided several exceptions, including being accompanied by a parent or guardian; running an

errand for a parent or guardian or an emergency errand; traveling in a motor vehicle to or from work; being involved in employment-related activities; or engaging in interstate travel. Minors affected by the curfew could still "attend school, religious, or civic organization functions, or generally exercise First Amendment speech and association rights." The curfew also permitted minors to remain on sidewalks in front of their homes or in front of neighbors' homes.

The Fifth Circuit noted that because the ordinance differentiated classes of individuals

based on age, the curfew must be analyzed under the equal protection clause. The plaintiffs charged that the curfew impinged on the fundamental right “to move about freely in public.” Assuming that the right to move about freely is a fundamental right and that it is impinged on by the curfew ordinance, the court accordingly subjected the ordinance to strict scrutiny review and asked whether it was sufficiently narrowly drawn to accomplish the state’s compelling interest.

Dallas presented statistical data establishing the amount of juvenile crime and the time of day that violent crime was likely to occur. Even though the city could not provide data regarding juvenile crime committed during curfew hours or juvenile victimization occurring during those hours, the circuit court held that the city did provide adequate data to establish that the age classification of the curfew fit the state’s compelling interest. The court further stated that the ordinance, particularly in light of the numerous exceptions, employed the least restrictive means of accomplishing its stated goals. The Fifth Circuit was unimpressed with the district court’s examples of activities that would be curtailed by the curfew, such as “concerts, movies, plays, study groups, or church activities that may extend past curfew hours” or even “an innocent stroll or gazing at stars from a public park.” The court noted that minors could engage in those activities if accompanied by a parent or guardian. The court then stated that “innocent strolls” could still be taken until 11 P.M. on weeknights and 12 A.M. on weekends; “indeed, a juvenile may stare at the stars all night long from the front sidewalk of his or her home or the home of a neighbor.”

Several federal courts have struck down juvenile curfews, generally after employing a strict scrutiny analysis. In 1976, the Second Circuit in *Naprstek v. City of Norwich* invalidated a curfew ordinance, ruling it void for vagueness. The curfew had been in existence for 56 years. Constitutional issues raised by the plaintiffs were similar to those raised in *Bykofsky*, including violations of freedom of speech, assembly, association, and parents’ rights to due process and

family privacy. The appellate court ruled that by failing to provide a termination time for the curfew, the ordinance was “void for vagueness” and unconstitutional in its application. In *Johnson v. City of Opelousas* (1981), the Fifth Circuit found the Opelousas ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague and facially overbroad, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and in violation of the minor’s right of interstate and intrastate travel. The curfew in Opelousas prohibited minors younger than age 17 from being on the street or in a public place between 11 P.M. and 4 A.M. between Sunday and Thursday and 1 A.M. and 4 A.M. on Friday and Saturday, unless accompanied by an adult or in response to an emergency. The Fifth Circuit recognized that restrictions on minors that would be unconstitutionally invalid if applied to adults may be justified, but only if they serve significant state interests. The court then held that the curfew was unconstitutionally overbroad because it unnecessarily prohibited minors from engaging in First Amendment activities, such as association and interstate travel. By including innocent activities in its list of prohibited activities, the curfew was not sufficiently narrowly drawn. The fault with the curfew in this case was that it allowed too few exceptions. The court decided that the nighttime activities prohibited by the curfew, such as religious or school meetings, burdened minors’ fundamental rights. The ordinance at issue prevented minors from engaging in legitimate employment, being on the sidewalk in front of their own houses, and interstate travel.

In 1984, a federal district court struck down a New Hampshire city curfew ordinance in *McColleston v. City of Keene* (1984). The curfew applied to juveniles younger than age 16 and was in effect from 10 P.M. until 5 A.M. The ordinance contained several exceptions, including minors who were passengers in a motor vehicle and minors traveling before midnight to or from participation in a public assembly. The plaintiffs contended that the ordinance was still overly broad and violated due process guarantees against unreasonable governmental interference

178 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

with citizens' liberty and privacy rights. The defendants claimed that the ordinance was narrowly drawn, given the exceptions provided for legitimate activity. Furthermore, the city argued that restrictions on the minors' or the minors' parents' liberty and privacy interests were justified by the "significant and legitimate public purposes" that were served by the ordinance.

The district court sided with the plaintiffs and found the ordinance to be overbroad and to impermissibly curtail liberty and privacy rights of both juveniles and their parents; the court also found it in violation of the three-pronged *Bellotti* test. The city's interests in suppression of crime, promotion of juvenile morality, and support of parental authority did not justify infringing on individual rights of travel and privacy. The court acknowledged that the state had a great interest in regulating the activities of children and a legitimate interest in controlling crime and promoting public welfare. Regardless, the court found the curfew to be too broad and in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The state's objectives were not sufficient enough to justify the juvenile curfew. The curfew provided no exemption for emergencies and the existing exceptions were limited to employment travel or being with a chaperone approved by the ordinance.

In *Waters v. Barry* (1989), the district court for the District of Columbia struck down a curfew ordinance that prohibited juveniles from being on the street or in public places between the hours of 11 P.M. and 6 A.M. Exceptions included minors traveling with their parents in a car, those returning from a job, and those on an emergency errand. The District of Columbia patterned its curfew exceptions after Middletown's curfew exemptions, which had withstood constitutional challenge. The District of Columbia district court held, however, that the District of Columbia's ordinance was more limiting than the Middletown ordinance. It also noted that it could not agree with the *Bykofsky* court that the constitutional rights of minors are less deserving of protection than are those of adults.

In reaching this decision, the district court applied the three *Bellotti* criteria in an in-depth analysis. Addressing the first criterion, the court noted that the District of Columbia posed just as much danger to adults as to children; therefore, there was no reason to place a "peculiar burden" on juveniles' constitutional rights. The second criterion, "juveniles' inability to make critical decisions in an informed mature manner," was not supported by the ordinance because a minor's "decision to either stay inside or roam at night does not present the type of profound decision which *Bellotti* would leave to the state." Likewise, the court viewed the ordinance as impermissibly encroaching on the third criterion: the importance of the parents' role in directing the upbringing of their children.

Thus, the court found no justification for according juveniles lesser rights. Because the curfew affected rights that the court determined fundamental and because there was no *Bellotti* justification for treating juveniles differently in this instance, the court applied strict scrutiny analysis. The court then determined that although the statute's purpose, to protect juveniles from harm, was legitimate and indeed a compelling state interest, the curfew ordinance was not narrowly tailored to effectuate that purpose. The court noted that the curfew was enacted without credible statistical evidence that juveniles either commit more crimes or are more frequently victims of crime during the hours of the curfew. Although violence was widespread, there was no evidence that juveniles were more likely to be involved in it than adults.

After the curfew ordinance was invalidated in *Waters*, the District of Columbia enacted a new ordinance. The curfew affected persons younger than age 17 and contained eight exceptions, which were copied verbatim after Dallas' juvenile curfew upheld in *Qutb*. In 1996, the district court addressed the constitutionality of this curfew in *Hutchins v. District of Columbia* (1996). Acknowledging that minors' fundamental rights may not always be treated in the same fashion as adults' fundamental rights, the court applied the

three *Bellotti* factors to determine whether legitimate grounds existed for treating minors' right to free movement differently from adults' right to free movement. The court followed *Waters* in applying the first two factors. It noted an absence of necessary evidence showing that most parents in the District of Columbia were unable to control or protect their children to circumvent the third *Bellotti* factor, the importance of parental control in child rearing. The court concluded that there were no legitimate grounds for treating the minors' fundamental rights differently from adults; thus, the curfew was subject to strict scrutiny analysis.

The District of Columbia offered statistical information to substantiate its compelling state interest in reducing juvenile crime and victimization. Furthermore, it pointed to the exceptions as establishing that the curfew was narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means necessary to achieve its stated goals, but it failed to convince the court. The court was particularly unmoved by the statistical information and described the information as a "hodge-podge of national, as opposed to local, statistics, other cities' statistics, unverifiable charts, and statistics for people over the age of seventeen." Juvenile crime data included all persons younger than age 18; the curfew, however, targeted minors younger than age 17. Therefore, the statistics were overinclusive and, hence, unreliable. Furthermore, other crime statistics were not broken down by the time of day or night when the incident occurred or by the ages of perpetrators and victims. The court observed that the District of Columbia ignored "available statistics that show that more than ninety percent of all juveniles committed no crimes at all and were not arrested at night or any other time."

The District of Columbia acknowledged that it had adopted the Dallas juvenile ordinance that withstood strict scrutiny analysis in *Qutb*. The *Hutchins* court noted, however, that the District of Columbia "did not—and could not—also adopt wholesale the evidentiary statistics that allowed the Dallas ordinance in *Qutb* to withstand constitutional scrutiny." The court also stated that many of the exceptions were "vague

and undefined." The district court held that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to further the compelling interests of the District of Columbia and declared it unconstitutional.

San Diego enacted a juvenile curfew ordinance in 1947 and began enforcing it in 1993. Applying strict scrutiny analysis in *Nunez v. City of San Diego* (1997), the Ninth Circuit struck down the ordinance. The Ninth Circuit rejected the curfew for three reasons. First, it determined that the language in the ordinance was too vague. Juveniles could not be expected to be able to discern what kind of behavior was illegal. In addition, the loose language afforded law enforcement too much discretion in deciding how to enforce the ordinance. Second, the court held that the curfew unfairly limited juveniles' First Amendment rights of free speech, religion, and travel. Third, it found that the curfew unconstitutionally burdened parents, usurping their rights as guardians. The court said that the "ordinance [is] an exercise in sweeping state control irrespective of parents' wishes. Without proper justification, it violated the fundamental right to rear children without undue interference." The court did go on to make clear that a less restrictive curfew ordinance might withstand constitutional scrutiny. The 1947 statute contained dated language and requirements that were rarely found in newer ordinances.

Conclusion

Juvenile curfews are the latest fad in juvenile justice, a field strewn with the remnants of quick fixes to a serious problem (see, e.g., Bernard 1992; Hemmens et al. 1997). There is little evidence that curfews work, yet they have been adopted wholesale—the public wants action of some kind, any kind—a "just do something" mentality. This demand is related to feelings of loss of control over our youth, a feeling that appears periodically in American culture (Bernard 1992). Juvenile curfews are an attempt both to protect children and to prevent juvenile crime, thereby protecting society. Although these are laudable goals, it is less

180 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

clear whether a curfew is the most appropriate means of achieving these ends.

Curfews are not going away—less than two weeks after the San Diego curfew ordinance was struck down in *Nunez*, the San Diego City Council approved a new ordinance modeled after the Dallas ordinance upheld in *Qutb* (Jones 1996). A recent study by the United States Conference of Mayors indicates that more than three quarters of American cities have some form of nighttime curfew, and more than 90 percent of these cities believe nighttime curfews are useful tools for law enforcement (Conference of Mayors 1997). These figures suggest that curfews are widely viewed as appropriate.

The question that enactment and enforcement of juvenile curfews begs is whether these laws are constitutional. The answer, according to the courts, is mixed. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that children are different and that the law must somehow reflect this fact. Yet, the Supreme Court has failed to establish a structured framework for minors' rights. The *Bellotti* test may not apply outside of the abortion context because the greater need to protect children considering an abortion may justify state action in instances in which it would otherwise be impermissible. Other cases involving juvenile rights are split. Whether juveniles have the same rights as adults is still in question until the Supreme Court issues a definitive pronouncement.

The consequence of an absence of a definitive pronouncement by the Supreme Court is confusion among the lower courts. There is disagreement about whether juveniles possess the same fundamental rights as adults. If not, then rational basis review applies and the curfew is likely to stand. If so, then strict scrutiny review applies and the curfew is likely to fall. Courts that uphold curfews while purporting to apply strict scrutiny have done so only by either misapplying the test or by accepting at face value crime statistics. This is not true strict scrutiny review. The Supreme Court should address the constitutionality of juvenile curfews and, in doing so, set forth a clear framework for consideration of the

(sometimes) competing interests of the child, parent, and state. Until the high court provides clear guidance, lower federal courts and state courts are likely to continue to issue conflicting rulings. The curfew ordinance upheld in *Qutb* and struck down in *Hutchins* is a prime example of the differing results that lower courts may reach when they work without sufficient guidance from the Supreme Court.

Curfews clearly threaten the exercise of a number of rights. The district court in *Waters v. Barry* (1989) likened the District of Columbia's curfew to "a bull in a china shop of constitutional values." Historically, juveniles have been treated as second-class citizens under the rationale that they needed more protection than adults. The question that blanket juvenile curfews raise is, When does protection become impairment?

The current trend is for courts to uphold juvenile curfews so long as the ordinance provides exceptions for legitimate activities and the city is able to make a showing of a serious juvenile crime problem. Lack of empirical evidence on curfew effectiveness works in a city's favor in two ways—it is easy to convince a court in these times that there is a juvenile crime problem and, without statistics, it is difficult to determine whether a curfew actually has any effect on juvenile crime. Courts are often reluctant to disagree with the conclusions of the elected representatives without explicit empirical evidence to the contrary.

"History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to ignore" (Justice Marshall dissenting in *Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association* [1989]). The recent surge in the popularity of curfew enactment and enforcement and the urgency with which some cities have turned to them, almost as a panacea, suggest that juvenile curfews are a sign of public hysteria rather than a reasoned response to juvenile crime and delinquency. Surely, criminalizing another activity instead of addressing the underlying social problems is unwise, unproductive, and doomed for failure.

References

- Baker v. Borough of Steelton, 17 Dauphin 17 (Pennsylvania, 1912).
- Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
- Bernard, Thomas J. 1992. *The Cycle of Juvenile Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bilchik, Shay. 1996. "Curfew: An Answer to Juvenile Delinquency and Victimization?" *Juvenile Justice Bulletin* (April):1-11.
- Boland, Barbara and James Q. Wilson. 1978. "Age, Crime, and Punishment." *The Public Interest* 51:22-34.
- Buck, Winifred. 1896. "Objections to a Children's Curfew." *North American Review* 164:381-4.
- Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (1975).
- Carmen, Rolando V., del, Mary Parker, and Francis Reddington. 1997. *Briefs of Leading Cases in Juvenile Justice*. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson.
- Chen, Gregory Z. 1997. "Youth Curfews and the Trilogy of Parent, Child, and State Relations." *New York University Law Review* 72:131-74.
- City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa, 1992).
- Conference of Mayors. 1997. *A Status Report on Youth Curfews in America's Cities*. Washington, DC: United States Conference of Mayors.
- Crowell, Anthony. 1996. "Minor Restrictions: The Challenge of Juvenile Curfews." *Public Management* (August):4-12.
- Department of Justice. 1996. *Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Act*. Washington, DC: Department of Justice.
- Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 936 (Texas, 1898).
- Federle, Katherine H. 1995. "Children, Curfews, and the Constitution." *Washington University Law Quarterly* 73:1315-68.
- Feldmann, Linda. 1996. "Cities Adopt Curfews, But Impact on Crime is Debated." *Christian Science Monitor*, January 4, p. A1.
- Fox, James A. and Sanford A. Newman. 1997. "Juvenile Crime Rate Spikes When School Lets Out, Study Indicates." *Criminal Justice Newsletter* 28:5-6.
- Freitas, Susan L. 1996. "After Midnight: The Constitutional Status of Juvenile Ordinances in California." *Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly* 24:219-46.
- Fritsch, Eric J., Tory J. Caeti, and Craig Hemmens. Forthcoming. "Juvenile Justice in Texas: An Analysis of Changing Policy Assumptions." *Law and Policy*.
- Fritsch, Eric J. and Craig Hemmens. 1995. "Juvenile Waiver in the United States 1977-1995: A Comparison and Analysis of Waiver Statutes." *Juvenile and Family Court Journal* 46:17-35.
- Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
- Hall, Donald M. 1957. "Note: Locomotion Ordinances as Abridgment of Personal Liberty." *Tulane Law Review* 32(1): 117-9.
- Hemmens, Craig, Eric J. Fritsch, and Tory J. Caeti. 1997. "Juvenile Justice Code Purpose Clauses: The Power of Words." *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 8:221-46.
- Howell, James C. 1997. *Juvenile Justice and Youth Violence*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Hunt, A. Lee and Ken Weiner. 1977. "The Impact of a Juvenile Curfew: Suppression and Displacement Patterns of Juvenile Offenses." *Journal of Police Science and Administration* 5:407-12.
- Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C., 1996).
- In re J. M., 768 P.2d 219 (Colorado, 1989).
- In re Maricopa County, 887 P.2d 599 (Arizona, 1994).
- Jeffs, Tony and Mark K. Smith. 1996. "Getting the Dirtbags Off the Streets: Curfews and Other Solutions to Juvenile Crime." *Youth and Policy* 53:1-14.
- Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 358 F.2d 1065 (Fifth Circuit, 1981).
- Jones, Charisse. 1996. "Cities Give Curfew Laws a Closer Look." *USA Today*, June 21, p. A1.
- Kalvig, Kenneth A. 1996. "Oregon's New Parental Responsibility Acts: Should Other States Follow Oregon's Trail?" *Oregon Law Review* 75:829-901.
- Manfredi, Christopher P. 1998. *The Supreme Court and Juvenile Justice*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H., 1984).
- McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
- Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
- Mooney, Martin E. 1977. "Note: Assessing the Constitutional Validity of Juvenile Curfew Statutes." *Notre Dame Lawyer* 52:858-81.
- Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815 (Second Circuit, 1976).
- National Council on Crime and Delinquency. 1972. "Juvenile Curfews: A Policy Statement." *Crime & Delinquency* 18:132-3.
- Note. 1958. "Curfew Ordinances and the Control of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime." *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 107:66-101.

182 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

- Nunez v. City of San Diego, 1997 WL 304747 (Ninth Circuit, 1997).
- Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa, 1989).
- People v. Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55 (Illinois, 1976).
- People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498 (California, 1945).
- Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
- Platt, Anthony. 1969. *The Childsavers*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (Fifth Circuit, 1993).
- Rothman, David J. 1980. *Conscience and Convenience*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Ruefle, William and Kenneth M. Reynolds. 1995. "Curfew and Delinquency in Major American Cities." *Crime & Delinquency* 41:347-63.
- . 1996. "Keep Them at Home: Juvenile Curfew Ordinances in 200 American Cities." *American Journal of Police* 15:63-84.
- Scherr, Peter L. 1992. "The Juvenile Curfew. Ordinance: In Search of A New Standard of Review." *Washington University Journal of Urban And Contemporary Law* 41:163-92.
- Schwartz, Robert. 1985. "Rights Issue Teen-Age Curfews—A Revival." *The Los Angeles Times*, August 10, p. D1.
- Sharp, Deborah. 1996. "New Orleans Puts Its Curfew in Good Light." *USA Today*, October 4, p. A4.
- Sheperd, Robert E. 1996. "The Proliferation of Juvenile Curfews." *American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Newsletter* (September):1-3.
- Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
- Smith, Wesley R. 1994. "Don't Stand So Close to Me." *Policy Review* (Fall):48-54.
- Snyder, Howard, Melissa Sickmund, and Eileen Poe-Yamagatta. 1996. *Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1996 Update on Violence*. Washington, DC: Department of Justice.
- Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
- Toth, Jeremy. 1995. "Juvenile Curfew: Legal Perspectives and Beyond." *In the Public Interest* 14:39-82.
- Tribe, Laurence H. 1988. *American Constitutional Law*. Minneapolis, MN: West.
- Trollinger, Tona. 1996. "The Juvenile Curfew: Unconstitutional Imprisonment." *William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal* 4:949-1003.
- Ward, Regina M. 1956. "Comment: Constitutional Law—Police Power—Municipal Ordinances—Philadelphia Curfew Law." *Villanova Law Review* 1:51-63.
- Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C., 1989).
- Williams, Allan F. and Adrian K. Lund. 1986. "Adults' Views of Laws That Limit Teenagers' Driving and Access to Alcohol." *Journal of Public Health Policy* 7:190-7.
- Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Explain the purposes of curfew laws, and state whether you do or do not support those purposes.
2. What groups of persons, other than juveniles, have been the subject of curfew laws over the years?
3. Have the courts struck down or upheld curfew laws? Cite some example cases. In cases where a curfew was struck down, what was the courts' reasoning?
4. What does research show about the effectiveness of curfew laws, and whether they work? Are they, or could they be, effective in your city?
5. Based on the research and examples in other cities, do you believe curfew laws will be expanded or eliminated?

READING

The increase in gang membership and gang activities has elicited a number of police tactics to reduce the problem. Gang suppression is the primary strategy used by police, but some researchers believe it is the least effective strategy. The authors of this article report on the results of an anti-gang initiative of the Dallas Police Department. Strategies included saturation patrol and aggressive curfew and truancy enforcement. Control areas were selected, and preintervention and postintervention measures of gang violence and offenses that were reported to the police were analyzed. The findings indicated that aggressive curfew and truancy enforcement led to significant reductions in gang violence, whereas simple saturation patrol did not. In addition, there were no significant reductions in offenses reported to the police. The significance of these findings and policy implications are discussed.

Gang Suppression Through Saturation Patrol, Aggressive Curfew, and Truancy Enforcement

A Quasi-Experimental Test of the Dallas Anti-Gang Initiative (1999)

Eric J. Fritsch, Tory J. Caeti, Robert W. Taylor

For years, police agencies have pursued tactics designed to deal with the proliferation of gangs and gang violence. According to the National Youth Gang Survey, the primary strategy in many jurisdictions is suppression (Spergel and Curry 1990). Suppression tactics include tactical patrols by law enforcement, vertical prosecution by district attorneys, and intensive supervision by probation departments. Generally, suppression involves the arrest, prosecution, and incarceration of gang members. Although suppression is the primary strategy in many jurisdictions, it is also frequently viewed as the least effective (Spergel and Curry 1990).

In 1996, the Dallas Police Department received an anti-gang initiative grant from the

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services to combat violent gang activity. The grant period lasted from June 1, 1996, through May 31, 1997. In 1996, the city of Dallas had 79 gangs with 6,145 documented gang members. In addition, there were 1,332 gang-related incidents recorded in 1996. The Dallas Police Department targeted five areas, made up of a varying number of patrol beats, which were home to seven of the most violent gangs in Dallas. In the year preceding the grant, the targeted gangs accounted for 18 percent of the known gang members in Dallas and were responsible for approximately 35 percent of the gang-related violent crimes.

The primary objective of the grant was to fund overtime enforcement in the five targeted

184 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

areas in hopes of significantly decreasing violent gang activity through suppression. Gang Unit officers teamed with Interactive Community Policing (ICP) officers to develop innovative enforcement strategies for each of the targeted areas. Subsequently, teams of six to eight officers were assembled and received overtime pay to implement the developed strategy. These officers were freed from calls for service and instead spent their time implementing and carrying out the particular enforcement strategy. Although tactics such as “buy-bust” operations and warrant service were employed during the grant period, the vast majority of overtime funds were spent on three suppression tactics: aggressive curfew enforcement—juvenile curfew ordinances were strictly enforced whenever suspected gang members were encountered;¹ aggressive truancy enforcement—officers worked closely with local school districts in enforcing truancy laws;² and saturation patrol—officers conducted high-visibility patrols in target areas, stopping and frisking suspected gang members or other suspicious persons that they observed and making arrests when appropriate. The research reported in this article assessed the effectiveness of these strategies in reducing gang-related violence and gang-related offenses reported to the police.

Literature Review

The Police Role in Dealing With Gangs

Several authors, while noting that gangs per se probably cannot be eradicated, believe that the police can manage and, in effect, suppress the more negative aspects of gang activity (Huff and McBride 1993; Owens and Wells 1993; Rush 1996). The various strategies adopted by law enforcement to deal with gangs have been well documented (Dart 1992; Huff and McBride 1993; Jackson and McBride 1996; Johnson, Webster, Connors, and Saenz 1995; Klein 1993, 1995; Knox 1994; Spergel 1995; Weston 1993). Some have advocated the use of specialized patrols, especially foot patrol (Wilson and

Kelling 1989); others have embraced a philosophy best represented by the GREAT program, which integrates schools and law enforcement and teaches resistance (Howell 1996); and still others have advocated traditional and non-traditional law enforcement suppression techniques (Houston 1996; Johnson et al. 1995; Needle and Stapleton 1983; Rush 1996). However, empirical evaluations of the prescribed strategies have been few in number.

Gang suppression by law enforcement has also often included a broad range of tactics that frequently have taken the form of crackdowns. Crackdowns typically have involved “a sharp increase in law enforcement resources applied to the previously under-enforced laws, with a clear goal of enhancing general deterrence of the misconduct” (Sherman 1990b, p. 2). Most often, crackdowns have been effective initially, have had a short residual deterrent effect, and have been followed by an eventual return to preintervention levels of crime (Sherman 1990b). Generally, greater successes have been found in strategies focusing on specific offenses, offenders, and places than by simply increasing presence (Sherman 1990b). Although Sherman (1990b) has provided an extensive review of police crackdowns, including those emphasizing suppression of drug sales, drunk driving, prostitution, subway crime, and various other serious and nonserious crimes, no gang-specific crackdowns were examined or discussed in his review.

Gang crackdowns have not been evaluated systematically (Klein 1995). Some authors have dismissed the use of the crackdown entirely. “In the case of youth gang interdiction, this tactic is analogous to an attempt to put out a forest fire with a water bucket” (Shelden, Tracy, and Brown 1997, p. 212). However, a crackdown can be, and often is, a coordinated effort by a law enforcement agency to stop a certain type of crime or an offender using more than simple police presence. Indeed, the role of crime analysis in directing and supporting police crackdowns is growing; however, to date, very little empirical research examining well-coordinated crackdowns directed by crime analysis

has been conducted. The studies that have been done have shown dramatic results, as was the case in the Minneapolis “hot-spots” research (Sherman 1990b) and the Kansas City Gun Experiment (Sherman, Shaw, and Rogan 1995).

Gang problems and behaviors vary widely from city to city as well as within cities (Weisel and Painter 1997). In accordance, it is doubtful that one strategy will be effective across and within all jurisdictions. Some law enforcement agencies have adopted a philosophy of total suppression, in which any gang member or wannabe has been targeted, such as in the Los Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD) Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums (CRASH) (Freed 1986; Klein 1993). Others, such as the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Operation Safe Streets (OSS), have adopted a philosophy of target suppression, in which the police have only targeted hard-core gang members (Freed 1986; Klein 1993). Still others, such as the Oxnard, California, Police Department’s Gang-Oriented Comprehensive Action Program (GOCAP) and the Westminster, California, Tri-Agency Resource Gang Enforcement Team (TARGET), have focused on information sharing and intelligence gathering to identify, arrest, and successfully prosecute gang members (Kent and Smith 1994; Owens and Wells 1993).

Most of the current prescriptive literature has focused on community-oriented tactics. Some have recommended that the police stop trying to eradicate gangs and that they communicate with gang youths in such a way as to demonstrate respect, acceptance, and concern for gang youths (Spergel 1995). The literature has also concluded that law enforcement alone cannot solve the gang problem—in fact, the typical police organization is ill-equipped and poorly structured to deal with gangs (Rush 1996). Dealing with gangs requires a comprehensive approach that involves all members of the criminal justice community, schools, community leaders, and the like (Owens and Wells 1993; Rush 1996). A fundamental problem with all of the aforementioned strategies, but especially the latter, has been the lack of reliable, well-documented,

well-designed, empirical evaluations of the strategies and tactics employed (Klein 1993, 1995; Knox 1994; Spergel 1995).³ In fact, some of the evaluations of the tactics have been gleaned from newspapers (Freed 1986).

A recent review of several gang efforts has questioned the efficacy of police responses in dealing with the problem (Weisel and Painter 1997). In describing the gang enforcement tactics in five major cities in the United States, Weisel and Painter (1997) noted that “none of the agencies engaged in any identifiable long-term planning process or conducted research to monitor the changing nature of the problem. None . . . engaged in meaningful evaluations of effectiveness of specialized or other departmental efforts related exclusively to gang enforcement” (p. 83). In fact, some evaluative statements have been based on hunches because of the lack of empirical data. For example, Klein (1993) has said, “My informed hunch is that suppression programs, left to their own devices, may deter a few members but also increase the internal cohesiveness of the group” (p. 312). Indeed, much of the current literature has concluded that traditional law enforcement tactics alone will have little effect on reducing, managing, or suppressing gangs (Huff and McBride 1993; Rush 1996; Shelden et al. 1997; Spergel 1995).

Empirical Evaluations of the Effect of Police on Gang Activity

Spergel (1995) has concluded that the strategy of targeting gangs and gang members only for suppression purposes is flawed. However, in evaluating the effectiveness of suppression, Spergel also noted that “we have no systematic or reliable assessments of the effectiveness of a gang suppression strategy by criminal justice agencies, particularly law enforcement” (p. 198). Indeed, his analysis of the literature assessing the effectiveness of gang suppression by law enforcement consisted of a series of anecdotal comments from newspaper articles—hardly a scientific source. Klein (1995) reviewed several sweep programs

186 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

that were undertaken in California. Operation Hammer, which was conducted by the LAPD, was a preannounced, media-covered gang sweep of Los Angeles that resulted in 1,453 juveniles being arrested; however, 1,350 were released without formal charges being filed. In the end, the operation was characterized by Klein and some LAPD officials as “all show” that was only for public relations. However, Klein also reported that when he rode along with Los Angeles County Sheriff’s officials on a gang sweep that was not announced, not covered, and that was coordinated among several different targeted areas, the results were much different. Whereas Operation Hammer provided serious gang members with good laughing material, the Sheriff’s sweep produced no humor among the arrestees that night.

Evaluations of community-based gang prevention programs are increasing. However, many of these have been qualitative and did not measure the impact of the program on crime in general or even on gang-related crime. For example, Thurman, Giacomazzi, Reisig, and Mueller (1996) evaluated a community-based gang prevention program implemented in Mountlake Terrace, Washington. Their evaluation included direct observation, focus group interviews, and official crime statistics. The program purported to provide an alternative outlet in which youths at risk or already involved in a gang could spend their time (Thurman et al. 1996). The official crime statistics used in the study were general calls for service to the police, with no breakdown given between gang-related calls for service and regular calls for service. Although Thurman et al. concluded that the intervention “appears to be a cost-effective gang prevention and intervention program” (p. 292), no data on crime; effect on the number of gang members, gang-related crimes, or gang-related calls for service; or other statistical evidence were offered to support this conclusion. Furthermore, the extent and scope of the gang problem in the area, the demographic characteristics of the community, and the crime statistics for the community were not discussed. The authors concluded that the program “offers

an effective alternative to traditional law enforcement approaches which typically rely on police crackdowns and curfews to regulate gang activity” (Thurman et al. 1996, p. 279), yet no evidence was offered to show that these latter techniques were ineffective or have not been effective in the past—either nationally or in Mountlake Terrace.

Palumbo, Eskay, and Hallett (1992) evaluated three gang prevention programs, including Arizona New Turf, GREAT, and Community Reliance Resource Effort (CARE). They found that although all of the programs were well implemented, there was no effect on the gang problem, even though police officers, students, and members of the community felt positively about the programs. Indeed, the majority of the community-based programs may fall victim to a common criticism—they sound good, feel good, look good, but do not work good. Many of the evaluations of these community programs have relied on qualitative data that typically show that everyone surveyed or interviewed thought the program was effective and useful, but no quantitative empirical support has been offered to indicate the impact on the gang problem, gang-related crime, or the gang members served by the program.

Much of the current literature has been dismissive, perhaps prematurely, of the ability of the police to suppress gang activity in that there are virtually no empirical studies that support such a claim. As Klein (1993) noted,

The message is not so much that suppression does or does not “work”: evidence one way of the other is sorely lacking. There are logical, as well as experiential, reasons to believe that suppression programs can have deterrent effects and thus, by our reasoning, can contribute substantially to gang and drug activity prevention. (P. 308; emphasis in original)

Curfew and Truancy Enforcement

The literature assessing curfew and truancy enforcement is still in its infancy; most existing studies have focused on tactics, descriptions of

programs, and legal issues (Friend 1994; Garrett and Brewster 1994; "Juvenile Curfews" 1994; Ruefle and Reynolds 1995; Watzman 1994). Curfews have received attention recently because of their perceived effectiveness in reducing juvenile crime and juvenile victimization. Much anecdotal reference about their effectiveness has appeared in the popular media (LeBoeuf 1996; Ruefle and Reynolds 1995), but the existing academic literature on curfew and truancy enforcement has been limited to a few articles on the number of arrests and the various types of ordinances that have been enacted.

Hunt and Weiner (1977) studied a Detroit curfew that was specifically designed to reduce criminal gang activity by youths. They used before and after comparisons of crime rates and criminal temporal activity and concluded that the curfew enforcement seemed to effectively reduce or suppress the relative level of crime during curfew hours, although they also found evidence of temporal displacement (i.e., gang-related crime increased during noncurfew hours). Ruefle and Reynolds (1995) surveyed metropolitan police departments serving populations of more than 200,000 and found that curfews in one form or another existed in 59 (77 percent) of the 77 largest American cities. The Dallas Police Department's internal analysis revealed that following adoption of its aggressive curfew enforcement program, juvenile victimization during curfew hours dropped 17.7 percent and juvenile arrests dropped 14.6 percent from the previous year (Click 1994). Statistics from Phoenix, Arizona, revealed that 21 percent of all curfew violators were gang members. Furthermore, a 10 percent decrease in juvenile arrests for violent crimes occurred following implementation of an aggressive curfew program (LeBoeuf 1996). Decreases in various other juvenile crimes occurred in several other metropolitan areas (Chicago, Denver, Jacksonville, New Orleans, North Little Rock) that employed curfew programs (LeBoeuf 1996).

Truancy has been linked to a variety of negative consequences for youths (e.g., drug use, delinquency, unemployment) and for society

(i.e., daytime crime, auto theft, vandalism) (Garry 1996; J. R. Martin, Schulze, and Valdez 1988; Rohrman 1993). However, the impact of aggressive truancy enforcement on crime rates remains essentially unevaluated. One evaluated program used a small squad of officers to enforce truancy laws; although numerous arrests were made, the impact on felonies and misdemeanors in the area was nominal (J. R. Martin et al. 1988). However, the study did not control for whether the crimes under study were committed by adults or by juveniles.

Methodology

A quasi-experimental design was used for the evaluation reported in this article. The main objective of the initiative was to decrease gang-related violence in the five targeted areas. The five areas were composed of patrol beats and were selected on the basis of two criteria.⁴ First, the areas had experienced a large amount of gang violence in the preceding year. Second, they overlapped some of the defined Enterprise Zones and Renaissance Areas in Dallas. Enterprise Zones are designated by the city to encourage economic development in an area, and businesses receive tax breaks for locating in the Zones. A Renaissance Zone is an area in which neighborhood organizations use federal funds to design and implement programs to reduce crime and disorder.

To estimate the impact of the enforcement strategies on crime, it was important to select control areas for comparison purposes. Four control areas were selected based on a two-stage selection process. First, the number of violent gang-related offenses from June 1, 1995, through May 31, 1996, for each patrol beat in the same patrol division as the corresponding target area was determined from data provided by the Dallas Police Department Gang Unit. Second, the beats with the largest number of violent gang-related offenses during the time period were matched with a corresponding target area and served as control areas.⁵ The target and control areas were sufficiently similar to allow comparison and estimation of the efficacy of the gang suppression effort.

188 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Two data sets were used to measure the anti-gang initiative's impact on crime. First, offenses reported to the police from June 1, 1995, through May 31, 1997, were obtained from the Crime Analysis Unit of the police department. Murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, auto theft, theft, arson, other assault, criminal mischief, drug offenses, and weapon offenses were analyzed. The last two offenses were measured by number of arrests rather than reported offenses. Second, data from the Gang Unit on all of the gang-related offenses reported to the police from June 1, 1995, through May 31, 1997, were collected. Several offenses were aggregated into the category of violent gang-related offenses.⁶

Because of the small sample size, gang-related property crimes were not analyzed. Final determination of whether an offense was gang related was made by Gang Unit detectives after a follow-up investigation based on police department criteria for gang-related crime.⁷ Report formats clearly indicated that the offense was gang related by both a checked box and a narrative. Annual precomparisons and postcomparisons of crime in general and gang-related violence in particular were analyzed for each target and control area to determine the anti-gang initiative's impact on crime. For each comparison, a paired samples *t* test was computed to determine statistically significant differences between the mean values over two time periods. In instances in which statistically significant differences existed, efforts were made to determine the particular strategy employed during the time period (curfew enforcement, truancy enforcement, or saturation patrol).

Limitations

Determining the generalizability of any evaluation of a gang suppression strategy is at best difficult; at worst, it is impossible. One specific problem with gang intervention strategy evaluation is the fact that police, prosecutor, and legislative definitions of gangs, gang-related crime, and gang members differ widely (Caeti, Fritsch, and Hemmens 1995; Curry, Ball, and Decker 1996). A second problem occurs when there is wholesale

adoption of any gang intervention strategy without looking carefully at evaluations of the strategy and its assumptions, especially suppression strategies. This practice is ill-advised and could in fact be destructive (Klein 1995). Therefore, results must be interpreted with caution and replicated across and within several jurisdictions before broad and definitive conclusions can be drawn about the overall usefulness of a particular strategy. The fact that definitions of gang-related crime vary makes this caution all the more salient.

Findings

Gang Violence

Table 1 compares the mean number of violent gang-related offenses in the five target areas per month with those in the four control areas. Overall, there was a statistically significant decrease (57 percent) in gang-related violence in the target areas during the grant period. Statistically significant decreases in gang violence were observed during the anti-gang initiative in the control areas as well, but the overall decrease was less substantial than in the target areas—37 percent in the control areas in comparison to 57 percent in the target areas.

Compared with the year prior to the anti-gang initiative (June 1, 1995, through May 31, 1996), there were statistically significant reductions in violent gang-related offenses in Target Areas 1, 4, and 5 during the grant period (June 1, 1996, through May 31, 1997). There was approximately a 73 percent reduction in violent gang-related activity in Target Areas 1 and 4 and a 64 percent reduction in Target Area 5. Little change in gang violence occurred in the control areas for these beats; indeed, Control Areas 4 and 5 experienced a 22 percent increase in gang violence during the grant year.

This increase in Control Areas 4 and 5 could be due to displacement of gang activity by the initiative. That is, increased police activity in a targeted area may have forced gang members into areas of the city with a lesser law enforcement

Section II ▼ Gang Suppression Through Saturation Patrol, Aggressive Curfew 189

Table 1 Mean Number of Violent Gang-Related Offenses per Month by Area

Area	Target Area			Control Area		
	Time 1	Time 2	t Test	Time 1	Time 2	t Test
Area 1	6.8	1.8	3.69*	2.9	2.6	0.46
Area 2	5.1	3.8	1.03	10.2	5.7	2.31*
Area 3	2.0	1.0	1.65	7.6	3.8	3.06*
Area 4	3.5	1.0	4.33*	1.9	2.3	-0.53
Area 5	3.5	1.3	3.04*	1.9	2.3	-0.53
All areas combined	20.9	8.9	7.21*	22.6	14.3	3.76*

NOTE: Time 1 = Year 1 (June 1995 through May 1996); Time 2 = Year 2 (June 1996 through May 1997).

* $p < .05$.

presence. Gang violence may have moved to another area instead of being eradicated. To investigate the possibility of displacement, the number of violent gang-related offenses for the 33 nontarget beats, contiguous to target beats, was determined and comparisons were examined. The sample size for each beat was small, which precluded the use of a paired samples *t* test; therefore, the raw frequencies were analyzed. Of the 33 beats contiguous to target beats, 15 experienced a decrease in gang violence during the grant period, whereas 10 experienced an increase and 8 experienced no change. Although the anti-gang initiative may have displaced some gang violence to other beats, the extent of displacement appears to have been minimal.

Further analysis was conducted to identify the strategies employed in Target Areas 1, 4, and 5 to determine which of them might be responsible for the significant decrease in gang violence. The strategies were obtained from weekly and monthly reports written by the sergeants responsible for a target area; they documented the overtime-funded enforcement strategies that were employed in the area during the study period. Of the strategies used in each area, the vast majority of overtime hours were spent on curfew enforcement in Target Area 1 (80 percent of overtime hours) and truancy enforcement in Target Areas

4 and 5 (89 percent of overtime hours). Therefore, concentrated efforts to enforce truancy and curfew laws had a positive impact on reducing gang violence.

In addition, there was also a 46 percent reduction in gang violence in Target Area 3 during the grant period and a 25 percent reduction in Target Area 2, but these reductions were not statistically significant. Differently, there were statistically significant decreases in gang violence in Control Areas 2 and 3, even though these areas did not receive overtime-funded enforcement strategies. There was a 44 percent reduction in violence in Control Area 2 and a 50 percent reduction in Control Area 3. However, these control areas may have received extra attention from the Gang Unit during on-duty hours. Because enforcement strategies in the five target areas were overtime funded, more on-duty time may have been spent in the control areas that did not have any overtime funds. Unfortunately, quantitative data to support this statement were unavailable.

It is important to recognize that the main strategies employed in Target Areas 2 and 3 differed from those in the other areas. Of the documented strategies in each area, the vast majority of overtime hours was spent on undirected saturation patrol. Officers in Target Areas 2 and 3 also employed other suppression strategies,

190 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

such as truancy and curfew enforcement, but to a much lesser degree than did officers in Target Areas 1, 4, and 5. Therefore, saturation patrol to increase police presence alone was not effective in decreasing the level of gang violence in these areas.

Offenses Reported to the Police

Data were collected on index violent and property crimes reported to the police. In addition, data were obtained on other assaults, criminal mischief, drug offenses, and weapon offenses. The following two hypotheses were tested:

Hypothesis 1: Increased officer presence led to decreases in reported offenses, especially for suppressible crimes such as robbery, auto theft, burglary, and criminal mischief.

Hypothesis 2: Freedom from responding to calls for service led to greater officer-initiated activity, which resulted in more arrests for drug and weapon offenses.

Table 2 compares the mean number of offenses reported to the Dallas Police Department per month during the grant year with the number of offenses reported per month during the prior year. As shown in Table 2, there were statistically significant increases in reported robberies (23.8 percent increase) and auto thefts (15.4 percent increase) in the target areas during the grant period. In addition, there were statistically significant decreases in reports of criminal mischief (15 percent decrease) and arrests for weapons violations (30 percent decrease) in the target areas. The

Table 2 Mean Number of Offenses Reported to Dallas Police Department per Month

Offense	Target Area			Control Area		
	Time 1	Time 2	t Test	Time 1	Time 2	t Test
Index violent						
Aggravated assault	92.3	90.4	0.30	65.6	74.9	-0.99
Murder	3.7	2.6	1.26	2.8	1.3	2.16
Rape	5.5	5.3	0.16	6.3	7.0	-0.60
Robbery	61.0	75.5	-2.42*	47.1	44.5	1.15
Index property						
Arson	2.3	2.3	0.00	3.4	3.6	-0.24
Auto theft	142.6	164.6	-2.66*	160.4	174.3	-1.34
Burglary	129.3	141.5	-1.76	154.1	168.5	-1.40
Theft	349.8	366.9	-1.69	348.6	388.2	-2.73*
Part II offenses						
Assault	181.6	239.3	-1.55	148.3	211.1	-1.81
Criminal mischief	181.9	154.7	2.56*	208.3	181.7	3.19*
Drug offense ^a	86.4	107.1	-1.84	53.1	57.5	-0.62
Weapon offense ^a	19.5	13.8	3.25*	10.7	10.3	0.21

Note: Time 1 = Year 1 (June 1995 through May 1996); Time 2 = Year 2 (June 1996 through May 1997).

a. Based on the number of arrests.

* $p < .05$.

statistically significant decrease in criminal mischief was also observed in the control areas during the grant period, despite the lack of overtime-funded enforcement strategies; thus, the decrease cannot be attributed to activities generated by the overtime funding in the target areas.

Neither of the two hypotheses was supported by the data. In fact, the direct opposite effect was noted in a few instances. For example, statistically significant increases in robbery and auto theft were observed in the target areas, perhaps because increased police presence encouraged the reporting of offenses due to the increased availability and presence of officers, but no data relevant to this explanation were available. Also, there was a statistically significant decrease, rather than the hypothesized increase, in arrests for weapons violations, which may be due to the deterrent effect of the increased presence of officers in these areas. Indeed, it is plausible that the strategies deterred gang members from visible criminal mischief and from carrying weapons once the word got out that the police were being more active. However, data were not available to support or refute this explanation.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study found that, consistent with previous research, undirected saturation patrol has little effect on reducing crime (Sherman 1990b). In short, simply adding more police officers, without direction, was not effective. Unfortunately, this conclusion has been overgeneralized to mean that policing and patrol does not work. Fortunately, other research has shown that directed patrol (whether directed toward offenders, places, victims, or offenses) was effective in varying degrees (Abrahamse, Ebener, Greenwood, Fitzgerald, and Kosin 1991; S. E. Martin 1986; S. E. Martin and Sherman 1986; Sherman, 1990a, 1990b, 1992; Sherman et al. 1995). The research reported in this article provides support for the latter statement because the aggressive enforcement of truancy and curfew laws was effective in

reducing gang-related violence in target areas. This finding needs replication, particularly in a true experimental design.

Enforcement of curfew and truancy is frequently a low-priority task of officers, but it can have an impact on gang violence and may potentially have an even greater impact on juvenile victimization. For example, the number of homicides in Dallas (citywide) that involved a juvenile victim (excluding child abuse deaths) dropped from 18 during the year prior to the anti-gang initiative to 7 during the initiative. Furthermore, the number of gang-related juvenile homicide victims dropped from 6 during the first time period to 2 during the second (Caeti 1997).

We also found little effect on the number of offenses reported to the police. Increased officer presence did not lead to a decrease in offenses reported to the police. Sherman (1990b, 1992) reported that both increases and decreases in calls for service have been noted as the result of a crackdown. Thus, the validity of using calls for service as a measure of effectiveness must be questioned. In addition, freeing officers from responding to calls for service did not lead to greater officer-initiated activity, such as drug and weapons arrests. The question "What do officers do with their time?" needs greater empirical attention. Furthermore, suppressible crime was not affected greatly by the initiative overall. Perhaps this was because the enforcement activities that relied on curfew and truancy enforcement only had appreciable effects on the crimes that juvenile offenders commit. Indeed, criminal mischief and weapons offenses decreased dramatically in the targeted areas. Individuals who commit robberies and other serious felonies may be unaffected by curfew or truancy enforcement because they may be adults and/or not in the school system.

Many police scholars have concluded that traditional police activities and goals (preventive patrol, rapid response, investigations, etc.) have failed to achieve crime reduction and have increased problems of police-citizen alienation

192 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

(Kelling 1978). However, more recently, Kelling (1996), in discussing how to define the bottom line in policing, noted the following:

A basic purpose of police is crime prevention. The idea that police cannot do anything about crime and that they stand helpless in the face of demographics, drugs, gangs, or whatever is unacceptable—often . . . a “cop-out” that covers lack of strategic commitment and absence of planning and implementation. (P. 31)

Police gang suppression activity may not affect gang membership or the conditions that create gangs. However, it is possible that those activities affect the nefarious effects of gangs—crime and violence.

Would we really care if kids joined gangs if gangs did not engage in criminal activity? Probably not; in fact, some positive gang values (group cohesiveness, loyalty, respect, discipline, etc.) are encouraged to a large extent in legitimate activities, such as youth sports, clubs, and various other groups. In any case, the gang suppression activities of law enforcement probably cannot and perhaps should not be concerned with the “whys” of gangs. As Spergel (1995) noted,

The police cannot be held responsible for basic failures of youth socialization; lack of social and economic achievement by families, deficiencies of schools, decreased employment opportunities for African-American youth, the extensive street presence and accessibility of sophisticated weaponry, and the extensive racism and social isolation that appear to be highly correlated with the gang problem in some low-income minority communities. (P. 191)

The police should, however, concern themselves with a narrower mission of developing effective strategies to address the crime problems that gangs create. The idea that the police can change the underlying socioeconomic conditions that give rise to gangs or to the infinite reasons

why kids join gangs is naive and unrealistic. This is not to say that other community agencies should not focus on such endeavors. The simple fact of the matter is that the police are designed, organized, staffed, and trained to deal with crime, not social services.

Although strategies that use offender-, place-, and crime-specific techniques are in their infancy and require greater empirical attention, much of the recent literature that has evaluated such strategies is promising (Sherman 1990b, 1992). For example, when overtime-funded officers were freed from calls for service in Houston, substantial reductions in suppressible crimes soon followed (Hoover and Caeti 1994). The philosophy is that police agencies can impact the level of crime and disorder in a community. The police *do* make a difference. Saying that crime and disorder are a product of social and economic forces the police cannot and should not affect is rejected (Hoover and Caeti 1994, p. 1).

The police should coordinate with other public agencies in their efforts to deal with gangs; and these efforts should be focused on the criminal problems that gangs create. Interagency cooperation and information-sharing models provide promise as well, especially the ability to successfully prosecute serious and habitual offenders (Owens and Wells 1993). Recent technological advances in the areas of computer mapping, object-oriented databases, management information systems, and offender identification and tracking all bode well for the ability of the police to increase their effectiveness in managing crime, particularly gang crime. More empirical evaluation research is needed concerning which law enforcement strategies can lead to reductions in gang violence and victimization through gang violence.

Notes

1. Dallas has a nocturnal curfew ordinance that requires individuals (not accompanied by their parent or guardian) younger than age 17 to be in their residence between the hours of 11 P.M. and 6 A.M. on weeknights (Sunday through Thursday) and between

Section II ▼ Gang Suppression Through Saturation Patrol, Aggressive Curfew 193

the hours of 12 A.M. and 6 A.M. on weekends (Friday and Saturday).

2. The State of Texas truancy law requires juveniles between the ages of 7 and 16 to be enrolled in and attending school. Enforcement activity was conducted between the hours of 10 A.M. and 3 P.M. weekdays, concentrating on the gang-ridden target areas.

3. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) has developed a comprehensive gang suppression and intervention strategy based on community models (Spergel, Curry, Chance, Kane, Ross, Alexander, Simmons, and Oh 1994). The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) (1997) has also published a monograph on *Urban Street Gang Enforcement*, which is a comprehensive overview of the various tactics employed by all agencies that come into contact with gangs. These works are very extensive, yet they are completely prescriptive—there is little mention or review of any empirical studies that evaluate the police role in dealing with gangs.

4. The target areas were composed of the following patrol beats: Target Area 1—Beats 513, 514, and 515; Target Area 2—Beats 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, and 419; Target Area 3—Beats 311, 312, 314, and 316; Target Area 4—Beats 112, 113, 115, 154, and 156; and Target Area 5—Beats 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, and 152.

5. The following beats comprise the control areas, which did not receive the overtime-funded enforcement strategies under the anti-gang initiative: Control Area 1—Beats 552, 553, and 555; Control Area 2—Beats 423, 425, 426, 427, 445, 448, and 456; Control Area 3—Beats 325, 326, 327, and 328; Control Areas 4 and 5—Beats 114, 116, 131, 134, and 135. Because Target Areas 4 and 5 were in the same patrol division, the same control area was used for both.

6. Capital murder ($n = 2$); murder ($n = 19$); attempted murder ($n = 5$); aggravated assault ($n = 415$); misdemeanor assault ($n = 167$); sexual assault ($n = 1$); deadly conduct ($n = 64$); aggravated robbery ($n = 56$); robbery ($n = 46$); injury to a child ($n = 5$); terrorist threats ($n = 16$); retaliation ($n = 4$); and cruelty to animals ($n = 1$).

7. According to Dallas Police Department policy, an incident should be considered gang-related activity when participants, acting individually or collectively, are known to be gang members or gang associates and the criminal activity engaged in is aggravated assault, assault, robbery, homicide, possession for sale of narcotics, shooting at house and/or car, arson, retaliation/witness tampering, auto theft, criminal mischief (graffiti), sexual assault, kidnapping, or burglary.

Officers may also consider an incident as street gang activity when (1) the participants are identified as gang members or associates who are acting individually or collectively to further any criminal purpose of the gang; (2) a reliable informant identifies an incident as gang activity or a participant as a gang member, (3) an informant of previously untested reliability identifies an incident as a gang activity and it is corroborated by other existing circumstances or independent information; (4) there are strong indications that an incident is gang related, such as the nature of the offense (i.e., drive-by shooting) or the fact that the participants were wearing/using common identifying signs, symbols, or colors; or (5) gang members or associates are identified through existing police gang intelligence files.

References

- Abrahamse, Allan F., Patricia A. Ebener, Peter W. Greenwood, Nora Fitzgerald, and Thomas E. Kosin. 1991. "An Experimental Evaluation of the Phoenix Repeat Offender Program." *Justice Quarterly* 8:141–72.
- Bureau of Justice Assistance. 1997. *Urban Street Gang Enforcement*. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
- Caeti, Tory J. 1997. "Who's Killing Our Kids? An Analysis of Juvenile Homicide Victims in Dallas 1993–1997." Research Initiation Grant Project, University of North Texas, Denton.
- Caeti, Tory J., Eric J. Fritsch, and Craig Hemmens. 1995. "Bangin' in the Legislature: A Comparison of State Statutory Responses to Gangs." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Boston.
- Click, Benjamin R. 1994. "Statistics in Dallas Encouraging." *Police Chief* 61 (12):33–6.
- Curry, G. David, Richard A. Ball, and Scott H. Decker. 1996. "Estimating the National Scope of Gang Crime From Law Enforcement Data." *National Institute of Justice: Research in Brief*.
- Dart, Robert W. 1992. "Chicago's 'Flying Squad' Tackles Street Gangs." *Police Chief* 59:96–8.
- Freed, David. 1986. "Policing Gangs: Case of Contrasting Styles." Pp. 288–91 in *The Modern Gang Reader*, edited by M. W. Klein, C. L. Maxson, and J. Miller. Los Angeles: Roxbury.
- Friend, Charles E. 1994. "Juvenile Curfew." *Policy Review* 6:1–4.

194 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

- Garrett, Dennis A. and David Brewster. 1994. "Curfew: A New Look at an Old Tool." *Police Chief* (December):29-61.
- Garry, Eileen M. 1996. "Truancy: First Step to a Lifetime of Problems." *Juvenile Justice Bulletin* (October).
- Hoover, Larry T. and Tory J. Caeti. 1994. "Crime-Specific Policing in Houston." *Texas Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Program Bulletin* 1 (9).
- Houston, James. 1996. "What Works: The Search for Excellence in Gang Intervention Programs." *Journal of Gang Research* 3:1-16.
- Howell, James C. 1996. *Youth Gang Violence Prevention and Intervention: What Works*. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
- Huff, C. Ronald and Wesley D. McBride. 1993. "Gangs and the Police." Pp. 401-16 in *The Gang Intervention Handbook*, edited by A. P. Goldstein and C. R. Huff. Champaign, IL: Research Press.
- Hunt, A. Lee and Ken Weiner. 1977. "The Impact of a Juvenile Curfew: Suppression and Displacement in Patterns of Juvenile Offenses." *Journal of Police Science and Administration* 5:407-12.
- Jackson, Robert K. and Wesley D. McBride. 1996. *Understanding Street Gangs*. Incline Village, NV: Copperhouse.
- Johnson, Claire M., Barbara A. Webster, Edward F. Connors, and Diana J. Saenz. 1995. "Gang Enforcement Problems and Strategies: National Survey Findings." *Journal of Gang Research* 3:1-18.
- "Juvenile Curfews and Gang Violence: Exiled on Main Street." 1994. *Harvard Law Review* 107 (7):1693-710.
- Kelling, George L. 1978. "Police Field Services and Crime: The Presumed Effects of a Capacity." *Crime & Delinquency* 24:173-84.
- . 1996. "Defining the Bottom Line in Policing: Organizational Philosophy and Accountability." Pp. 23-36 in *Quantifying Quality in Policing*, edited by L. T. Hoover. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.
- Kent, Douglas R. and Peggy Smith. 1994. "The Tri-Agency Resource Gang Enforcement Team: A Selective Approach to Reduce Gang Crime." Pp. 292-96 in *The Modern Gang Reader*, edited by M. W. Klein, C. L. Maxson, and J. Miller. Los Angeles: Roxbury.
- Klein, Malcolm W. 1993. "Attempting Gang Control by Suppression: The Misuse of Deterrence Principles." Pp. 304-13 in *The Modern Gang Reader*, edited by M. W. Klein, C. L. Maxson, and J. Miller. Los Angeles: Roxbury.
- . 1995. *The American Street Gang: Its Nature, Prevalence, and Control*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Knox, George W. 1994. *An Introduction to Gangs*. Bristol, IN: Wyndham Hall.
- LeBoeuf, Donni. 1996. *Curfew: An Answer to Juvenile Delinquency and Victimization?* Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Martin, Joe R., Arnie D. Schulze, and Mike Valdez. 1988. "Taking Aim at Truancy." *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 51:8-12.
- Martin, Susan E. 1986. "Policing Career Criminals: An Examination of an Innovative Crime Control Program." *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 77:1159-82.
- Martin, Susan E. and Lawrence W. Sherman. 1986. "Catching Career Criminals: Proactive Policing and Selective Apprehension." *Justice Quarterly* 3:171-92.
- Needle, Jerome A. and W. V. Stapleton. 1983. *Police Handling of Youth Gangs*. Washington, DC: American Justice Institute, National Juvenile Justice System Assessment Center.
- Owens, Robert P. and Donna K. Wells. 1993. "One City's Response to Gangs." *Police Chief* 58:25-7.
- Palumbo, Dennis J., R. Eskay, and Michael A. Hallett. 1992. *Do Gang Prevention Strategies Actually Reduce Crime?* Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
- Rohrman, Doug. 1993. *Combating Truancy in Our Schools: A Community Effort*. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
- Ruefle, William and Kenneth Mike Reynolds. 1995. "Curfews and Delinquency in Major American Cities." *Crime & Delinquency* 41:347-63.
- Rush, Jeffrey P. 1996. "The Police Role in Dealing With Gangs." Pp. 85-92 in *Gangs: A Criminal Justice Approach*, edited by J. M. Miller and J. P. Rush. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson.
- Shelden, Randall G., Sharon K. Tracy, and William B. Brown. 1997. *Youth Gangs in American Society*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Sherman, Lawrence W. 1990a. "Police Crackdowns." *National Institute of Justice Reports* (March/April).
- . 1990b. "Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence." *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research* 12:1-48.
- . 1992. "Attacking Crime: Police and Crime Control." Pp. 159-230 in *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, vol. 14, edited by M. Tonry and N. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Section II ▼ Gang Suppression Through Saturation Patrol, Aggressive Curfew 195

- Sherman, Lawrence W., James W. Shaw, and Dennis P. Rogan. 1995. "The Kansas City Gun Experiment." *National Institute of Justice: Research in Brief*.
- Spergel, Irving A. 1995. *The Youth Gang Problem*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Spergel, Irving A. and G. David Curry. 1990. "Strategies and Perceived Agency Effectiveness in Dealing With the Youth Gang Problem." Pp. 288–309 in *Gangs in America*, edited by C. R. Huff. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Spergel, Irving A., David Curry, Ron Chance, Candice Kane, Ruth Ross, Alba Alexander, Edwina Simmons, and Sandra Oh. 1994. *Gang Suppression and Intervention: Problem and Response*. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Thurman, Quint C. Andrew L. Giacomazzi, Michael D. Reisig, and David G. Mueller. 1996. "Community-Based Gang Prevention and Intervention: An Evaluation of the Neutral Zone." *Crime & Delinquency* 42:279–95.
- Watzman, Nancy. 1994. "Curfew Revival Gains Momentum." *Governing* 7:20–1.
- Weisel, Deborah L. and Ellen Painter. 1997. *The Police Response to Gangs: Case Studies of Five Cities*. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.
- Weston, Jim. 1993. "Community Policing: An Approach to Youth Gangs in a Medium-Sized City." *Police Chief* 60 (August):80–4.
- Wilson, James Q. and George L. Kelling. 1989. "Making Neighborhoods Safe." *Atlantic Monthly* (February):46–52.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. According to the authors, what are "police suppression tactics"? Give examples of how these tactics might be applied in cities.
2. Based on the research evidence, do police suppression tactics work, or are the results mixed? Explain.
3. Was there a reduction in gang violence in the Dallas study? What about offenses reported to police? Could this work in your city?
4. What do the authors conclude that police can and should do about gang activities?

READING

Adult homicide rates in the United States declined in the 1980s and 1990s, but youth homicide rates have increased dramatically. Homicides committed by juvenile offenders with handguns accounted for more than 100% increases from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s. Police departments throughout the United States turned to "community-" and "problem-oriented" policing to deal with this increase in violent crimes by juvenile offenders. This article describes the results of a National Institute of Justice-funded evaluation of Boston's youth homicide reduction initiative. Operation Ceasefire was a problem-oriented policing intervention aimed at reducing youth homicide and youth firearms violence in Boston. It represented an innovative partnership between researchers and practitioners to assess the city's youth homicide problem and implement an intervention designed to have a substantial near-term impact on the problem. Operation Ceasefire was based on the "pulling levers" deterrence strategy that focused criminal justice attention on a small number of chronically

offending gang-involved youth responsible for much of Boston's youth homicide problem. The evaluation suggests that the Ceasefire intervention was associated with significant reductions in youth homicide victimization, shots-fired calls for service, and gun assault incidents in Boston. A comparative analysis of youth homicide trends in Boston relative to youth homicide trends in other major U.S. and New England cities also supports a unique program effect associated with the Ceasefire intervention.

Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence

An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire (2001)

**Anthony A. Braga, David M. Kennedy,
Elin J. Waring, Anne Morrison Piehl**

Operation Ceasefire is a problem-oriented policing intervention aimed at reducing youth homicide and youth firearms violence in Boston. It represented an innovative partnership between researchers and practitioners to assess the city's youth homicide problem and implement an intervention designed to have a substantial near-term impact on the problem. Operation Ceasefire was based on the "pulling levers" deterrence strategy that focused criminal justice attention on a small number of chronically offending gang-involved youth responsible for much of Boston's youth homicide problem. Our impact evaluation suggests that the Ceasefire intervention was associated with significant reductions in youth homicide victimization, shots-fired calls for service, and gun assault incidents in Boston. A comparative analysis of youth homicide trends in Boston relative to youth homicide trends in other major U.S. and New England cities also supports a unique program effect associated with the Ceasefire intervention.

Although overall homicide rates in the United States declined between the 1980s and 1990s, youth homicide rates, particularly incidents involving firearms, increased dramatically. Between 1984 and 1994, juvenile (younger than 18) homicide victimizations committed with handguns increased by

418 percent, and juvenile homicide victimizations committed with other guns increased 125 percent (Fox 1996). During this time period, adolescents (ages 14 to 17) as a group had the largest proportional increase in homicide commission and victimization, but young adults (ages 18 to 24) had the largest absolute increase in numbers, and there was a good deal of crossfire between the two age groups (Cook and Laub 1998). All of the increase in youth homicide was in gun homicides (Cook and Laub 1998). For many cities, the bulk of this dramatic increase in youth homicide occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Boston, youth homicide (ages 24 and younger) increased more than threefold—from 22 victims in 1987 to 73 victims in 1990. Youth homicide remained high even after the peak of the epidemic; Boston averaged about 44 youth homicides per year between 1991 and 1995.

At the same time that the United States was experiencing this sudden increase in youth violence, the capacity of police departments to design and implement creative new operational strategies also increased through the advent of "community" and "problem-oriented" policing (Goldstein 1990; Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy 1990). In Boston, an interagency problem-solving intervention, based in part on a tight link

between research, the design of interventions, and operations, has shown much promise in reducing youth homicide (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 1997; Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga 1996). Nationally, without the support of a formal evaluation, the Boston program has been hailed as an unprecedented success (see, e.g., Butterfield 1996; Witkin 1997). This article describes the results of a National Institute of Justice-funded evaluation of Boston's youth homicide reduction initiative. Our analyses of Boston's youth homicide prevention program suggests that it was a very effective intervention; not only was the intervention associated with a significant reduction in youth homicide victimization, it also was associated with significant reductions in shots-fired calls for service and gun assault incidents.

The Boston Gun Project and the Operation Ceasefire Intervention

Problem-oriented policing holds great promise for creating a strong local response to youth homicide problems. Problem-oriented policing works to identify why things are going wrong and to frame responses using a wide variety of often untraditional approaches (Goldstein 1979). Using a basic iterative approach of problem identification, analysis, response, evaluation, and adjustment of the response, problem-oriented policing has been effective against a wide variety of crime, fear, and order concerns (Braga, Weisburd et al. 1999; Eck and Spelman 1987; Goldstein 1990). This adaptable and dynamic analytic approach provides an appropriate framework to uncover the complex mechanisms at play in youth homicide and develop tailor-made interventions to reduce youth homicide victimization.

The Boston Gun Project is a problem-oriented policing initiative aimed at reducing homicide victimization among young people in Boston. *Youth* was initially defined as “age 21 and under” and, as the project developed, “age 24 and

under.”¹ Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, the project was designed to proceed by (1) assembling an interagency working group of largely line-level criminal justice and other practitioners; (2) applying quantitative and qualitative research techniques to create an assessment of the nature of, and dynamics driving, youth violence in Boston; (3) developing an intervention designed to have a substantial, near-term impact on youth homicide; (4) implementing and adapting the intervention; and (5) evaluating the intervention's impact. The project began in early 1995 and implemented what is now known as the Operation Ceasefire intervention beginning in the late spring of 1996.

Core participating agencies, as defined by regular participation in the Boston Gun Project Working Group over the duration of the project, included the Boston Police Department; the Massachusetts departments of probation and parole; the office of the Suffolk County District Attorney; the office of the U.S. Attorney; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services (juvenile corrections); Boston School Police; and gang outreach and prevention “streetworkers” attached to the Boston Community Centers program. Other important participants, either as regular partners later in the process or episodically, have included the Ten Point Coalition of activist Black clergy, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Massachusetts State Police, and the office of the Massachusetts Attorney General.

Project research showed that firearms associated with youth, especially with gang youth, tended to be semiautomatic pistols, often ones that were quite new and apparently recently diverted from retail (Kennedy et al. 1996; Kennedy et al. 1997). Many of these guns were first sold at retail in Massachusetts, and others were smuggled in from out of state. Project research also showed that the problem of youth homicide was concentrated among a small number of chronically offending gang-involved youth.² Only about 1,300 gang members—less

198 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

that 1 percent of their age group citywide—in about 61 gangs were responsible for at least 60 percent of all youth homicides in the city. These gangs were well known to the authorities and streetworkers; gang members were also often well known and tended to have extensive criminal records (Kennedy et al. 1996). Chronic disputes, or “beefs,” among gangs appeared to be the most significant driver of gang violence (Braga, Piehl, and Kennedy 1999).

The research findings were discussed and analyzed within the working-group problem-solving process and were instrumental in the development of an operational strategy. The research findings and the working-group process thus led to the Operation Ceasefire intervention (for a complete discussion of the program development and implementation process, see Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 1999). Operation Ceasefire included two main elements: (1) a direct law-enforcement attack on illicit firearms traffickers supplying youth with guns and (2) an attempt to generate a strong deterrent to gang violence. The working group framed a set of activities intended to systematically address the patterns of firearms trafficking identified by the research. These included the following:

- Expanding the focus of local, state, and federal authorities to include *intrastate* trafficking in Massachusetts-sourced guns, in addition to interstate trafficking.
- Focusing enforcement attention on traffickers of those makes and calibers of guns most used by gang members.
- Focusing enforcement attention on traffickers of those guns showing short time to crime and thus most likely to have been trafficked. The Boston Field Division of ATF set up an in-house tracking system that flagged guns whose traces showed an 18-month or shorter time to crime.
- Focusing enforcement attention on traffickers of guns used by the city’s most violent gangs.

- Attempting restoration of obliterated serial numbers and subsequent trafficking investigations based on those restorations.
- Supporting these enforcement priorities through analysis of crime gun traces generated by the Boston Police Department’s comprehensive tracing of crime guns and by developing leads through systematic debriefing of, especially, arrestees involved with gangs and/or involved in violent crime.

The “pulling levers” strategy, as the second element came to be known by working-group members, involved deterring violent behavior by chronic gang offenders by reaching out directly to gangs, saying explicitly that violence would no longer be tolerated, and backing that message by “pulling every lever” legally available when violence occurred (Kennedy 1997, 1998). Simultaneously, streetworkers, probation and parole officers, and later churches and other community groups offered gang members services and other kinds of help. The Ceasefire working group delivered this message in formal meetings with gang members, through individual police and probation contacts with gang members, through meetings with inmates of secure juvenile facilities in the city, and through gang outreach workers. The deterrence message was not a deal with gang members to stop violence. Rather, it was a promise to gang members that violent behavior would evoke an immediate and intense response. If gangs committed other crimes but refrained from violence, the normal workings of police, prosecutors, and the rest of the criminal justice system dealt with these matters. But if gang members hurt people, the working group focused its enforcement actions on them.

When gang violence occurred, the Ceasefire agencies addressed the violent group or groups involved, drawing from a menu of all possible legal levers. The chronic involvement of gang members in a wide variety of offenses made them, and the gangs they formed, vulnerable to

a coordinated criminal justice response. The authorities could disrupt street drug activity, focus police attention on low-level street crimes such as trespassing and public drinking, serve outstanding warrants, cultivate confidential informants for medium- and long-term investigations of gang activities, deliver strict probation and parole enforcement, seize drug proceeds and other assets, ensure stiffer plea bargains and sterner prosecutorial attention, request stronger bail terms (and enforce them), and focus potentially severe federal investigative and prosecutorial attention on, for example, gang-related drug activity. The multitude of agencies involved in the working group assessed each gang that behaved violently and subjected them to such crackdowns. These operations were customized to the particular individuals and characteristics of the gang in question and could range from probation curfew checks to DEA investigations.³

The Ceasefire crackdowns were not designed to eliminate gangs or stop every aspect of gang activity but to control and deter serious violence. To do this, the working group explained its actions against targeted gangs to other gangs, as in “this gang did violence, we responded with the following actions, and here is how to prevent anything similar from happening to you.” The ongoing working-group process regularly watched the city for outbreaks of gang violence and framed any necessary responses in accord with the Ceasefire strategy. As the strategy unfolded, the working group continued communication with gangs and gang members to convey its determination to stop violence, explain its actions to the target population, and maximize both voluntary compliance and the strategy’s deterrent power.

A central hypothesis within the working group was the idea that a meaningful period of substantially reduced youth violence might serve as a “firebreak” and result in a relatively long-lasting reduction in future youth violence (Kennedy et al. 1996). The idea was that youth violence in Boston had become a self-sustaining cycle among a relatively small number of youth, with objectively high levels of risk leading to

nominally self-protective behavior such as gun acquisition and use, gang formation, tough street behavior, and the like: behavior that then became an additional input into the cycle of violence (Kennedy et al. 1996). If this cycle could be interrupted, a new equilibrium at a lower level of risk and violence might be established, perhaps without the need for continued high levels of either deterrent or facilitative intervention.

Deterrence and Crime Prevention

The Operation Ceasefire intervention is, in its broadest sense, a deterrence strategy. Deterrence theory posits that crimes can be prevented when the costs of committing the crime are perceived by the offender to outweigh the benefits of committing the crime (Gibbs 1975; Zimring and Hawkins 1973). Most discussions of the deterrence mechanism distinguish between “general” and “special” deterrence (Cook 1980). General deterrence is the idea that the general population is dissuaded from committing crime when it sees that punishment necessarily follows the commission of a crime. Special deterrence involves punishment administered to criminals with the intent to discourage them from committing crimes in the future. Much of the literature evaluating deterrence focuses on the effect of changing certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment associated with certain acts on the prevalence of those crimes (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978; Cameron 1988; Cook 1977, 1980; Paternoster 1987; Sherman 1990; Sherman and Berk 1984; Weisburd, Waring, and Chayet 1995). In addition to any increases in certainty, severity, and swiftness of sanctions associated with youth violence, the Operation Ceasefire strategy sought to gain deterrence through the advertising of the law enforcement strategy and the personalized nature of its application. It was crucial that gang youth understood the new regime that the city was imposing.

The pulling-levers approach attempted to prevent gang violence by making gang members

200 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

believe that consequences would follow on violence and gun use and choose to change their behavior. A key element of the strategy was the delivery of a direct and explicit “retail deterrence” message to a relatively small target audience regarding what kind of behavior would provoke a special response and what that response would be. Law enforcement agencies in Boston increased the cost of gang-related violence. The deterrence principles applied in the Operation Ceasefire intervention could be regarded as a “meso-deterrence” strategy. Beyond the particular gangs subjected to the intervention, the deterrence message was applied to a relatively small audience (all gang-involved youth in Boston) rather than a general audience (all youth in Boston) and operated by making explicit cause-and-effect connections between the behavior of the target population and the behavior of the authorities. Knowledge of what happened to others in the target population was intended to prevent further acts of violence by gangs in Boston.

The effective operation of general deterrence is dependent on the communication of punishment threats to the public. As Zimring and Hawkins (1973) observe, “the deterrence threat may best be viewed as a form of advertising” (p. 142). One noteworthy example of this principle is an evaluation of Massachusetts’ 1975 Bartley-Fox amendment, which introduced a mandatory minimum one-year prison sentence for the illegal carrying of firearms. The high degree of publicity attendant on the amendment’s passage, some of which was inaccurate, was found to increase citizen compliance with existing legal stipulations surrounding firearm acquisition and possession, some of which were not in fact addressed by the amendment (see Beha 1977). Zimring and Hawkins further observe that “if the first task of the threatening agency is the communication of information, its second task is persuasion” (p. 149). In his article on the misapplication of deterrence principles in gang suppression programs, Malcolm Klein (1993) suggests that law enforcement agencies do not generally have the capacity to “eliminate” all gangs in a gang-troubled jurisdiction, nor do

they have the capacity to respond in a powerful way to all gang-offending in such jurisdictions. Pledges to do so, though common, are simply not credible. The Operation Ceasefire working group recognized that, for the strategy to be successful, it was crucial to deliver a credible deterrence message to Boston gangs. Therefore, the Ceasefire intervention targeted those gangs that were engaged in violent behavior rather than expending resources on those who were not.

Impact Evaluation

Like most evaluations of crime prevention programs (Ekblom and Pease 1995), our evaluation design departs from the desirable randomized controlled experimental approach. The Operation Ceasefire strategy was aimed at all areas of the city with a serious youth violence problem. There were no control areas (or control gangs) set aside within the city because of the following: (1) The aim was to do something about serious youth violence wherever it presented itself in the city, (2) the target of the intervention was defined as the self-sustaining cycle of violence in which all gangs were caught up and to which all gangs contributed, and (3) the communications strategy was explicitly intended to affect the behavior of gangs and individuals not directly subjected to enforcement attention (Kennedy et al. 1996). Therefore, it was not possible to compare areas and groups affected by the strategy to similar areas and groups not affected. Our analysis of impacts within Boston associated with the Ceasefire intervention follows a basic one-group time-series design (Campbell and Stanley 1966; Cook and Campbell 1979); we also use a nonrandomized quasi-experiment to compare youth homicide trends in Boston to youth homicide trends in other large U.S. cities (Cook and Campbell 1979; Rossi and Freeman 1993).

Within-Boston Outcome Measures: Homicide and Gun Violence

The key outcome variable in our assessment of the impact of the Ceasefire intervention was

the monthly number of homicide victims ages 24 and younger. The Ceasefire intervention mostly targets violence arising from gang dynamics; our earlier research suggests that most gang members in Boston are ages 24 and younger (Kennedy et al. 1996; Kennedy et al. 1997). Therefore, our impact evaluation focuses on the number of youthful homicide victims in this age group. The homicide data used in these analyses were provided by the Boston Police Department's Office of Research and Analysis. The youth homicide impact evaluation examined the monthly counts of youth homicides in Boston between January 1, 1991, and May 31, 1998; the preintervention period included the relatively stable but still historically high postepidemic years of 1991 to 1995 (see Figure 1).

Beyond preventing youth homicides, the Ceasefire intervention was also designed to reduce other forms of nonfatal serious violence. As such, our evaluation also examines monthly counts of citywide shots-fired citizen calls for service data and citywide official gun assault incident report data. These data are available for a slightly shorter time period than our homicide data set due to lags in the Boston Police Department's data collection and preparation procedures. These data are examined for the January 1, 1991, through December 31, 1997, time period. The computerized Boston Police Department incident data have what is, for our purposes, an important shortcoming—the records do not capture the age of the victim (this is, of course, also true for shots-fired calls for service). To assess the effects of the intervention on gun assaults in specific age groups, we collected information on the age of the victim from hard copies of gun assault incident reports for the study time period. Because the collection and coding of this information was a time-consuming task, we chose to collect these data for one high-activity police district. District B-2 covers most of Boston's Roxbury neighborhood and has a very dense concentration of gangs; 29 of 61 identified gangs (47.5 percent) had turf in B-2 (Kennedy et al. 1997). Furthermore, there were 217 homicide victims ages 24 and younger in Boston between

1991 and 1995; a third of these victims were killed in B-2 (71 of 217, 32.7 percent).

Simple Pre/Post Comparisons

In these analyses, we selected May 15, 1996, the date of the first direct communications with Boston gangs, as the date Ceasefire was implemented because all elements of the strategy—the focus on gun trafficking, a special interagency response to gang violence, and the communications campaign with gangs—were in place as of that date. No other rival programs were implemented in Boston even roughly close to this time period (Piehl, Kennedy, and Braga 2000). The well-known large reduction in yearly Boston youth homicide numbers certainly suggests that something noteworthy happened after Operation Ceasefire was implemented in mid-1996. As discussed earlier, Boston averaged 44 youth homicides per year between 1991 and 1995. In 1996, the number of Boston youth homicides decreased to 26 and then further decreased to 15 youth homicides in 1997. It is noteworthy that the yearly total of youth homicides in 1997—the first full calendar year of data after the implementation of Operation Ceasefire—represents the smallest number of youth homicides in Boston since 1976. This suggests that it was unlikely that the youth homicide reduction was due to a regression to the mean number of yearly youth homicides of the pre-youth homicide epidemic years. This suggests that Operation Ceasefire was associated with a large reduction in youth homicides in Boston (see also Piehl et al. 2000).

Table 1 presents the results of the Poisson regressions controlling for trend and seasonal effects. The Ceasefire intervention was associated with a statistically significant decrease in the monthly number of youth homicides; according to the incidence rate ratio, the Ceasefire intervention was associated with a 63 percent decrease in the monthly number of youth homicides. The Ceasefire intervention was also associated with statistically significant decreases in the monthly numbers of citywide gun assault incidents, citywide shots-fired calls for service, and youth gun

202 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

assault incidents in district B-2. According to the incidence rate ratios, the Ceasefire intervention was also associated with a 25 percent decrease in the monthly number of citywide gun assault incidents, a 32 percent decrease in the monthly number of citywide shots-fired calls for service, and a 44 percent decrease in the monthly number of youth gun assaults in district B-2. The likelihood ratio test result was also significant, confirming that the intervention variables significantly improved the fit of the models to the data. The deviance divided by degrees of freedom results were only slightly higher than 1.0; this suggests that the Poisson distribution was appropriate for the youth homicide, city gun assault incidents, and B-2 youth gun assault incidents models (see SAS Institute 1997:285). The results for the shots-fired calls for service model, however, suggested that these data were over dispersed. The significant reduction in shots-fired calls for service associated with the Ceasefire intervention remained after the model was run with a correction for overdispersion.

The youth homicide and gun violence reductions associated with the Ceasefire intervention could have been caused or meaningfully influenced by other causal factors (see Piehl et al. 2000). We therefore controlled for changes in Boston's employment rate as measured by the Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training, changes in Boston's youth population ages 5 to 24 as measured by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, changes in citywide trends in violence as measured by the robbery data reported in the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports, changes in homicide victimization among older victims (ages 25 and older), and changes in youth involvement in street-level drug market activity as measured by Boston Police Department arrest data. Admittedly, these controls are far from ideal. For example, measuring changes in Boston's citywide youth population does not directly measure population changes among our target audience—gang-involved youth offenders. However, these variables represent the best available information on

these alternate endogenous explanations for Boston's decrease in youth homicide. When these control variables were added to our models, our findings did not substantively change. The significant reductions in youth homicide, shots-fired calls for service, gun assault incidents, and youth gun assault incidents in B-2 associated with Operation Ceasefire remained when the control variables were added to our Poisson regression models.

Youth Homicide Trends in Boston Relative to Youth Homicide Trends in Other Cities

Although the within-Boston analyses support that a large reduction in youth homicide and gun violence was associated with the Ceasefire intervention, it is necessary to distinguish youth homicide trends in Boston from national trends in youth homicide. Many major cities in the United States have enjoyed noteworthy reductions in homicide and nonfatal serious violence (see, e.g., Blumstein and Rosenfeld 1998); the reductions in other cities could be associated with a number of complex and tightly interwoven endogenous or exogenous factors such as positive changes in the national economy, shifts in the age distribution of offending populations, or the stabilization of urban drug markets. Moreover, many cities, most notably New York (Kelling and Bratton 1998), have implemented crime prevention interventions that have been credited with substantial reductions in violence. The following analyses provide insight on whether Boston's reduction in youth homicide was part of national youth homicide trends and whether the program impact associated with the Ceasefire intervention was distinct in magnitude from other youth homicide reductions occurring at the same time as the Ceasefire intervention. Furthermore, because other cities were also taking intervention action to reduce youth homicide, these analyses will suggest whether any program impact in Boston was larger than, or distinct from, any other deliberate interventions implemented during the same time period. A priori, we predicted

Section II ▼ Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence 203

Table 1 Results of the Poisson Regressions Controlling for Trend and Seasonal Effects

	<i>Youth Homicides</i>	<i>Gun Assaults</i>	<i>Shots Fired</i>	<i>B-2 Youth Gun Assaults</i>
Incidence rate ratio	0.37	0.75	0.68	0.56
Parameter estimate	-0.9948	-0.2886	-0.3854	-0.5814
Standard error	0.2501	0.0514	0.0271	0.1339
Chi-square	15.8217	31.5819	202.6158	18.8439
Probability > chi-square	0.0001*	0.0001*	0.0001*	0.0001*
Likelihood ratio test chi-square	16.6259	31.9418	206.8892	19.6072
Probability > likelihood ratio test chi-square	0.0001*	0.0001*	0.0001*	0.0001*
Trend	-0.0014	-0.0093*	-0.0119*	-0.0093*
January	-0.0213	-0.0108	-0.0008	-0.0442
February	2.8335*	2.8736*	2.8356*	3.1343*
March	-0.0185	0.0508	-0.0111	0.0382
April	0.3767	1.0479*	1.0473*	0.9969*
May	0.1890	0.1048	0.3272*	0.1842
June	1.1827*	1.1471*	1.5021*	1.1553*
July	0.3444	0.2728*	0.4407*	0.4252*
August	0.1410	0.3388*	0.4416*	0.1975
September	1.3472*	1.1825*	1.2423*	1.2634*
October	0.3486	0.1141	0.2507*	0.1807
November	0.6932*	0.9248*	1.0636*	0.7601*
Log likelihood	47.5647	19680.27	111620.60	1535.6891
Deviance/ <i>df</i>	1.12	1.65	9.18	1.47

NOTE: December was the reference category for the month dummy variables.

* $p < .05$.

that Boston would experience a significant reduction in monthly youth homicide counts associated with the timing of the Ceasefire intervention.

To compare youth homicide trends in Boston to national youth homicide trends, we analyzed youth homicide data for the largest cities in the United States. By rank ordering U.S. Census population data in 1990 and 1996, we selected 41 of the most populous cities in the US.⁸ Boston was ranked 20th in population size among these cities in both

1990 and 1996 with an average population of about 565,000. We then obtained monthly counts of the number of homicide victims ages 24 and younger for the 41 comparison cities from Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) data for the time period of January 1991 through December 1997. After a close examination of these data, 2 cities (Washington, D.C. and New Orleans) were excluded due to extensive missing data. This left us with 39 major U.S. cities in the comparison group.

204 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Examination of the trends in youth homicides in the other cities with significant intervention coefficients also supports the distinctiveness of the Boston case. Although based on exploratory analysis, the presence of these differences undermines the argument that the changes in Boston reflect trends in other major U.S. cities.

The Role of Preventing Illegal Firearms Trafficking

Finally, there is the question of what degree, if any, of violence reduction in Boston should be attributed to the prevention of illegal firearms trafficking. Trafficking was, of course, one of the principal original foci of the Gun Project and attention to trafficking one of Operation Ceasefire's two fundamental planks. Evaluating the particular contribution of supply-side interventions in Boston is, we believe, essentially impossible. Antitrafficking efforts were implemented at the same time as violence deterrence efforts, and both might be expected to influence, for example, gun carrying, gun use, and the mix of illegal guns found on the street. A stand-alone trafficking prevention intervention would not face these difficulties and could lead to definitive answers on the impact of supply-side interventions. Operation Ceasefire, however, was not a stand-alone trafficking prevention intervention.

Here, as well, the distinctive characteristics of the decline in homicide and shootings in Boston offer the best insight into what might have happened. Two things are certain. First, supply-side efforts cannot be responsible for the abrupt reductions in gun-related violence over the summer of 1996. Boston trafficking cases follow that reduction rather than anticipate it. Second, antitrafficking efforts in Boston did nothing to reduce the existing stockpile of illegally acquired and possessed firearms in Boston. Those guns held by gang members in Boston in May of 1996 were, for the most part, still held by them several months later when the violence reached its new, lower equilibrium. The change that had occurred was not in the extent of gun

ownership but in *gun use*. The principal impact therefore was nearly certainly a demand-side, deterrence-based effect rather than a supply-side effect. It may well be that antitrafficking efforts strengthened and prolonged that impact. Whether any such effects were large or small cannot be independently established in this case.

Conclusion

The Boston Gun Project was an attempt to bring problem-oriented policing to bear on one important problem, youth violence, in one city, Boston. The project assembled a working group with members from a wide variety of agencies and representing a wide variety of law enforcement, social service, and other operational capacities (Kennedy et al. 1996). It went through a variety of shifts typical of problem-solving operations: shifts in the problem definition, in the shape of the intervention, and in the management and membership of the core operational partnership. Its core operational intervention, Operation Ceasefire, was designed to operate anywhere in the city where youth violence was a serious problem and was intended to interrupt the self-sustaining cycle the Gun Project hypothesized to be driving youth violence in the city (Kennedy et al. 1996). The pulling-levers deterrence strategy at the heart of Operation Ceasefire was designed to influence the behavior, and the environment, of the core population of chronic-offender gang-involved youth. Gun Project research found to be at the heart of the city's youth violence problem (Kennedy 1997).

As we have noted, these interests and diagnoses—the desire to operate wherever youth violence presented itself and the belief that there was essentially one dynamic, which had to be addressed, driving violent behavior by various groups in various places within the city—made a classic experimental evaluation design impossible. It was appropriate neither from the viewpoint of participating agencies nor from the perspective of the forces believed to be driving youth violence

to set aside particular areas, groups, or individuals as controls. There are thus irreducible limits to attributing any violence reduction in Boston to any particular operational intervention.

This article makes a weaker but still meaningful case: that there was an innovative intervention implemented, there were subsequent substantial reductions in youth violence in Boston, the timing of those reductions is consistent with the intervention having impact, those reductions were robust relative to proxy measures of rival causal factors in the city, the reductions in Boston were significantly larger than those in most other American cities at the time, and the large and abrupt changes that characterized the reduction in Boston differed from those of other American cities. There seems, then, to be reason to believe that something distinct happened in Boston and that its impact was both larger and of a different character than either secular trends or deliberate interventions then operating in other cities.

The results of the impact evaluation support the growing body of research that asserts that problem-oriented policing can be used to good effect in controlling crime and disorder problems (Braga, Piehl, et al. 1999; Clarke 1992; Eck and Spelman 1987; Goldstein 1990). In particular, the Ceasefire intervention suggests a new approach to controlling violent offenders from a more focused application of deterrence principles. In contrast to broad-based “zero tolerance” policing initiatives that attempt to prevent serious offending by indiscriminately cracking down on minor crimes committed by all offenders, the pulling-levers deterrence strategy controlled violence by focusing on particular groups that were behaving violently, subjecting them to a range of discretionary criminal justice system action, and directly communicating cause and effect to a very specific audience. Unfortunately, we were not able to collect the necessary pretest and posttest data to shed light on any shifts in street-level dynamics that could be associated with the pulling-levers deterrence strategy. Our research efforts during the pretest phase were focused on

problem analysis and program development. A priori, we did not know what form the intervention would take and who our target audience would be. In this regard, our assessment is very much a “black box” evaluation. Additional research on the deterrence mechanisms of the pulling-levers approach to controlling offenders is necessary.

We believe that the research presented here shows that the Boston Gun Project was a meaningful problem-oriented policing effort, bringing practitioners and researchers together in new ways, leading to a fresh assessment of the youth violence problem in Boston, and leading to operational activities that were a substantial departure from previous practice. The principal intervention, Operation Ceasefire, was likely responsible for a substantial reduction in youth homicide and youth gun violence in the city. At first blush, the effectiveness of the Operation Ceasefire intervention in preventing violence may seem unique to Boston. Operation Ceasefire was constructed largely from the assets and capacities available in Boston at the time and deliberately tailored to the city’s particular violence problem. Operational capacities of criminal justice agencies in other cities will be different, and youth violence problems in other cities will have important distinguishing characteristics. However, we believe that the working-group problem-solving process and the pulling-levers approach to deterring chronic offenders are transferable to other jurisdictions. A number of cities have begun to experiment with these frameworks and have experienced some encouraging preliminary results (see, e.g., Coleman et al. 1999; Kennedy and Braga 1998). These cities include Minneapolis, Minnesota; Baltimore; Indianapolis, Indiana; Stockton, California; Lowell, Massachusetts; Los Angeles; Bronx, New York; High Point, North Carolina; Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Memphis, Tennessee; New Haven, Connecticut; and Portland, Oregon.

The Boston Gun Project applied the basic principles of problem-oriented policing to a substantial public safety problem. Addressing this

206 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

problem required the involvement of multiple agencies and the community as well as substantial investments in analysis, coordination, and implementation. The experience of the Gun Project suggests that deploying criminal justice capacities to prevent crime can yield substantial benefits. The problem-solving orientation of the project means that the problem definition, the core participants, and the particulars of the intervention evolved over the course of the collaboration. Operation Ceasefire itself was highly customized to the goals of the collaboration, the particular nature of the youth violence problem in Boston, and the particular capacities available in Boston for incorporation into a strategic intervention. Therefore, Operation Ceasefire as such is unlikely to-be a highly specifiable, transportable “technology.” However, certain process elements of the Boston Gun Project, such as the central role of the line-level working group and the use of both qualitative and quantitative research to “unpack” chosen problems, should be generally applicable to other problem-solving efforts. Using the working-group problem-solving approach, criminal justice practitioners in other jurisdictions will develop a set of intervention strategies that fits both the nuances of their youth violence problem and their operational capacities. Although the resulting package of interventions may not closely resemble the tactics used in Operation Ceasefire, the frameworks will be similar.

Notes

1. We expanded our study to include youth ages 24 and younger when Boston Gun Project research revealed that street gangs were an important driver in youth gun violence. Most Boston gang members were between the ages of 14 and 24 (see Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 1997).

2. During the problem analysis phase of the project, the authors did not provide or press a definition of *gang* on the members of the working group. Defining gang is a core problem in analyzing and understanding gang- and group-related youth crime and violence (Ball and Curry 1995). The character of criminal and disorderly juvenile gangs and groups varies widely both

within and across cities (Curry, Ball, and Fox 1994). The members of the working group used a definition that could be reduced to a self-identified group of kids who act corporately (at least sometimes) and violently (at least sometimes) (see Kennedy et al. 1997).

3. There were, in fact, only two major Ceasefire crackdowns. In May 1996, the Vamp Hill Kings were subjected to a multiagency operation that included street drug enforcement and drug market suppression, warrant service, stepped-up street enforcement by the Boston Police Department (10 arrests), Operation Night Light probation visits to suspected gang members (38 home visits, 10 probation surrenders), parole visits, 4 Department of Youth Services surrenders, seizure of pit bull dogs by animal control, special bail conditions established for cases presented to Massachusetts district courts, and 4 cases accepted for prosecution by the U.S. Attorney (3 pled guilty, 1 was deported). In August 1996, the Intervale Street Posse was subjected to a similar multiagency operation that included 15 federal arrests on drugs and homicide conspiracy charges (those federally charged were held out of state on pretrial detention) and 8 state drug arrests prosecuted by Suffolk County District Attorney.

4. We ranked the top 40 cities according to U.S. Census population estimates in 1990 and 1996. In this procedure, we observed that Fresno, California, and Tulsa, Oklahoma, were not in the top 40 in 1990 but were in the top 40 in 1996. St. Louis, Missouri, and Oakland, California, were in the top 40 in 1990 but not in the top 40 in 1996. Rather than exclude either pair of cities, we decided to keep both pairs in the sample. After Boston was removed from this group of populous cities, we were left with 41 cities.

References

- Aldrich, John and Forrest Nelson. 1984. *Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models*. Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Ball, Richard and G. David Curry. 1995. “The Logic of Definition in Criminology, Purposes and Methods for Defining ‘Gangs.’” *Criminology* 33:225–46.
- Beha, James A. 1977. “‘And Nobody Can Get You Out’: The Impact of a Mandatory Prison Sentence for the Illegal Carrying of a Firearm on the Use of Firearms and on the Administration of Criminal Justice in Boston-Part I.” *Boston University Law Review* 57:96–146.

Chapter 1 ▼ Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence 207

- Blumstein, Alfred, Jacqueline Cohen, and Daniel Nagin, eds. 1978. *Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates*. Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences.
- Blumstein, Alfred and Richard Rosenfeld. 1998. "Explaining Recent Trends in U.S. Homicide Rates." *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 88:1175–216.
- Braga, Anthony A., Anne M. Piehl, and David M. Kennedy. 1999. "Youth Homicide in Boston: An Assessment of Supplementary Homicide Report Data." *Homicide Studies* 3:277–99.
- Braga, Anthony A., David L. Weisburd, Elin J. Waring, Lorraine Green Mazerolle, William Spelman, and Francis Gajewski. 1999. "Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment." *Criminology* 37:541–80.
- Butterfield, Fox. 1996. "In Boston, Nothing Is Something." *New York Times*, November 21, p. A20.
- Cameron, Samuel. 1988. "The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence." *Kyklos* 41:301–23.
- Campbell, Donald T. and Julian Stanley. 1966. *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Clarke, Ronald V., ed. 1992. *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies*. New York: Harrow and Heston.
- Coleman, Veronica, Walter C. Holton, Kristine Olson, Stephen Robinson, and Judith Stewart. 1999. "Using Knowledge and Teamwork to Reduce Crime." *National Institute of Justice Journal*, October: 16–23.
- Cook, Philip J. 1977. "Punishment and Crime: A Critique of Current Findings Concerning the Preventive Effects of Punishment." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 41:164–204.
- . 1980. "Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the Second Decade." Pp. 211–68 in *Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research*, Vol. 2, edited by Norval Morris and Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cook, Philip J. and John H. Laub. 1998. "The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence." Pp. 27–64 in *Youth Violence*, edited by Michael Tonry and Mark H. Moore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cook, Thomas and Donald Campbell. 1979. *Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Curry, G. David, Richard Ball, and Richard Fox. 1994. *Gang Crime and Law Enforcement Record Keeping* (NCJ 148345). Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
- Dobson, Annette. 1990. *An Introduction to Generalized Linear Models*. New York: Chapman and Hall.
- Eck, John E. and William Spelman. 1987. *Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport News*. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
- Eckblom, Paul and Ken Pease. 1995. "Evaluating Crime Prevention." Pp. 585–662 in *Building a Safer Society: Crime and Justice*, Vol. 19, edited by Michael Tonry and David Farrington. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Fox, James Alan. 1996. *Trends in Juvenile Violence*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
- Gibbs, Jack P. 1975. *Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence*. New York: Elsevier.
- Goldstein, Herman. 1979. "Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach." *Crime & Delinquency* 25:236–58.
- . 1990. *Problem-Oriented Policing*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press
- Kelling, George L. and William J. Bratton. 1998. "Declining Crime Rates: Insiders' Views of the New York City Story." *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 88:1217–32.
- Kennedy, David M. 1997. "Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention." *Valparaiso University Law Review* 31:449–84.
- . 1998. "Pulling Levers: Getting Deterrence Right." *National Institute of Justice Journal*, July:2–8.
- Kennedy, David M. and Anthony A. Braga. 1998. "Homicide in Minneapolis: Research for Problem Solving." *Homicide Studies* 2 (3): 263–90.
- Kennedy, David M., Anthony A. Braga, and Anne M. Piehl. 1997. "The (Un)Known Universe: Mapping Gangs and Gang Violence in Boston." Pp. 219–62 in *Crime Mapping and Crime Prevention*, edited by David Weisburd and J. Thomas McEwen. New York: Criminal Justice Press.
- . 1999. "Operation Ceasefire: Problem Solving and Youth Violence in Boston." Unpublished report submitted to the National Institute of Justice. Available on request from authors.
- Kennedy, David M., Anne M. Piehl, and Anthony A. Braga. 1996. "Youth Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a

208 POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

- Use-Reduction Strategy." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 59:147–96.
- Kleck, Gary. 1995. *Targeting Guns: Firearms and Their Control*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Klein, Malcolm. 1993. "Attempting Gang Control by Suppression: The Misuse of Deterrence Principles." *Studies on Crime and Crime Prevention* 2:88–111.
- Littell, Ramon C, George A. Milliken, Walter W. Stroup, and Russell D. Wolfinger. 1996. *SAS System for Mixed Models*. Cary, NC: SAS Institute, Inc.
- McCullagh, Peter and John Nelder. 1989. *Generalized Linear Models*. 2nd ed. New York: Chapman and Hall.
- McDowall, David, Richard McCleary, Errol Meidinger, and Richard Hay. 1980. *Interrupted-Time Series Analysis*. Sage University Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Paternoster, Raymond. 1987. "The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues." *Justice Quarterly* 4:173–217.
- Piehl, Anne M., Suzanne J. Cooper, Anthony A. Braga, and David M. Kennedy. 1999. "Testing for Structural Breaks in the Evaluation of Programs." NBER working paper no. 7226, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
- Piehl, Anne M., David M. Kennedy, and Anthony A. Braga. 2000. "Problem Solving and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of the Boston Gun Project." *American Law and Economics Review* 2:58–106.
- Rossi, Peter H. and Howard E. Freeman. 1993. *Evaluation: A Systematic Approach*. 5th ed. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- SAS Institute. 1993. *SAS/STAT Software: The GENMOD Procedure*. Release 6.09, technical report P-243. Cary, NC: SAS Institute, Inc.
- . 1997. *SAS/STAT Software: Changes and Enhancements through Release 6.12*. Cary, NC: SAS Institute, Inc.
- . 1998. "V6 SAS Note: PROC MIXED Can Return Incorrect DF with DDFM=SATTERTH and REPEATED." February 18 (<http://www.sas.com/service/techsup/unotes/V6/E/E660.html>).
- Sherman, Lawrence. 1990. "Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence." Pp. 1–48 in *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, Vol. 12, edited by Michael Tonry and Norval Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sherman, Lawrence and Richard Berk. 1984. "The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault." *American Sociological Review* 49:261–72.
- Sparrow, Malcolm, Mark H. Moore, and David M. Kennedy. 1990. *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing*. New York: Basic Books.
- Weisburd, David, Elin J. Waring, and Ellen F. Chayet. 1995. "Specific Deterrence in a Sample of Offenders Convicted of White Collar Crimes." *Criminology* 33:587–607.
- Witkin, Gordon. 1997. "Sixteen Silver Bullets: Smart Ideas to Fix the World." *U.S. News and World Report*, December 29, p. 67.
- Zimring, Franklin and Gordon Hawkins. 1973. *Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What is meant by the "pulling levers" strategy? Give an example of the strategy, and how the "pulling levers" strategy might serve as a deterrent to criminal activity.
2. Did Operation Ceasefire reduce gun ownership among Boston youth? If not, what was reduced?
3. Was the Boston program a broad-based "zero-tolerance" strategy, or did the police target certain crimes? Explain.
4. Based on the authors' recommendations, how do you think the Operation Ceasefire strategy might be applied to your city, or other cities?