

# 11

## TOOLS OF THE TRADE

### Tactics and Targets of Terrorists

#### OPENING VIEWPOINT

##### Actionable Intelligence—Israel and the Hunt for the Engineer<sup>a</sup>

**Yehiya Ayyash**, a master bomb maker better known as “the Engineer,” was a model activist within Hamas’s cell-based organizational structure. Unlike Palestine Liberation Organization-style groups, Hamas required its operatives to organize themselves into small semi-autonomous units. Ayyash was an al-Qassam cell (and later a “brigade”) commander, but he had very few outside contacts and built his bombs in an almost solitary setting. He taught others to make bombs and how suicide bombers should position themselves for maximum effect.

The Engineer’s first device was a Volkswagen car bomb that was used in April 1993. When Hamas began its suicide bombing campaign after the February 1994 Hebron massacre, Ayyash was the principal bomb maker. His bombs were sophisticated and custom made for each mission. They were particularly powerful compared to others previously designed by Hamas.

Ayyash was killed in January 1996. The cell phone he was using to carry on a conversation with his father had been booby-trapped by Israeli security agents and was remotely detonated. The assassination occurred as follows:

Fifty grams of RDX [plastic] explosives molded into the battery compartment of a telephone had been designed to kill only the man cradling the phone to his ear. The force of the concentrated blast caused most of the right side of Ayyash’s face to implode ... The booby-trapped cellular phone had been ... so target specific, that the left side of Ayyash’s face had remained whole. The right hand which held the telephone was neither burnt or damaged.<sup>b</sup>

*(Continued)*



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The Engineer had been directly or indirectly responsible for killing approximately 150 people and injuring about 500 others.

#### Notes

- a. Primarily from Katz, Samuel M. *The Hunt for the Engineer: How Israeli Agents Tracked the Hamas Master Bomber*. New York: Fromm International, 2001.
- b. *Ibid.*, pp. 260–1.

In this chapter, readers will investigate terrorist objectives, methods, and targets. The discussion focuses on the rationale behind the calculation of terrorists' ends and means—*what* terrorists are trying to do and *how* they try to do it. Weaponry is, of course, an integral factor in the evaluation of ends and means, so attention will also be given to the terrorists' arsenal.

*Terrorism*—however defined—is usually officially condemned, even by movements and governments that most of the global community would consider to be terrorists (they, of course, consider themselves to be freedom fighters, or the champions of freedom fighters). This is because much of the discussion about the objectives and methods of politically violent movements is a *moralistic debate*, centering on whether one can legitimately select certain methods as an expression of dissent. When terrorists adopt methods that will inevitably cause the deaths of defined enemies—including innocent civilians—a process of “moral disengagement” occurs that allows them to justify their actions.<sup>1</sup> Thus, “the conversion of socialized people into dedicated combatants is not achieved by altering their personality structures, aggressive drives, or moral standards. Rather, it is accomplished by cognitively restructuring the moral value of killing.”<sup>2</sup>

Previous chapters stressed the importance of *perspective* in the debate about the morality of extremists' tactics and targets, including the important role of codes of self-sacrifice that essentially “cleanse” those who follow the code, regardless of the scale of the violence committed in support of the cause. The following concepts are particularly pertinent for understanding terrorist behavior:

- “It became necessary to destroy the town to save it.”<sup>3</sup>
- “Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice.”<sup>4</sup>
- “One person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter.”
- “One man willing to throw away his life is enough to terrorize a thousand.”<sup>5</sup>



**Photo 11.1** A dramatized depiction of a 19th-century “scientific anarchist” constructing a bomb in his apartment

(Source: Hulton Archive/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Ironically, many people sympathize with the goals and objectives of violent extremist movements but oppose the means they use to accomplish those ends. The problem for some sympathizers is the seeming senselessness of certain types of violence. To most onlookers, many methods appear to be senseless and random; however, from the perspective of terrorists, these methods are neither. Two commonalities must be remembered about terrorist violence from the perspective of terrorists:

- *Terrorist violence is rarely senseless.* It is usually well thought out and not an exercise in irrationality. Within the context of their circumstances, extremists conclude that terrorist methods make perfect sense. Regardless of the ultimate scale of violence applied or the number of civilian casualties, these are considered to be logical and sensible consequences of waging a just war.
- *Terrorist violence is rarely random.* Targets are specifically selected and represent the outcome of careful deliberation. An element of randomness occurs when “targets of opportunity” are attacked without a period of careful pre-planning.

Extremist movements justify the selection of terrorist methods in different ways. Among extremists, acceptance is almost universal that terrorist violence is a kind of “poor man’s warfare” the weak use against stronger opponents. According to this rationale, terrorism is a weapon used by the downtrodden poor against brutally intransigent regimes. There is also a rationale that politically violent groups have no recourse other than to engage in terrorism because their opponents are unreceptive (perhaps violently so) to peaceful or democratic methods of dissent. As a matter of practicality, extremists adopt terrorist methods for several reasons:

- Terror tactics are relatively easy to use and therefore commend themselves to an organization without sophisticated weapons or popular support.
- Terrorism produces disproportionate publicity, which is highly prized by separatist movements or political factions that may feel they have no other way of seizing the world’s attention.
- Spectacular atrocities illustrate a government’s inability to rule. If a government is perceived to be weakened, exasperated security forces may be provoked to overreaction.<sup>6</sup>
- Following the notion of the “Adaptive Adversary”, extremist groups and individuals may perceive that their message is not gaining the attention of elites or the public through non-violent methods, and turn to violent means to achieve their goals. Once violent actions are chosen, the extremist groups become engaged in a dynamic and adaptive struggle with security authorities to realize their extremist vision.

Based on such justifications and practical considerations, terrorists have selected methods and targets from a menu of options derived from their interpretation of their environment. Many terrorists in the past were known to discriminate in selecting methods and targets. Conversely, practitioners of the New Terrorism are apt to wield any available weapon against broadly defined enemy interests.

Table 11.1 reports the incidence of terrorism against specific types of targets worldwide in 2015.

**Table 11.1** Targets of terrorist attacks worldwide, 2016

Target Type	Number of Targets
Private citizens and property	4,734
Police	1,760
Government (general)	1,016
Business	946
Military	558
Terrorists/nonstate militia	336
Utilities	344
Religious figures/institutions	292
Educational institutions	232

Target Type	Number of Targets
Transportation	228
Other	142
Journalists and media	125
Government (diplomatic)	92
Violent political party	74
Nongovernmental organizations	52
Telecommunication	50
Maritime	33
Airports and airlines	32
Food or water supply	12
Tourists	11
Abortion related	1
Total	11,100

(Source: US Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, Annex of Statistical Information*. Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2017)

The discussion in this chapter will review the following:

- The Purpose: Terrorist Objectives
- The Means: Terrorist Methods
- The Focus: Terrorist Targets
- The Outcome: Is Terrorism Effective?

## The Purpose: Terrorist Objectives

Objectives and goals are theoretical concepts that help explain the actions taken by extremist groups and movements during the course of their struggle; they are descriptions of processes that move toward final outcomes. An *objective* is an incremental step in the overall process that leads to an ultimate goal. A *goal* is the final result of the process, the terminal point of a series of objectives. Thus, a desired objective in a revolutionary campaign could be the overthrow of an enemy government or social order; the goal could be the establishment of a new society. During a revolutionary campaign, many objectives would have to be achieved to reach the final goal. For example, an objective for Marxists would be the revolutionary overthrow of a capitalist government. Their goal would be the construction of a new, classless society.

## Typical Objectives

Similarities in objectives can be identified among politically violent groups and movements. These objectives tend to fall somewhere within the range of minimal and optimal desirability: “For most terrorists, the *minimal* objective is increased public recognition that they are a political actor to contend with. The *optimal* objective is movement toward achieving their communal, revolutionary, or other political objective.”<sup>7</sup>

The following discussion identifies a few commonalities in objectives. The selected list is by no means common to all violent extremists at all phases of their campaigns, and this is not an exhaustive analysis of every objective.<sup>8</sup> However, it is instructive to review a few central objectives.<sup>9</sup> These common objectives are the following:

- Changing the existing order.
- Psychological disruption.
- Social disruption.
- Publicizing the cause.
- Creating a revolutionary environment.

### Changing the Existing Order

At some level, all terrorists seek to change an existing order, even if it is simply a short-term objective to disrupt the normal routines of society by inflicting maximum casualties. When evaluating what it means to change an existing order, one must take into consideration the different profiles of terrorist movements, their motives, and the idiosyncrasies of individual terrorists. Several examples follow:

- *Ethnonationalist* terrorists seek to win recognition of their human rights, or a degree of national autonomy, from the present order.
- *Nihilists* wish to destroy systems and institutions without regard for what will replace the existing order.
- *Religious* terrorists act on behalf of a supernatural mandate to bring about a divinely inspired new order.
- *Lone wolves* have a vague and sometimes delusional assumption that their actions will further a greater cause against a corrupt or evil social order.

### Psychological Disruption

An obvious objective is to inflict maximum psychological damage by applying dramatic violence against symbolic targets: “From the terrorists’ perspective, the major force of terrorism comes not from its physical impact but from its psychological impact.”<sup>10</sup> When terrorist violence is applied discerningly, the weak can influence the powerful, and the powerful can intimidate the weak. Cultural symbols, political

institutions, and public leaders are examples of iconic (nearly sacred) targets that can affect large populations when attacked.

Although it is seemingly simplistic to state that terrorists strike these targets to spread terror, this is not an inaccurate characterization of the trauma that follows from a particularly dramatic terrorist incident. For example, many New Yorkers exhibited strong manifestations of stress and anxiety long after the September 11, 2001 attacks.<sup>11</sup>

### Social Disruption

Social disruption is an objective of propaganda by the deed. The ability of terrorists and extremists to disrupt the normal routines of society demonstrates both the weakness of the government and the strength of the movement; it provides terrorists with potentially very effective propaganda. When governments fail to protect the normal routines of society, discontent may spread throughout society, thus making the population susceptible to manipulation by a self-styled vanguard movement. For example, social disruption could be accomplished—and government weakness could be demonstrated—by bombing attacks on public transportation systems. These kinds of attacks have occurred many times in Israel, including a Jerusalem attack in February 1996 when Hamas bombed a bus, killing 22 Israelis. Similarly, a **suicide bombing** on December 25, 2003, at a bus station killed four Israelis; it was carried out by a 17-year-old member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In January 2017, a heavy truck was driven into a group of Israeli soldiers in Jerusalem, killing or injuring nearly 20 people.

In another scenario, a targeted group could be attacked specifically to deter it from traveling through a region or territory; this group could be an ethnonationalist group or simply an economic group, such as the customers of a tourism industry. Tourists, for example, have been targeted repeatedly in Egypt:

- In November 1997, in the ancient ruins of Luxor, Islamists killed more than 60 people (mostly tourists).
- In July 2005, a bombing in the resort city of Sharm El Sheikh on the Sinai Peninsula killed approximately 90 people.
- In 2014, an ultimatum attributed to the Islamist group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis warned tourists to leave Egypt immediately.

### Publicizing the Cause

Terrorists practice propaganda by the deed as a way to achieve exposure for their cause. When successfully manipulated, specific populations, governments, or other interests will focus on the extremists and their grievances. In the modern era, this means that a great deal of terrorist violence is **media-oriented terrorism**. Live broadcasting of violent incidents and their aftermath is de rigeur for media networks that

wish to remain competitive in the global audience market. Television can bring terrorism, warfare, or other violence into hundreds of millions of households within seconds. Thus, with proper planning, terrorists can succeed not only in publicizing their cause but also in causing significant psychological disruption. In this way, the cause receives maximum exposure, and the target audience becomes victimized. All that is required is to attack a symbol that moves the targeted audience.

### Creating a Revolutionary Environment

Dissident extremists understand that they cannot hope to win in their struggle against the state without raising the revolutionary consciousness of the people. Theoretically, this objective can be achieved through the cumulative effect of the objectives just discussed. For many terrorists, propaganda by the deed is considered to be the most direct method for creating a broad-based revolutionary environment so that “the destruction of one troop transport truck is more effective propaganda for the local population than a thousand speeches.”<sup>12</sup> Revolutionary theorists predicted that terrorism would force the state to overreact, the people would understand the true repressive nature of the state, and a mass rebellion would occur—led by the revolutionary vanguard movement.

## Playing to the Audience: Objectives, Victims, and Constituencies

Terrorists adapt their methods and selection of targets to the characteristics of their championed group and the idiosyncrasies of their environment. Targets are selected for specific symbolic reasons, with the objectives of victimizing specific groups or interests and sending symbolic messages to the terrorists’ constituency. In a sense, the targeted groups or interests serve as conduits to communicate the extremist movement’s message. Thus:

... the act of victimizing captures the attention of particular audiences and allows the terrorist to communicate more specific messages tailored to each one ... The use of threat and violence against victims—the kidnappings, the bombings, the assassinations, the killings—serves to transmit specific demands to certain targets and different messages to other targets.<sup>13</sup>

If skillfully applied, propaganda by the deed can be manipulated to affect specific audiences. These audiences can include the following segments of society:<sup>14</sup>

- *Politically Apathetic People.* The objective of terrorist violence directed toward this group is to force an end to their indifference and, ideally, to motivate them to petition the government for fundamental changes.



- *The Government and Its Allied Elites.* Terrorists seek to seriously intimidate or distract a nation's ruling bodies to force them to deal favorably with the underlying grievances of the dissident movement.
- *Potential Supporters.* An important objective of propaganda by the deed is to create a revolutionary consciousness in a large segment of society. This is more easily done within the pool of those who are sympathetic to the extremists' objectives but who do not yet approve of their methods.
- *Confirmed Supporters.* Terrorists seek to assure their members and confirmed supporters that the movement continues to be strong and active. They communicate this through acts of symbolic violence.

Depending on whom they claim to champion, extremist movements adapt their tactics to their environment as a way to communicate with (and attract) their defined constituency. Consider, for example, the perspective from two familiar environments (ethnonationalism and ideology).

*Ethnonationalist terrorists* have tended to be focused and surgical, with the important exception of extreme examples of communal violence. Their objectives are to win improved conditions or autonomy for their championed group. Even when the scale of violence has escalated to the point of near civil war, the enemy group has usually been clearly (if broadly) defined, and the targeted symbols have been interpreted as representations of the enemy group. Attacks against rival ethnonational groups certainly cause civilian casualties, but these civilians have been defined as legitimate targets because of their ethnonational affiliation. Thus, aside from extreme communal terrorist environments:

... these terrorist movements ... see themselves as a revolutionary vanguard—if not in classic Marxist-Leninist terms, at least as a spearhead, similarly using violence to “educate” fellow members of their national or ethnic group about the inequities imposed upon them by the ruling government and the need for communal resistance and rebellion.<sup>15</sup>

*Left-wing ideological terrorists* historically tended to be focused and relatively surgical in their objectives and methods. Their overriding objective has been to use propaganda by the deed to create a revolutionary consciousness in their championed group and thereby to attract the championed group to the cause. Leftists have traditionally been careful about attacking clearly symbolic targets such as buildings, offices, interests, and officials. Based on their interpretation of the existing social and political environment, “the overriding tactical—and indeed ethical—imperative for left-wing terrorists has been the deliberate tailoring of their violent acts to appeal to their perceived ‘constituencies.’”<sup>19</sup>

*Right-wing ideological terrorists* have been much less likely to be either focused or surgical in their political objectives. This is perhaps because their objectives are often

quite vague, and their constituencies are not clearly defined. Right-wing ideology is very idiosyncratic to specific national political environments, and rarely is there a global philosophy that seeks to bind together the violent right. Within the context of terrorist objectives, right-wing terrorist violence has been described as nothing more than:

... an egocentric pleasure derived from brawling and bombing, preening or parading in 1940s-era Nazi regalia ... given that the majority of right-wing groups do not espouse any specific programme of reform, preferring to hide behind vague slogans of strident nationalism, the need for racial purity and the re-assertion of governmental strength.<sup>17</sup>

Thus, with a few exceptions, appeals to specific constituencies are commonly made by terrorists and extremists. These appeals are peculiar to the environment and idiosyncrasies of the movement, although leftists and ethnonationalists have sometimes championed the same groups out of a sense of revolutionary solidarity. Terrorists select their methods within the context of their social and political environments. They appeal to specific constituencies and justify their choice of methods by championing the political cause of their constituencies. Their targeted interests (i.e., enemy interests) can be defined narrowly or broadly, so civilian populations can be included as legitimized targets.

Table 11.2 illustrates the relationship between several extremist groups and movements and their constituencies, objectives, methods, and targeted interests.

**Table 11.2** Constituencies and enemies: selecting tactics and targets

Group or Movement	Activity Profile			
	Constituency	Objectives	Methods	Targeted Interest
Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades	Palestinians	Palestinian state	Suicide bombings; small-arms attacks	Israeli civilians; Israeli military
Iraqi and Syrian Islamist insurgents	Sunni Muslims	Collapse of Syrian and Iraqi regimes; establishment of Islamist state	Terrorist attacks; guerrilla warfare	Regime institutions; non-Sunnis
Al-Qa'ida and affiliates	Devout Muslims	Worldwide Islamic revolution	Well-planned bombings; indigenous insurrections	The West; secular Islamic governments
Provisional IRA	Irish Catholics	Union with the Irish Republic	Small-arms attacks; bombings	British; Ulster Protestants
Bosnian Serb Militias	Bosnian Serbs	Serb state	Ethnic cleansing; communal terrorism	Bosnian Muslims; Bosnian Croats
Tamil Tigers	Sri Lankan Tamils	Tamil state	Terrorist attacks; guerrilla warfare	Sri Lankan government; Sinhalese

## The New Terrorism and New Objectives

The New Terrorism is different from previous models because it is characterized by vaguely articulated political objectives, indiscriminate attacks, attempts to achieve maximum psychological and social disruption, and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. It also includes an emphasis on building horizontally organized, semi-autonomous cell-based networks.

### Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Objectives of the New Terrorism

Terrorist violence is, at its core, symbolic in nature. With notable exceptions, methods and targets have tended to be focused and relatively surgical, and they have been modified to accommodate the terrorists' definitions of who should be labeled as a championed group or as an enemy. However, the redefined morality of the New Terrorism opens the door for methods to include high-yield weapons and for targets to include large populations. Symbolic targets and enemy populations can now be hit much harder than in the past; all that is required is the will to do so.

Why would terrorists deliberately use high-yield weapons? What objectives would they seek? Depending on the group, many reasons have been suggested, including the following general objectives:<sup>18</sup>

- *Attracting Attention.* No one can ignore movements that carry out truly devastating attacks. This is the ultimate manifestation of armed propaganda and propaganda by the deed.
- *Pleasing God.* Divinely inspired terrorists seek to carry out what they believe to be a mandate from God. For example, Christian terrorists believing in the inevitability of the apocalypse might wish to hasten its arrival by using a weapon of mass destruction.
- *Damaging Economies.* This could be accomplished by the contamination of food or other consumer products. A few poisoning events or other acts of consumer-focused sabotage could damage an economic sector. In addition to the contamination and supply-chain impacts of such events, other possible economic impact categories include:
  - *Deaths, injuries and illnesses.* The loss of valuable family and community members, and workers, either permanently or for a period of time, can significantly impact economic systems.
  - *Medical expenses.* The cost of health care from attacks – whether borne by governments or individuals – can be significant and put a strain on already tight budgets.
  - *Ecological and symbolic damage.* The value communities and nations place in ecologies and important symbols can be significant; damage to them can have quantifiable impacts on tourism, food production systems, and quality of life.

- *Avoidance behavior.* When the public change their behavior through fear – whether taking time off work or avoiding restaurants, transit, sports venues, and shopping malls – the economic impacts can be substantial.
- *Resilience.* Despite the impacts, people and economic systems are resilient in the face of attacks. For example, the “Boston Strong” campaign after the Marathon Bombings of 2013 appears to have offset any negative behavioral impact from that event.
- *Influencing Enemies.* Terrorists may be moved to wield exotic weapons as a way to influence a large population. After using these weapons, their demands and grievances would receive serious scrutiny.

In the era of the New Terrorism, terrorists may strike with the central objective of killing as many people as possible. For example, in late 2006 and early 2007, a series of vehicular bombs used by Islamist extremists in Iraq were constructed using chlorine-filled tanks. However, violent extremists are not necessarily interested in overthrowing governments or changing policies as their primary objectives. Rather, their intent is simply to deliver a high body count and thereby terrorize and disrupt large audiences. For example, the 1993 and 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City by radical Islamists, Aum Shinrikyō’s 1995 **Sarin nerve gas** attack in Tokyo, and the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City by American terrorists were all intended to kill as many civilians as possible and to demonstrate the vulnerability of society. There was little if any consideration given to changing government policies.

The following examples are cases of attempted and actual acquisitions of **chemical agents** by extremists. They demonstrate how the underlying characteristic of groups willing to use these weapons is that their objectives (often very vague) permit indiscriminate targeting. These groups also exhibit a minimal intention to pursue concrete political objectives.

### *The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord*

**The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA)** was an apocalyptic religious and racial supremacist survivalist community in the Ozark Mountains of Arkansas. The group was effectively disbanded in 1985 after prosecutions by federal authorities for, among other charges, possessing a large quantity of poisonous **potassium cyanide**. CSA had intended to use the toxin to poison water supplies in US cities.<sup>19</sup> Its objective was to fulfill its apocalyptic vision of hastening the end of time and the coming of a new racial and religious age. CSA is an important example of the threat from committed fringe communities (a number of which exist in the United States) and how such communities can easily acquire chemical agents if motivated to do so.

### *Ramzi Yousef*

Yousef masterminded the first World Trade Center attack in February 1993. Some authorities claimed that he had incorporated toxic **sodium cyanide** into the bomb,

intending to create a toxic chemical cloud.<sup>20</sup> This is however unlikely<sup>21</sup> as Yousef apparently did attempt to procure chemical agents prior to the attack but was unable to do so. His case confirms that some activists in the new international terrorist environment have no compunction about using chemical agents (if available) to inflict as high a death toll as possible. This kind of objective is purely terroristic in character.

### *Aum Shinrikyō*

The Aum Supreme Truth cult released Sarin nerve gas into the Tokyo subway system in March 1995, killing 12 and injuring thousands. The Aum example is significant because it provides several important lessons. First, the attack was easily planned; second, it was easily carried out; third, the chemical agent was easily manufactured; fourth, the potential death toll from this kind of attack is massive; and fifth, the emergency medical systems of major cities may be unable to respond effectively to this kind of attack.

## The Means: Terrorist Methods

The terrorist environment today is shaped by advances in technology, information, and transnational interconnectivity. This truly globalized environment has given rise to new possibilities in terrorist methodology.<sup>22</sup> Two factors in particular are believed by experts to contribute significantly to the distinctiveness of methodologies in the era of the New Terrorism. The first is “the diffusion of information technology and advanced communications”:

The concern about chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear ... terrorism is based partly on the increased ease of finding pertinent information on [the] Internet. The principal impact of the new electronic technologies, however, has not been to move the terrorists toward more exotic methods of attack, but rather ... to improve the efficiency of all of their activities... . Computers and satellite phones have become standard equipment in terrorist groups.<sup>23</sup>

A second distinction of the New Terrorism’s methods is the “increased movement, and ease of movement, across international boundaries”:

The terrorists’ greater ability to operate over long distances has manifested itself [in] ... the building by several terrorist groups of globe-circling infrastructures [and] ... the rise of ad hoc terrorists—small cabals of extremists who do not belong to any larger, established, previously known group.<sup>24</sup>

The following discussion reviews common methods used by terrorists to achieve their objectives, including their selection of weapons.

## Concept: Asymmetrical Warfare

The concept of asymmetrical warfare has been adapted to the characteristics of contemporary political violence.<sup>25</sup> Modern asymmetrical warfare refers to the use of unconventional, unexpected, and nearly unpredictable methods of political violence. Terrorists intentionally strike at unanticipated targets and apply unique and idiosyncratic tactics. This way, they can seize the initiative and redefine the international security environment and overcome the traditional protections and deterrent policies that societies and the international community use.

### The Appeal of Asymmetrical Conflict

Asymmetrical warfare as a method of confrontation arose “from the perception that the United States, and the West (including Israel) more generally, have developed an unassailable capacity for conventional warfare.”<sup>26</sup> Because of this reality, state-level rivals must resort to unconventional and subversive methods to confront US and Western interests—they could never otherwise confront the West using conventional means. At the same time, dissidents must adopt unorthodox methods that can deliver maximum propaganda and symbolic blows against the seemingly overwhelming power of enemy states or societies. Hence, the New Terrorism is characterized by a new doctrine that allows for the use of weapons of mass destruction, indiscriminate attacks, maximum casualties, technology-based terrorism, and other exotic and extreme methods.

This methodology is particularly appealing to antistate movements. Dissident terrorists are quantitatively and qualitatively weaker than conventional security forces. In today’s intensive security environment, they simply cannot prevail or last indefinitely in an urban-based guerrilla campaign—readers may recall the fates of the Montoneros and Tupamaros (cited later in this chapter as cases of unviable movements). Modern terrorists who understand this are more willing than before to deploy unconventional weapons and use highly destructive tactics. Through the adoption of asymmetrical methods, “the weaker forces are seeking total war, encompassing all segments of society.”<sup>27</sup> They are trying to break the enemy’s will to resist through whatever means are at their disposal.

### Netwar: A New Organizational Theory

The New Terrorism incorporates maximum flexibility into its organizational and communications design. Semi-autonomous cells either are prepositioned around the globe as sleepers (such as the March 11, 2004 Madrid terrorists) or travel to locations where an attack is to occur (such as the September 11 hijackers in the United States). They communicate using new cyber and digital technologies. An important concept in the new terrorist environment is the **netwar** theory, which refers to:

... an emerging mode of conflict and crime ... in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age. These protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed small groups who communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, without a precise central command.<sup>28</sup>

The new “internetted” movements have made a strategic decision to establish virtual linkages via the Internet and other technologies. They represent modern adaptations of the following organizational models:<sup>29</sup>

- *Chain Networks.* People, goods, or information move along a line of separated contacts, and end-to-end communication must travel through the intermediate nodes.
- *Star, Hub, or Wheel Networks.* A set of actors is tied to a central node or actor and must go through that node to communicate and coordinate.
- *All-Channel Networks.* There is a collaborative network of small militant groups, and every group is connected to every other group.

### Case in Point: The “Martyr Nation” as an Asymmetrical Strategy

The application of asymmetrical warfare is evident in the conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis during 2001 to 2002. The doctrine of engagement used by Palestinian nationalists called for incessant confrontation with the Israelis, using guerrilla, terrorist, and suicidal martyrdom tactics to strike unexpectedly at soft civilian targets. As one Palestinian leader said, “Our ability to die is greater than the Israelis’ ability to go on killing us.” Nationalists contended that “Israel is confronting a martyr ‘nation,’ not just individual fanatics or militant groups.”<sup>30</sup> Thus, the Maoist concept of *people’s war* arguably has had an asymmetrical application in the martyrdom tactics used by Palestinian extremists, because it suggests that an entire people is willing to sacrifice a great deal to achieve its goals.

This concept of a **martyr nation** as a doctrine for engagement is an example of modern asymmetrical warfare, and it has been applied outside of Israel and the occupied territories. The Palestinians’ notion that their ability to die is greater than their enemy’s ability to go on killing them was not lost on Iraqi insurgents, who regularly employed suicidal martyrdom tactics after 2003 against US-led occupation troops and perceived Iraqi collaborators.

## An Introduction to Common Methods of Terrorists

Methods adopted by modern terrorists reflect the idiosyncrasies of their political environments, so no single factor explains the adoption of specific tactics by different groups. For example, some methods can become routine among a number of groups but are then rarely employed by other groups. Nevertheless, some commonalities

do exist, and “the bomb and the gun” remain as staples in the terrorist arsenal. A number of tactics and weapons are recurrently encountered:


- *Bombings* are a very common terrorist method because they allow the extremist movement to inflict maximum physical and psychological damage with minimum casualties. *Suicide bombings* are particularly effective in the maximization of casualties and psychological consequences.
- *Sidearms* (pistols and rifles) are likewise commonly employed to ambush, assassinate, or otherwise inflict casualties on an enemy.
- *Kidnappings* are conducted for different reasons; they are done sometimes to extort ransoms and at other times for purely propaganda purposes. In the latter scenario, the hostages are sometimes executed.
- *Hijackings* of airliners, seagoing vessels, trains, and other modes of transportation are generally conducted for maximum propaganda effect. This is because they generally have an international profile and are conducted in conjunction with seizing hostages.
- *Vehicle attacks* have often been employed by terrorists in recent years. Vehicles are relatively easy to obtain, difficult to monitor by security officials, can quickly access public spaces to cause death and destruction, and may allow the terrorist to escape also. There appears to be a “contagion effect” here, whereby terrorists with different motives—ranging from Jihadist to right-wing extremist—have used this tactic.

Methods have occasionally become “signatures” of terrorist movements. These are methods that become closely affiliated with the operational activities of specific extremist groups. An example of a **signature method** is a technique used by the Irish Republican Army, Irish Protestant loyalists, and Italy’s Red Brigades known as “**kneecapping**.” The technique involved shooting a victim in the back of the knee joint, thus shooting off the kneecap. Other signature methods have included kidnappings (Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and Brazilian leftists), hijackings (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), suicide bombings (Iraqi insurgents and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), and embracing lone-wolf incidents (ISIS).

The weapons employed by terrorists are integral features of their overall methodologies. Firearms and explosives have historically been the weapons of choice for terrorists. This has not changed appreciably in the modern era, although available firepower has greatly increased, and the selection of targets has arguably become more indiscriminate. Weapons typically include small arms, commercial- and military-grade explosives, rocket-propelled grenades, vehicular (car and truck) bombs, and sometimes suicide bombs. Sophisticated weapons have occasionally been used, such as **precision-guided munitions** (shoulder-fired anti-aircraft rockets) and high-technology triggering devices for bombs. Very few examples exist of the use of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological, radiological,



or nuclear devices. Although the *threat* from terrorists' acquisition of weapons of mass destruction increased during the 1990s, the overarching profile of terrorists and extremists is that they typically wield conventional firearms and explosives.



**Photo 11.2** Anthrax-laced letters sent to Capitol Hill offices. Several letters were mailed during the immediate aftermath of the September 11 homeland attack, an act of bioterrorism that resulted in five deaths.

(Source: US Federal Bureau of Investigation)

## Weapons Old and New

In the modern era, weaponry can be classified along a sliding scale of technological sophistication and threat potential. This scale includes a high, medium, and low range, summarized as follows:<sup>31</sup>

- **High Range.** The New Terrorism is defined in part by the threatened acquisition of chemical agents, **biological agents**, or **nuclear weapons**. This threat includes the development of **radiological agents** that spread highly toxic radioactive materials by detonating conventional explosives. The first case of widespread use of a biological agent by terrorists occurred when **anthrax** was deliberately sent through the mail in the United States in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks.

- *Medium Range.* Terrorists currently have extensive access to military-style weaponry. These include automatic weapons, rocket launchers, and military-grade explosives of many varieties. Sympathetic state sponsorship and the international arms black market permit the procurement of a virtually unlimited array of conventional small arms and munitions. These arms have been the weapons of choice for terrorists in innumerable examples.
- *Low Range.* Often forgotten in discussions about the threat from medium- and high-range weaponry are the powerful homemade weapons that can be manufactured from commercial-grade components. For example, ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) bombs can be easily manufactured from readily available materials. Iraqi insurgents became quite adept at deploying **improvised explosive devices (IEDs)**, commonly referred to as “**road-side bombs,**” against US-led occupation troops.

Contrary to popular assumptions, terrorists and extremists have historically been selective about their choice of weapons and reserved about their use. They have not, as a rule, been particularly adventurous about the quality of violence that they employ. Although modern terrorists have used improvements in the technology of firearms and explosives, they are similar to their violent predecessors in the basic kinds of weaponry they elect to use:

Previously, most terrorists had shown an aversion to the esoteric and exotic weapons of mass destruction ... Radical in their politics, the majority of terrorists were equally conservative in their methods of operation. Indeed, from the time of the late nineteenth-century Russian revolutionaries and the [Irish] Fenian dynamiters ... terrorists have continued to rely almost exclusively on the same two weapons: the gun and the bomb.<sup>32</sup>

## Firearms

Small arms and other handheld weapons have been, and continue to be, the most common types of weapons employed by terrorists. These are light and heavy infantry weapons and include pistols, rifles, submachine guns, assault rifles, machine guns, **rocket-propelled grenades**, mortars, and precision-guided munitions. Typical firearms found in the hands of terrorists include the following:

- *Submachine Guns.* Originally developed for military use, **submachine guns** are now mostly used by police and paramilitary services. Although new models have been designed, such as the famous Israeli Uzi and the American Ingram, World War II-era models are still on the market and have been used by terrorists.
- *Assault Rifles.* Usually capable of both automatic (repeating) and semiautomatic (single-shot) fire, **assault rifles** are military-grade weapons that are used extensively by terrorists and other irregular forces. The **AK-47**, invented by **Mikhail Kalashnikov** for the Soviet army, is the most successful assault rifle in terms of production numbers and its widespread adoption by standing armies, guerrillas, and terrorists. The American-made **M-16** has likewise been produced in large numbers and has been adopted by a range of conventional and irregular forces.

- *Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs)*. Light, self-propelled munitions are common features of modern infantry units. The **RPG-7** has been used extensively by dissident forces throughout the world, particularly in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia. The weapon was manufactured in large quantities by the Soviets, Chinese, and other communist nations. It is an uncomplicated and powerful weapon that is useful against armor and fixed emplacements such as bunkers or buildings.
- *Precision-Guided Munitions*. Less commonly found among terrorists, but extremely effective when used, are weapons that can be guided to their targets by using infrared or other tracking technologies. The American-made **Stinger** is a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile that uses an infrared targeting system. It was delivered to the Afghan *mujahideen* during their anti-Soviet jihad and was used very effectively against Soviet helicopters and other aircraft. The Soviet-made **SA-7 (or Grail)** is also an infrared-targeted surface-to-air missile. Both the Stinger and the Grail pose a significant threat to commercial airliners and other aircraft.

### Common Explosives

Terrorists regularly use explosives to attack symbolic targets. Along with firearms, explosives are staples of the terrorist arsenal. The vast majority of terrorists' bombs are self-constructed, improvised weapons rather than premanufactured, military-grade bombs. The one significant exception to this rule is the heavy use of military-grade **mines** by the world's combatants. These are buried in the soil or rigged to be detonated as booby traps. Antipersonnel mines are designed to kill people, and antitank mines are designed to destroy vehicles. Many millions of mines have been manufactured and are available on the international market.

Some improvised bombs are constructed from commercially available explosives such as **dynamite** and **TNT**, whereas others are manufactured from military-grade compounds. Examples of compounds found in terrorist bombs include the following:

- *Plastic Explosives*. **Plastic explosives** are putty-like explosive compounds that can be easily molded. The central component of most plastic explosives is a compound known as **RDX**. Nations that manufacture plastic explosives often use chemical markers to "tag" each batch that is made. The tagged explosives can be traced back to their source if used by terrorists. Richard C. Reid, the "shoe bomber" aboard American Airlines Flight 63, attempted to detonate a bomb crafted from plastic explosives molded into his shoe in December 2001.
- *Semtex*. **Semtex** is a very potent plastic explosive of Czech origin. During the Cold War, it appeared on the international market, and a large quantity was obtained by Libya. It is popular among terrorists. For example, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has used Semtex-based bombs in Northern Ireland and England.
- *C-4*. Invented in the United States, **Composite-4 (C-4)** is a high-grade and powerful plastic explosive. It is more expensive and more difficult to obtain than Semtex. The availability of C-4 for use by terrorists became apparent when a renegade Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent was convicted of shipping 21 tons of the compound to Libya during

the 1970s. About 600 pounds of C-4 was used in the October 2000 attack against the American destroyer *USS Cole* in Yemen, and it was evidently used to bomb the American facility at Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in June 1996.

- *ANFO Explosives.* **Ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) explosives** are manufactured from common ammonium nitrate fertilizer that has been soaked in fuel oil. Using ammonium nitrate as a base for the bomb, additional compounds and explosives can be added to intensify the explosion. These devices require hundreds of pounds of ammonium nitrate, so they are generally constructed as car or truck bombs. ANFO explosives were used by the IRA in London in 1996; American extremist Timothy McVeigh used a 2-ton device in Oklahoma City in 1995. Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers also used ANFO-based devices during their decades-long insurgency.

### Triggers

Regardless of the type of explosive that is used, some bomb makers construct sophisticated triggering devices and are able to shape explosive charges to control the direction of the blast. Examples of triggering devices include the following:

- *Timed Switches.* Time bombs are constructed from acid-activated or electronically activated triggers. They are rigged to detonate after the passage of a period of time.
- *Fuses.* A very old and low-technology method to detonate bombs is to light a fuse that detonates the explosives. It can be timed by varying the length of the fuse. Shoe bomber Richard Reid was overpowered after a flight attendant smelled burning matches as he tried to light a fuse in his shoe.
- *Pressure Triggers.* Using **pressure triggers**, weapons such as mines are detonated when physical pressure is applied to a trigger. Car bombers in Iraq apparently attached broom handles or other poles to the front of their vehicles as plungers and then rammed their target with the plunger. A variation on physical pressure triggers are trip-wire booby traps. More sophisticated pressure triggers react to atmospheric (barometric) pressure, such as changes in pressure when an airliner ascends or descends.
- *Electronic Triggers.* Remotely controlled bombs are commonly employed by terrorists. **Electronic triggers** are activated by a remote electronic or radio signal.
- *High-Technology Triggers.* Some sophisticated devices may use triggers that are activated by motion, heat, or sunlight. The technologies for such devices are readily available. For example, household lighting and other devices commonly utilize motion- and solar-activated sensors.

### Types of Bombs

- *Gasoline Bombs.* The most easily manufactured (and common) explosive weapon used by dissidents is nothing more than a gasoline-filled bottle with a flaming rag for its trigger. It is thrown at targets after the rag is stuffed into the mouth of the bottle and ignited. Tar, Styrofoam, or other ingredients can be added to create a gelling effect for the bomb, which causes the combustible ingredient to stick to surfaces. These weapons are commonly called "**Molotov cocktails**," named for Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Union's foreign minister during World War II. The name was

invented during the 1939–1940 Winter War by Finnish soldiers, who used the weapon effectively against Soviet troops.

- *Pipe Bombs.* These devices are easily constructed from common pipes, which are filled with explosives (usually gunpowder) and then capped on both ends. Nuts, bolts, screws, nails, and other shrapnel are usually taped or otherwise attached to pipe bombs. Many hundreds of pipe bombs have been used by terrorists. In the United States, pipe bombs were used in several bombings of abortion clinics and at the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta. Modified pipe bombs have also been used by Palestinian suicide bombers during the *intifada*.
- *Vehicular Bombs.* Ground vehicles that have been wired with explosives are a frequent weapon in the terrorist arsenal. **Vehicular bombs** can include car bombs and truck bombs; they are mobile, covert in the sense that they are not readily identifiable, able to transport large amounts of explosives, and rather easily constructed. They have been used on scores of occasions throughout the world. Examples of groups that regularly used vehicular bombs include Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru, the IRA, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Palestinian groups, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain, Iraqi insurgents, and Lebanese groups. Some of these attacks have been quite devastating:
  - February 1993: Four hundred people were killed and 1,000 wounded in 13 simultaneous vehicular bombings in Bombay, India. The attacks were carried out to avenge an attack on a Muslim shrine by Hindus.
  - April 1995: One hundred sixty-eight people were killed, including 19 children, when Timothy McVeigh used a truck bomb to destroy the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.
  - June 1996: A truck bomb killed 19 people in an attack on the US Air Force barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Anti-Saudi Islamic revolutionaries were responsible.
  - August 1998: Twenty-nine people were killed and more than 220 were injured when a car bomb exploded in the town of Omagh, Northern Ireland. The Real Irish Republican Army claimed credit for the attack in an attempt to derail peace negotiations.
  - 2000–2001: The Basque terrorist group ETA ended its cease-fire and began a bombing campaign in Spain. A number of these bombs were car bombs.
  - February 2005: Rafiq Hariri, former prime minister of Lebanon, was assassinated by a car bomb; 20 other people were killed. Syrian agents were suspected.
  - June 2005: Dhari Ali al-Fayadh, a member of Iraq's newly constituted parliament, was assassinated by a suicide car bomb in Baghdad.
- *Improvised Rockets.* Examples exist of the deployment of self-designed rockets by terrorist groups. These are basic designs that are fired without precision at intended targets, but some designs have been significantly upgraded in sophistication. The most famous and frequently used improvised rocket is the **Qassam**, deployed by Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad against Israel. Fired from Gaza, Qassams are imprecisely aimed and directed against Israeli territory. They are responsible for killing or wounding hundreds of Israelis. The term *Qassam* is used generically to refer to several types of rockets, which also include multiple-tube Katyushas and Grads (Soviet-designed) and Iranian Fajr-5 rockets. Israel responded by deploying its **Iron Dome** missile defense network, widely credited with successfully intercepting many Palestinian-improvised rockets.<sup>33</sup>

- *Barometric Bombs*. These bombs use triggers that are activated by changes in atmospheric pressure. An altitude meter can be rigged to become a triggering device when a specific change in pressure is detected. Thus, an airliner can be blown up in midair as the cabin pressure changes. These are sophisticated devices.
- *Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)*. These bombs are constructed by non-state actors and outside of military or regulatory controls by terrorist and insurgent groups. The individuals producing the bombs have expertise in bomb making yet have limited access to equipment or materials. As such, the bomb can vary significantly in power and effectiveness. Yet the sheer volume of deployment, especially in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan in recent years, has led to thousands of deaths, probably more than any other type of weapon. Cheap to produce and often used as roadside bombs that are triggered, the US alone invested over \$60 billion on anti-IED armor and vehicles in the first decade of the post-9/11 era.<sup>34</sup>

### Case in Point: Weapons of Mass Destruction

Within the context of threats from high-range weapons, it is important to distinguish basic differences in four types of weapons: biological agents, chemical agents, radiological agents, and nuclear weapons.

#### *Biological Agents*

These weapons are “living organisms ... or infective material derived from them, which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals, and plants, and which depend on their ability to multiply in the person, animal, or plant attacked.”<sup>35</sup> Viruses, fungi, and bacteria are all labeled as “biological” weapons, but once biological components are obtained, the problem of weaponizing them can be difficult.<sup>36</sup> Toxins such as botulism (discussed in this section) are easier to obtain or manufacture than other potential weapons-grade biological components. The threat from such attacks comes mostly from possible poisoning of food or water rather than causing a catastrophic epidemic. Poisoning attacks would have limited but potentially severe casualties.

Experts generally agree that the most likely biological agents (whether bacteria or not) to be used by terrorists would be the following:

- *Anthrax*. Anthrax is a disease that afflicts livestock and humans. It can exist as spores or be suspended in aerosols. Humans contract anthrax either through cuts in the skin (cutaneous anthrax), through the respiratory system (inhalation anthrax), or by eating contaminated meat. Obtaining lethal quantities of anthrax is difficult but not impossible. Anthrax-infected letters were sent through the mail in the eastern United States immediately after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Those who died from anthrax exposure suffered from inhalation anthrax..
- *Smallpox*. Eradicated in nature, **smallpox** is a virus that is very difficult to obtain because samples exist solely in laboratories, apparently only in the United States and Russia. Its symptoms appear after about 12 days of incubation and include flu-like symptoms and

a skin condition that eventually leads to pus-filled lesions. It is a highly contagious disease and can be deadly if it progresses to a hemorrhagic (bleeding) stage known as the “black pox.”

- *Botulism*. Also known as **botulism, botulinum toxin** is a rather common form of food poisoning. It is a bacterium rather than a virus or fungus and can be deadly if inhaled or ingested even in small quantities.
- *Bubonic Plague*. A bacterium that led to the disease known as the Black Death in medieval Europe, **bubonic plague** is spread by bacteria-infected fleas that infect hosts when bitten. The disease is highly infectious and often fatal.

### Chemical Agents

These weapons are “chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid, or solid, which are used for hostile purposes to cause disease or death in humans, animals, or plants, and which depend on direct toxicity for their primary effect.”<sup>37</sup> Some chemical agents, such as pesticides, are commercially available. Other chemical agents can be manufactured by extremists using available instruction guides. Because of many plausible threat scenarios,<sup>38</sup> experts believe that chemical weapons in the possession of terrorists pose a more likely possibility than do biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.<sup>39</sup>

Examples of possible weaponized chemical agents in the arsenals of terrorists could include the following:

- **Phosgene gas** causes the lungs to fill with water, choking the victim.
- **Chlorine gas** destroys the cells that line the respiratory tract.
- **Mustard gas** is actually a mist rather than a gas. It is a blistering agent that blisters the skin, eyes, and nose, and can severely damage the lungs if inhaled.
- **Nerve gases**, such as Sarin, Tabun, and VX, block (or “short-circuit”) nerve messages in the body. A single drop of a nerve agent, whether inhaled or absorbed through the skin, can shut down the body’s neurotransmitters.

### Radiological Agents

These weapons are materials that emit radiation that can harm living organisms. To become threatening to life or health, these radioactive substances must be “ingested, inhaled, or absorbed through the skin” in sufficient quantities.<sup>40</sup> Non-weapons-grade radiological agents could theoretically be used to construct a toxic “**dirty bomb**” that would use conventional explosives to release a cloud of radioactive contaminants. Radioactive elements that could be used in a dirty bomb include plutonium, uranium, cobalt 60, strontium, and cesium 137.<sup>41</sup> Conceptually, radiological weapons are not unlike chemical or biological weapons in the sense that the effectiveness of each is based on contaminating or infecting living organisms. Absent of large quantities of radioactive materials, this type of weapon would likely cause minimal casualties outside of the blast radius of the bomb, but its psychological effect could be quite disruptive. Radiological materials are available, making the threat from a radiological weapon a plausible scenario—much more than nuclear weapons.

### *Nuclear Weapons*

Nuclear weapons are high-explosive military weapons using weapons-grade plutonium and uranium. Explosions from nuclear bombs devastate the area within their blast zone, irradiate an area outside the blast zone, and are capable of sending dangerous radioactive debris into the atmosphere that descends to the Earth as toxic **fallout**. Nuclear devices are sophisticated weapons that are difficult to manufacture, even for highly motivated governments. Modern nuclear arsenals include large strategic weapons powerful enough to lay waste to large areas and smaller, relatively compact tactical nuclear weapons that were originally developed to support ground troops. Although it is conceivable that terrorists could construct a nuclear device, this would be a very difficult technical and logistical endeavor.<sup>42</sup> Therefore, most threat scenarios envision the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons such as artillery shells by terrorists. The Soviets apparently developed several so-called suitcase bombs—nuclear weapons that are quite compact.

### **Case in Point: The Suicide Bombers<sup>43</sup>**

“Human bombs” are an accepted method of political violence in a number of conflicts, and as documented by researchers the phenomenon has become increasingly common in the modern era. For example, Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) compiled data indicating 2016 was historically the deadliest year on record for suicide bomb attacks: INSS reported that in 2016 there were 469 attacks carried out by 800 perpetrators in 28 countries resulting in 5,650 fatalities.<sup>44</sup> In 2017, there were 348 suicide attacks in 23 countries, in which 4,310 people were killed and 6,700 people were wounded. Notably, despite the drop in the number of attacks, around 137 of the total 623 terrorist suicide attackers were female, the highest number recorded.

Although some examples of suicidal behavior by ideological extremists can be found, most incidents have been committed by ethnonational and religious terrorists. When considering the tactical and symbolic value of suicide attacks, it is instructive to recall the words of the Chinese military philosopher Wu Ch’i: “One man willing to throw away his life is enough to terrorize a thousand,” although the gender-related suggestion is inapplicable in the modern era.<sup>45</sup> Women also sacrifice themselves as suicide bombers, having participated in more than 230 suicide attacks between 1985 and 2008, and many more since that time; for example, Boko Haram in Nigeria routinely deployed girls and young women as suicide bombers, as did Chechen insurgents against Russian targets.<sup>46</sup>

The attraction for deploying suicide squads is simply stated. Human bombs:

- possess an intelligence and flexibility that other weapons do not have;
- inflict significant psychological damage on an enemy;



- are relatively inexpensive weapons, so long as the reservoir of volunteers is maintained;
- exact a high human toll from an enemy while at the same time incurring acceptable losses.

In some conflicts, suicide bombings have rarely occurred. For example, the IRA, ETA, and European leftists and rightists did not use suicidal violence. In other conflicts, suicide attacks became a common method of waging war against the defined enemy. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Hezbollah (Islamic Jihad) in Lebanon, several Palestinian groups in Israel, Al-Qa'ida internationally, and Islamist insurgencies such as ISIS are all examples of movements that have used this tactic regularly. In other conflicts, suicide operations became the signature methods of Chechen rebels and Syrian/Iraqi insurgents. The following cases in point illustrate this behaviour.

### *Nationalism-Motivated Suicide Among the Tamil Tigers*

The civil war between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil separatists involved the extensive use of terrorist methods by the Tamil Tigers. Throughout the 1990s, the movement committed a series of assassinations, detonated a number of car and truck bombs, and regularly engaged in suicide bombing incidents. Tens of thousands of people died during this period. Some suicide attacks were significant events during the course of the war, including the following incidents:

- In May 1991, former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in India by a Tamil woman who detonated a bomb as she stood next to him. She was probably affiliated with Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers movement. In 1998, 26 people were sentenced to death by an Indian court for complicity in the assassination.
- In May 1993, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ramasinghe Premadasa was assassinated by a suicide bomber.
- In December 1999, Sri Lankan president Chandrika Kumaratunga was injured and narrowly escaped death when a suicide bomber attempted to assassinate her at an election rally.

### *Religion-Motivated Suicide and the Lebanon Model*

Lebanon descended into anarchy for approximately fifteen years during the 1970s and 1980s. The fighting was mostly religious, among contending paramilitaries drawn from the Shi'a, Sunni, Druze, and Christian communities. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) also had a strong presence. During the war, these factions carved out de facto fiefdoms that were secured by the paramilitaries. Terrorism and atrocities regularly occurred, and methods included suicide bombings.

The group that pioneered suicide bombing as an effective method of terrorist violence in the Middle East was Lebanon's Hezbollah.<sup>47</sup> Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shi'a movement that has historically received significant state support from Iran and Syria. The group conducted a series of suicide bombings in 1983 through 1985 against Israeli, American, and French interests. Credit for the bombings was usually

taken by a group calling itself Islamic Jihad, a radical splinter group from Hezbollah. The October 1983 suicide attacks against the French and American peacekeeping troops in Beirut were particularly effective—the attackers killed 58 French paratroopers and 241 American Marines, forcing the withdrawal of the peacekeepers. This tactic continued through the 1990s during Hezbollah’s campaign against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon’s southern border region. These attacks were directed against Israeli troops and Israel’s proxy, the mostly Christian South Lebanon Army.

An important aspect of the Lebanese example is that each suicide bomber was later glorified as a martyr. This concept of *martyrdom* is an important motivation behind the recruitment of young suicide bombers. In Israel, Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades all cited the Lebanon model as the inspiration for their renewed *intifada* against the Israelis.

### *Intifada-Motivated Suicide in Israel*

Israel has experienced a large number of suicide attacks. The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)<sup>48</sup> was founded in December 1987 when the first Palestinian *intifada* broke out. Hamas’s “military wing” is the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, which first appeared in January 1992.

Hamas made a concerted effort from 1994 to 1996 to establish itself as the preeminent Palestinian liberation organization. At that time, the PLO was deeply committed to the peace process, and Hamas was equally committed to sabotaging it. The movement conducted a significant number of bombings, shootings, and acts of sabotage. It was during this period that Hamas set the precedent—and honed the methodology—for Palestinian suicide bombings.

In 1995 and 1996, Hamas’s bombing campaign became more deadly as its bombs became increasingly sophisticated. This was the handiwork of an electrical engineer named Yehiya Ayyash, the master bomb maker better known as “the Engineer.”

Hamas was the first Palestinian group to initiate a suicide bombing campaign. It launched the operation in retaliation for the February 1994 Hebron massacre when Baruch Goldstein killed and wounded scores of Muslim worshippers at the Ibrahim Mosque on the holy site of the Cave of the Patriarchs. After Goldstein’s attack, Hamas recruited human-bomb candidates into its Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades’ cells, with the specific mission to attack Israeli civilian targets—primarily at commuter transportation sites. The suicide bombers used shrapnel-laden vehicular bombs, satchel charges (bagged bombs), and garment-strapped bombs. These attacks inflicted significant damage on Israel in terms of the number of Israeli casualties. For example, four Hamas bombers killed 59 people in 1996.<sup>49</sup>

Beginning in 2001, suicide bombers from sectarian Hamas and the secular PLO-affiliated al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades carried out dozens of attacks against civilian targets, killing scores of people during a deadly bombing campaign. The targets were selected to disrupt everyday life in Israel, often buses and other public sites. This was

not the first suicide bombing campaign in Israel, but it was by far the most sustained and lethal one. During 2001 to 2006, approximately 125 suicide bombings occurred, many carried out by young women. The following timeline summarizes the number of suicide attacks against Israel immediately before and after the bombing mission:<sup>50</sup>

- 1993: 13 attacks
- 1994: 7 attacks
- 1995: 8 attacks
- 1996: 4 attacks
- 1997: 4 attacks
- 1998: 2 attacks
- 1999: 0 attacks
- 2000: 4 attacks
- 2001: 36 attacks
- 2002: 60 attacks<sup>51</sup>
- 2003: 26 attacks<sup>52</sup>
- 2004: 14 attacks<sup>53</sup>
- 2005: 7 attacks<sup>54</sup>
- 2006: 4 attacks<sup>55</sup>

### *Martyrdom in the New Era of Terrorism*

Operatives of the Al-Qa'ida network and ISIS movement, affiliated movements, and other similar Islamist extremist groups have demonstrated a proclivity for suicidal violence. Members of these movements have committed many highly destructive suicide bombing attacks against enemy interests. They have also been known to carry out attacks against rival factions. ISIS in particular became the most prolific practitioner of suicide bombing, and in 2016 the movement was responsible for 70% of suicide bombs worldwide.<sup>56</sup> Historic examples of these methods include the following incidents:

- August 1998: Suicide bombers struck the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing more than 200 people and wounding 5,000.
- October 2000: The American destroyer *USS Cole* was severely damaged by two suicide bombers while berthed in the port of Aden, Yemen. The bombers detonated a boat bomb next to the *Cole*, killing themselves and 17 crew members and wounding 39 other Navy personnel. In September 2004, a judge in Yemen sentenced two people to death for the attack and imprisoned four others.<sup>57</sup>
- September 2001: Ahmad Shah Massoud was assassinated by two Arab suicide bombers posing as a film crew for an interview. Massoud was a highly regarded Afghan commander who fought very well during the anti-Soviet jihad. He was also the most effective commander fighting against the Taliban movement. The bombers were Afghan Arabs who used a booby-trapped camera.
- April 2002: A natural gas truck exploded on Djerba Island in Tunisia at the oldest synagogue in North Africa. Seventeen people, 12 of them German tourists, were killed.<sup>58</sup>
- November 2003: Two car bombs were detonated at two synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey.
- May and June 2005: About 130 suicide attacks occurred in Iraq.<sup>59</sup>
- July 2005: Three suicide bombs were detonated at the Egyptian resort town of Sharm El Sheik, killing more than 60 people.
- February 2008: Two mentally disabled women in Iraq, who were strapped with explosives, killed nearly 100 people and wounded about 200 at two pet markets when they were blown up by remote control.

- March 2008: A female suicide bomber in Iraq assassinated a prominent Sunni sheik, who had denounced Al-Qa'ida, in his home.
- January 2012: A suicide bomber killed and injured dozens of people in Burgas, Bulgaria. The bombing occurred near a tour bus transporting Israeli tourists.
- October 2013: A member of Syria's Al-Nusra Front detonated a truck bomb near Hama, killing approximately 30 people.
- January 2014: A Boko Haram suicide bomber killed and wounded scores in a crowded market area in Maiduguri, Nigeria.
- May 22, 2017: In Manchester, UK, more than 20 people were killed and about 60 wounded when a suicide bomber detonated explosives at an Ariana Grande concert.

Interestingly, Al-Qa'ida apparently designed an internal consensus about how to conduct terrorist operations. Members of the network committed to writing what are best described as operational protocols, discovered during searches of Al-Qa'ida hideouts in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Manuals—including a six-volume, 1,000-page CD-ROM version—were found in locations as diverse as Chechnya, the United States, Afghanistan, and England. Chapter Perspective 11.1 presents sample guidelines designed for Al-Qa'ida operatives.

## CHAPTER PERSPECTIVE 11.1

### The Al-Qa'ida “Terrorist Manual”<sup>a</sup>

In May 2000, a document written in Arabic was found during the search of a home of an alleged Al-Qa'ida member in Manchester, England. The document was a manual, approximately 180 pages in length, titled “Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants.” It is essentially an operations manual, or blueprint, for engaging in cell-based terrorist activities in foreign countries. Excerpts from the manual include the following passages.

#### Goals and Objectives

“The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate regimes does not know Socratic debates ... Platonic ideals ... nor Aristotelian diplomacy ... . But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine gun.

Missions Required: The main mission for which the Military Organization is responsible is: the overthrow of the godless regimes and the replacement with an Islamic regime. Other missions consist of the following:

1. Gathering information about the enemy, the land, the installations, and the neighbors.
2. Kidnapping enemy personnel, documents, secrets and arms.

3. Assassinating enemy personnel as well as foreign tourists.
4. Freeing the brothers who are captured by the enemy.
5. Spreading rumors and writing statements that instigate people against the enemy.
6. Blasting and destroying the places of amusement, immorality, and sin; not a vital target.
7. Blasting and destroying the embassies and attacking vital economic centers.
8. Blasting and destroying bridges leading into and out of the cities.

The following security precautions should be taken:

1. Keeping the passport in a safe place so it would not be seized [sic] by the security apparatus, and the brother it belongs to would have to negotiate its return (I'll give you your passport if you give me information).
2. All documents of the undercover brother, such as identity cards and passport, should be falsified.
3. When the undercover brother is traveling with a certain identity card or passport, he should know all pertinent [information] such as the name, profession, and place of residence.
4. The brother who has special work status ... should have more than one identity card and passport.
5. The photograph of the brother in these documents should be without a beard ...

### Operations

Cell or cluster methods should be adopted by the Organization. It should be composed of many cells whose members do not know one another ...

Facsimile and wireless: ... Duration of transmission should not exceed five minutes in order to prevent the enemy from pinpointing the device location ... .

### Measures that should be taken by the undercover member:

1. Not reveal his true name to the Organization's members who are working with him ...
2. Have a general appearance that does not indicate Islamic orientation (beard, toothpick, book, long shirt, small Koran).
3. Be careful not to mention the brothers' common expressions or show their behaviors ...
4. Avoid visiting famous Islamic places ...
5. Not park in no-parking zones and not take photographs where it is forbidden ... .

Important note: Married brothers should observe the following: Not talking with their wives about Jihad work."

### Note

- a. US Department of Justice website, [www.justice.gov/ag/manualpart1\\_1.pdf](http://www.justice.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf)

Table 11.3 summarizes the scale of violence experienced during the suicide bombing campaign waged by Palestinians during a nine-month period of the *intifada*.<sup>60</sup> The targets were almost exclusively civilians, and the death toll was acceptable from the perspective of the terrorists—200 people were killed during this timeline, at a cost of 13 “human bombs.”

The Palestinian *intifada* increased in scale and ferocity during 2001 and 2002. Fighting in Gaza and the West Bank became pitched battles between Palestinian guerrillas and the Israeli military. Street fighting broke out in Bethlehem, Nablus, Ramallah, and other ancient cities. At the same time, a deadly and unpredictable new weapon was applied extensively by the Palestinians—the human bomb.

Initially used by radical Islamic movements such as Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad, suicide bombing became a regular weapon of secular Palestine Liberation Organization fighters. The Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades were a secular “martyrdom” society linked to the mainstream Fatah organization of the PLO. Table 11.3 is a nine-month snapshot of the activity profiles of human bombing incidents.

**Table 11.3** The intifada suicide bombers

“Martyr” Profile	Activity Profile		
	Date	Target	Fatalities
22-year-old man, Jordanian	June 1, 2001	Tel Aviv discothèque	20 killed
23-year-old man, Hamas activist	August 9, 2001	Jerusalem pizzeria	15 killed, including 7 children
48-year-old man, first known Arab Israeli bomber	September 9, 2001	Train depot	3 killed
21-year-old man, engaged to be married	December 2, 2001	Haifa passenger bus	15 killed
28-year-old woman, first known female suicide bomber	January 27, 2002	Jerusalem shopping district	1 elderly man killed
21-year-old woman, English student	February 27, 2002	Israeli roadblock	3 hurt
19-year-old man	March 2, 2002	Bar Mitzvah celebration	9 killed
20-year-old man	March 9, 2002	Café near Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s residence	11 killed
20-year-old man	March 20, 2002	Commuter bus	7 killed
23-year-old man, wanted fugitive	March 27, 2002	Passover celebration Seder	21 killed
18-year-old woman, engaged to be married	March 29, 2002	Jerusalem supermarket	2 killed
23-year-old man	March 30, 2002	Tel Aviv restaurant	32 hurt
22-year-old man	March 31, 2002	Haifa restaurant	15 killed

(Source: Primarily from Ripley, Amanda. “Why Suicide Bombing Is Now All the Rage.” *Time*. April 15, 2002. Used with permission.)

## The Focus: Terrorist Targets

Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Marighella advocated the adoption of terrorism and **armed propaganda** as justifiable tactics in waging urban guerrilla warfare. He wrote that armed propaganda is a symbolic process in which targets should be chosen after a period of careful deliberation about the effect an attack will have on a larger audience. In his *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, Marighella recommended specific targets to be attacked for maximum propaganda effect. He suggested that careful selection would psychologically damage an enemy and attract supporters to the cause. Marighella wrote:

Bank assaults, ambushes, desertions and diverting of arms, the rescue of prisoners, executions, kidnappings, sabotage, terrorism, and the war of nerves, are all cases in point ... Airplanes diverted in flight by revolutionary action, moving ships and trains assaulted and seized by guerrillas, can also be solely for propaganda effect.<sup>61</sup>

Terrorists select their targets because of the expectation that any moral ambiguities of the deed will be outweighed by the target's propaganda value. Terrorists must calculate that they can manipulate the incident into a positive propaganda context. The following sampling of typical targets indicates that terrorists and extremists must rely on a process of redefining who constitutes an enemy group, thereby turning them into a legitimate target. Terrorists:


- take innocent civilians hostage—if the civilian is a symbolic person, they have not hesitated to execute them;
- attack and murder third-country military personnel who have no direct connection to their cause;
- indiscriminately attack civilians as part of terrorist and reprisal campaigns against enemy interests;
- regularly target symbolic buildings such as embassies.<sup>62</sup>

In many terrorist campaigns, the objective has been to disrupt society to the point where the routines of life cannot be managed and the government cannot maintain order. To accomplish this goal, some terrorist movements have incrementally adapted their methods to new targets. This point is exemplified by Algeria's Armed Islamic Group and Armed Islamic Movement, which escalated their terrorist campaign by gradually shifting their emphases to new targets, managing to move through several phases during their insurgency:<sup>63</sup>

- Beginning in 1992, the first targets were security forces who were ambushed in the countryside and in towns. Civilians were also targeted to keep them from revealing where the rebels were based.

- Next, assassinations were carried out. Suspected collaborators (broadly defined), government officials, party officials, and professionals were killed.
- Beginning in 1993, the terrorists redefined who their enemies were and began killing family members of government officials.
- Terrorists also began to target foreign workers and tourists in 1993.
- Women became specific targets for assassination. These victims included professionals and female family members of government officials.
- Indiscriminate bomb attacks began in 1994, escalating into a campaign of suicide bombings in Algiers in June 1995.

Figure 11.1 is a representation of tactics used in terrorist attacks worldwide in 2015.



**Figure 11.1** Tactics used in terrorist attacks worldwide, 2016

(Source: US Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, Annex of Statistical Information*. Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2017.)

## The Symbolism of Targets

In light of our previous discussions about terrorist groups, environments, and incidents, one conclusion should now be readily apparent: Terrorists select their targets because of their symbolic and propaganda value. High-profile, sentimental, or otherwise significant targets are chosen with the expectation that the terrorists' constituency will be moved and that the victims' audience will in some way suffer.

On occasion, terrorists attempt to demonstrate the weakness of an enemy and terrorize those who place their trust in that enemy. For example, in October 2004,



during a ceremony in Baghdad to celebrate the opening of a US-funded sewage facility, two suicide car bombs killed 42 people and wounded many more. At least 35 of the dead were children, many of whom were caught in the first blast as they gathered around US soldiers for candy. The other children were killed when they rushed to the scene and a second car bomb was detonated.<sup>64</sup>

The following targets are often selected because terrorists conclude that they offer a high return in propaganda value.

### Embassies and Diplomatic Personnel

The symbolism of embassy attacks and operations against diplomats can be quite profound. Embassies represent the sovereignty and national interests of nations. Diplomatic personnel are universally recognized as official representatives of their home countries, and attacks on embassy buildings or embassy personnel are conceptually the same as direct attacks on the nations they represent. Assaults on embassies also guarantee a large audience. For example, the 1996–1997 attack and hostage seizures by Peru's Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) on the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru, garnered worldwide attention. The incident ended with the deaths of the MRTA members and dealt a severe blow to the movement, but it demonstrated how a relatively small dissident movement can otherwise score significant propaganda successes. In another example, Iraqi insurgents began a campaign of attacks on Muslim diplomats in July 2005 to force their governments to sever ties with the newly installed Iraqi government.<sup>65</sup>

### International Symbols

Many nations deploy military representatives to other countries. They also encourage international investment by private corporations, which consequently set up offices and other facilities. These interests are understandable targets for terrorists because they can be manipulated symbolically to depict exploitation, imperialism, or other representations of repression. Thus, terrorists and extremists redefine military facilities, corporate offices, military personnel, and company employees as enemy interests and legitimate targets. For example, Colombian leftists attacked US business interests and Mormon missionaries—and took American citizens hostage—during the country's 1994 election season. In another example, during the winter of 1991, the Greek leftist terrorist group **Revolutionary Organization November 17** carried out a series of attacks against international businesses in Greece. Their targets symbolized the interests of the international coalition opposing Iraq during the Gulf War.<sup>66</sup>

### Symbolic Buildings and Sites

Buildings and sentimental sites often represent the prestige and power of a nation or the identity of a people. These sites can evoke strong psychological and emotional

reactions from people who revere them. Terrorists and extremists select these cultural symbols because they know that the target audience will be affected. Interestingly, the target audience can be affected without the use of violence against symbolic buildings and sites—the perception (by the target audience) of these sites as having been “desecrated” can involve nothing more than a show of strength at a cultural site. For example, in September 2000, Israeli leader Ariel Sharon, who was at that time the chair of the opposition Likud Party, made a politically motivated visit to Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque (also known as the Temple Mount). A strong opponent of the negotiation process that led to the Oslo (Peace) Accords, Sharon arrived at the site surrounded by 1,000 Israeli security officers. Palestinians became enraged by the symbolism of the incursion, and the Al-Aqsa *intifada* began. The *intifada* became a mass uprising marked by reprisals and terrorism.

### Symbolic People

Terrorists frequently assault individuals because of the symbolic value of their status. Security personnel, political leaders, journalists, business executives, and others are often selected as targets. Kidnappings and physical violence are common methods used by terrorists against human symbols. In kidnapping and hostage situations, videotapes and photographs are sometimes released for propaganda purposes. For example, in September 1977, the leftist Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Gang) kidnapped German industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer. He was murdered by the group in October 1977. Beginning in 2014, ISIS regularly broadcast images of its fighters and executions using video and social media technologies.

### Passenger Carriers

From the perspective of terrorists, passenger carriers are logical targets. If the carrier is big, such as an airliner, it provides a large number of potential victims or hostages who are confined inside a mobile prison. International passenger carriers readily lend themselves to immediate international media and political attention. For example, the nationalist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine repeatedly used airline hijackings to achieve maximum propaganda exposure for their movement. In Israel, Hamas regularly attacked buses, often assigning suicide bombers to the task. In a typical attack, on August 31, 2004, Hamas suicide operatives attacked two buses virtually simultaneously in the city of Beersheba, killing at least 15 people and wounding dozens. Chapter Perspective 11.2 applies the foregoing discussion to symbolic attacks against American interests.

### Public Venues

There have been numerous examples of public venues being attacked in recent years, including but not limited to the Bataclan concert hall and Parc-des-Princes stadium during the November 2015 Paris attacks, the June 2016 Pulse night club

attacks in Orlando, Florida, and the various truck attacks on public gatherings across Western Europe. The motives of the terrorists are not entirely clear. Each of these locations in different ways—whether an LGBT nightclub, rock concerts, international soccer games, or public parties with alcohol being served—could represent the Western decadence that many *ihadists* purport to resent. That said, it is possible that the terrorists are merely targeting locations with relatively low security (so-called “soft targets”) and large numbers of potential victims to maximize the media and social impact of the attacks.

## CHAPTER PERSPECTIVE 11.2

### The Symbolism of Targets: Terrorist Attacks Against the United States

Many targets are selected because they symbolize the interests of a perceived enemy. This selection process requires that these interests be redefined by extremists as representations of the forces against whom they are waging war. This redefinition process, if properly communicated to the terrorists’ target audience and constituency, can be used effectively as propaganda on behalf of the cause.

The following attacks were launched against American interests.

#### Embassies and Diplomatic Missions

- June 1987: A car bombing and mortar attack were launched against the US embassy in Rome, most likely by the Japanese Red Army.
- February 1996: A rocket attack was launched on an American embassy compound in Greece.
- August 1998: The US embassies were bombed in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. More than 200 people were killed.
- September 2012: Islamist insurgents attacked a US diplomatic compound and an annex in Benghazi, Libya. The US ambassador and a Foreign Service officer were killed at the compound. Two CIA contractors were killed at the annex.

#### International Symbols

- April 1988: A USO club in Naples, Italy, was bombed, most likely by the Japanese Red Army. Five people were killed.
- November 1995: Seven people were killed when anti-Saudi dissidents bombed an American military training facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
- November 2015: Four people, including two American trainers, were shot and killed by a Jordanian police captain at a police training facility near Amman, Jordan.

(Continued)

(Continued)

### Symbolic Buildings and Events

- January 1993: Two were killed and three injured when a Pakistani terrorist fired at employees outside the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.
- February 1993: The World Trade Center in New York City was bombed, killing six and injuring more than 1,000.
- September 2001: Attacks in the United States against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon killed approximately 3,000 people.
- January 2011: A viable anti-personnel pipe bomb was found in Spokane, Washington, along the planned route of a memorial march commemorating the Reverend Dr Martin Luther King Jr.

### Symbolic People

- May 2001: The Filipino Islamic revolutionary movement Abu Sayyaf took three American citizens hostage. One of them was beheaded by members of the group in June 2001.
- January 2002: An American journalist working for the *Wall Street Journal* was kidnapped in Pakistan by Islamic extremists. His murder was later videotaped by the group.
- August and September 2014: ISIS broadcast the beheadings of two captive American journalists.

### Passenger Carrier Attacks

- August 1982: A bomb exploded aboard Pan Am Flight 830 over Hawaii. The Palestinian group 15 May committed the attack. The plane was able to land.
- April 1986: A bomb exploded aboard TWA Flight 840. Four were killed and nine injured, including a mother and her infant daughter who fell to their deaths when they were sucked out of the plane. Flight 840 landed safely.
- December 2001: An explosive device malfunctioned aboard American Airlines Flight 63 as it flew from Paris to Miami. Plastic explosives had been embedded in the shoe of passenger Richard Reid.
- December 2009: An explosive device malfunctioned aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253 as it approached Detroit, Michigan. Plastic explosives had been embedded in the underwear of passenger Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

## The Threat From Cyberterrorism

Expansion of the Internet consistently results in the increasing assignment of fundamental responsibilities to computer systems and networks. The result is that government and industry become increasingly dependent on information technologies. Because of this, targeted attacks on computer systems and networks can conceivably

result in significant social, political, and economic disruption. Motivated extremists who understand this reality are likely to attempt to disrupt these systems when opportunities present themselves.

### Understanding Threats to Cybersecurity

There are several categories of cyberattacks that must be differentiated. Although the threat from potential **cyberterrorism** is often at the forefront of the discussion on homeland cybersecurity planning, it is only one possible type of cyberattack. The cybersecurity discussion must also consider the following delineations of the sources of and motivations behind cyberattacks:<sup>67</sup>

- *Cyberattack* is “a deliberate computer-to-computer attack that disrupts, disables, destroys, or takes over a computer system, or damages or steals the information it contains.”<sup>68</sup>
- *Cyberwarfare* “refers to offensive computer assaults that seek to damage or destroy networks and infrastructures or deter them from waging cyberattacks of their own.” It “is largely, but not exclusively, the domain of states.”<sup>69</sup>
- *Hacktivism* “is a form of ‘contentious politics’ carried out by non-state actors in support of a variety of political, social or religious causes, frequently in opposition to government policy.”<sup>70</sup> An instructive example of hacktivism is the loose anarchist collective calling itself Anonymous.
- *Cyberterrorism* “refers to computer-generated attacks that target other computers in cyberspace or the information they contain ... It is, in this sense, the ‘convergence of terrorism and cyberspace,’ with computer technology serving as both weapon and target.”<sup>71</sup>

### Malicious Use of Cyber Technology: Examples

Cyber technologies can be wielded as virtual weapons by extremists and governments. In this regard, a significant number of cyberattacks have occurred, and it is quite conceivable that emergent technologies will be used by terrorists to destroy information and communications systems when they become available.

Three early incidents illustrate the potential damage that can be wrought by motivated activists and extremists. The following cyberattacks occurred in 1998 and are among the first confirmed examples of the destructive use of cyber technologies by political activists and extremists:

- Members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (also known as the Tamil Tigers) inundated Sri Lankan embassies with 800 daily e-mails during a two-week period. The e-mail messages read, “We are the Internet Black Tigers and we’re doing this to disrupt your communications.” This attack was the first known cyberattack by a terrorist organization against an enemy country’s computer grid.

- Animal liberation activists dropped an “e-mail bomb” on the server of Sweden’s Smittskyddinstitutet. Its entire database crashed when 2,000 e-mail messages were sent on one day, followed on a second day by 3,000 messages. The institute was targeted because of its use of monkeys in medical experiments.
- A three-week e-mail campaign targeted approximately 100 Israeli Internet sites, resulting in the destruction of data. The campaign was launched by Lebanese Americans living in Texas.

Recent incidents are much more intensive and intrusive than the first incidents, and they demonstrate the potentially disastrous scale of destruction from cyberattacks when unleashed by determined adversaries:

- In 2008, immediately prior to the Russian invasion of neighboring Georgia, the government of Georgia was the subject of numerous cyberattacks, mostly the work of the Russians.
- In 2009–2010, Iran’s nuclear facility in Natanz was infected by the Stuxnet worm, severely damaging the uranium enrichment program at the facility. The United States and Israel are suspected to have embedded the worm, but both governments deny knowledge of the incident.
- In August and September 2012, cyberattacks were directed at US financial institutions by hackers calling themselves the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters.
- In November 2014, a sophisticated cyberattack against Sony Pictures accessed and released a large amount of confidential data. A group calling itself the Guardians of Peace demanded that Sony Pictures cancel its release of the comedy film *The Interview*, which depicted a plot to assassinate North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un. The government of North Korea is suspected to have hacked Sony Pictures, but the North Koreans vigorously denied the allegation.
- In 2015–2016, politically motivated cyber-hacking incidents during the US presidential election resulted in the appropriation and systematic release of emails from Democratic Party officials. These emails were steadily released during the election campaign and directed against the candidacy of Democratic Party presidential nominee Hillary Rodham Clinton.

In May and June 2017, two widespread ransomware attacks were conducted across Europe. Companies affected were predominantly in Eastern Europe—one research group estimated 60% of the infected computers were in Ukraine and 30% were in Russia—but other companies in the UK, Spain, Norway and Denmark were also struck. Ransoms were demanded from companies and government organizations in numerous sectors of the economy. Because of incidents such as these, the possibility of cyberterrorism has become a central threat scenario of the modern terrorist environment. As one plausible scenario suggests:

... a variation on [the] theme of terrorism as an asymmetric strategy goes further to suggest that unconventional modes of conflict will stem ... from a shift in the nature of conflict itself. In this paradigm, unconventional terrorist attacks on the sinews of modern, information-intensive societies will become the norm, replacing conventional conflicts over the control of territory or people.<sup>72</sup>

## The Outcome: Is Terrorism Effective?

Does terrorism work? When we consider the effectiveness of terrorism, the basic question to be answered is do the methods used by terrorists against their selected targets promote their goals and objectives? Terrorism is arguably effective—however defined—in some manner to someone.<sup>73</sup> The key (for terrorists) is to establish a link between terrorist methods used in incidents and desirable outcomes. Of course, success and effectiveness can be very subjective considerations. In this regard, there is a tendency for terrorists to use unconventional factors as measures for their effectiveness. For example, terrorists have been known to declare victory using the following criteria:

- Acquiring global media and political attention.
- Having an impact on a target audience or championed constituency.
- Forcing concessions from an enemy interest.
- Disrupting the normal routines of a society.
- Provoking the state to overreact.

The following discussion reviews these criteria. This is not an exhaustive evaluation of measures of effectiveness, but it demonstrates commonalities found among modern terrorist acts.

### Media and Political Attention

At times, the focusing of world attention on the terrorists' cause is itself a measure of success. One central fact in the age of instantaneous media attention is that:

... for the terrorist, success ... is most often measured in terms of the amount of publicity and attention received. Newsprint and airtime are thus the coin of the realm in the terrorists' mindset: the only tangible or empirical means they have by which to gauge their success and assess their progress. In this respect, little distinction or discrimination is made between good or bad publicity.<sup>74</sup>

Many terrorist groups engage in violence that is, at least in part, media oriented. As one Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Gang) member<sup>75</sup> reflected after his "retirement" from the terrorist trade, "We always immediately looked at how the newspapers, especially in Berlin, reacted to our actions, and how they explained them, and thereupon we defined our strategy."<sup>76</sup> The June 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, with its odyssey through several countries and the hijackers' manipulation of the world's media, is a classic example of a media-oriented terrorist incident. The epic case of Flight 847 and the role of the media will be explored further in Chapter 12.

## Having an Impact on an Audience

Terrorists use propaganda by the deed to affect audiences, hoping to rouse them to action or incite a society-level response. Victim audiences, neutral audiences, and championed groups can all be affected by a terrorist event. When an incident occurs, extremists and their supporters assess reactions from these audiences. From the terrorists' perspective, the effectiveness of an attack requires successful manipulation of various audiences' reactions. If, for example, a victim audience is successfully manipulated, members of the audience

change [their] travel habits or [their] vacation destinations out of fear of becoming victims. The rationale for this fear is small ... but the fear of victimization is real, especially among heavy media consumers.... A process of identification takes place not only with former victims and likely future victims but with all those in the audience who share some "victim characteristics."<sup>77</sup>

Chapter Perspective 11.3 explores a tactic adopted by insurgent groups and hostage takers of recording their victims and promulgating their images in the mass media, on social networking media, and on the Internet. This tactic will be further discussed in Chapter 12.

### CHAPTER PERSPECTIVE 11.3

#### Tactical Horror: Digital, Video, and Audio Terrorism

With the advent of the Internet, cable news networks, and social media, terrorists now possess unprecedented access to global audiences. Communications technologies quickly and cheaply bring symbolic images and extremist messages to the attention of policy makers and civilians around the world. Terrorists have adapted their tactics to these new technologies, and many utilize them to broadcast their messages and operations.

During the early millennium, hostage-takers discovered that the plight of their victims would garner intensive global attention so long as their images were promulgated to noteworthy cable news networks.

The typical pattern was for an international figure—often a foreign worker—to be seized by extremists, followed by a communiqué claiming credit for the abduction. A video or series of videos would be delivered to a news outlet, with images of the victim pleading for his or her life while seated before a flag and surrounded by hooded and armed terrorists. The outcome was sometimes satisfactory, with the hostage being granted freedom; at other times, the video incidents ended horrifically.



The first noted incident was the kidnapping and videotaped murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan in January 2002. Since then, Islamist insurgents in Iraq and Syria, terrorists in Saudi Arabia, and violent *ihadists* elsewhere have either issued Internet, cable news, and social media communiqués; videotaped their hostages; or executed them; or committed all of these actions. After the Daniel Pearl murder, a gruesome cycle of beheadings occurred, as illustrated by the following incidents from Iraq:

- Victims represent the international community, and have included citizens from Bulgaria, Pakistan, South Korea, Nepal, Norway, the United States, Great Britain, Turkey, and Iraq.
- Al-Qa'ida in Iraq and other Islamist or other sectarian movements appeared to be responsible for most of the kidnappings and murders.
- A number of hostages were beheaded, sometimes on video recordings that were posted on the Internet.

In the aftermath of the initial cycle of broadcasts, subsequent cycles of media-oriented terror have included Internet and social media images of killings and other incidents, such as mass executions of prisoners by ISIS.

An unusual example of an *unsuccessful* campaign to generate this measure of effectiveness is found in the motives of South Africa's People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD). Founded in 1996, PAGAD waged a campaign of violence to protest the values of what it considered to be an immoral South African society. Originally a vigilante anticrime group, PAGAD evolved into a dissident terrorist group. It espoused an antigovernment and anti-Western ideology, supposedly on behalf of South Africa's Muslim population, but its attacks focused largely on moral targets. PAGAD selected these targets—primarily in Cape Town—as a way to promote moralistic Islamic values and cleanse society. Targets included fast-food restaurants, gay bars, tourist sites, and other symbols of Western decadence and immorality. Unfortunately for PAGAD, South Africa's population was minimally affected, and there was not a societal reaction to PAGAD's attacks (other than revulsion). Interestingly, it promoted its cause in part by maintaining a website.<sup>78</sup>

## Forcing Concessions From an Enemy Interest

Enemy interests—broadly defined—will sometimes concede to the demands of a politically violent movement. Concessions vary in magnitude. They can be made as short-term and immediate concessions or as long-term and fundamental concessions whereby an entire society essentially concedes to a movement. At the level of immediate concessions, accommodations could include ransoms paid by companies for the release of employees who are being held hostage. At the societal level, laws might be changed or autonomy granted to a national group. One repeated method used by terrorists to force concessions is **kidnapping/hostage taking**. This is because:

... hostage takers may influence the government's decision by promising rewards for compliance... The release of hostages unharmed when ransom is paid underwrites a promise in the future. Sequential release of selected hostages makes promises credible. Maintaining secrecy about a government's concessions is an additional reward for compliance.<sup>79</sup>

For example, in 1969, two radical Brazilian organizations—National Liberation Action and MR-8—collaborated in the kidnapping of the American ambassador to Brazil, Charles Burke. They demanded and received radio airtime in exchange for his release. The groups were permitted to broadcast their indictment of Brazil's authoritarian government to a broad audience.

### Disruption of Normal Routines

An obvious measure of effectiveness is whether the normal routines of society can be affected or halted by a terrorist incident or campaign. Some targets—such as the commercial transportation industry—can be selectively attacked to the point where their operations will be disrupted. When this happens, the daily habits of individuals and routines of society will change. In this way, large numbers of people in the broader society in essence respond to the tactics of a relatively weak movement. For example, “for most of the first half of 2002, US airlines were still reeling from the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Despite a recovery of passenger numbers and the US economy more generally, the industry's financial results for the first quarter of 2002 were dire. Compared to the first quarter of 2001, revenues were down by over 20 percent and a net profit of \$2 billion in 2000 was transformed into a loss of over \$7 billion for 2001.”<sup>80</sup> Moreover, subsequent research has shown that, as a consequence of business and vacation travelers avoiding flying following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the total economic impact could have been over \$100 billion when impacts across supply chains are taken into account.<sup>81</sup>

### Provoking the State to Overreact

One outcome that terrorists allude to as a measure of effectiveness is the state's imposition of violent security countermeasures in response to a terrorist environment. This notion of “enraging the beast” is common across the spectrum of terrorist environments. Terrorists, of course, anticipate that the state will become violently repressive, the people will suffer, and the masses will rise up in rebellion after experiencing the true nature of the enemy. This theory has had only

mixed success, as evidenced in the following cases in point that are now familiar to readers.

### Viable Movements

Some movements proved to be viable after provoking the state, as demonstrated by the examples of the Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Northern Ireland's Irish Republican Army fought in an environment wherein Irish Catholics were subjected to violence perpetrated by Protestant paramilitaries, British security forces, and the Royal Irish Constabulary. The IRA had a significant amount of popular support. Because of this support—and because its opponents could not end the violence—the aboveground Sinn Féin party was welcomed as an equal partner by the British during several rounds of peace talks in the late 1990s, also known as the decommissioning process.

The Palestine Liberation Organization survived countless crises that might have defeated other movements. It maintained a consistent level of international and domestic violence directed against Israel for decades. Despite significant applications of force by the Israelis—including assassinations, surgical reprisals, reprisal campaigns, and conventional warfare—the PLO continued to garner worldwide attention and regional support from sympathetic governments.

### Unviable Movements

Some movements proved to be unviable after provoking the state, as demonstrated by the examples of the Montoneros and Tupamaros.

Argentina's Montoneros were effective according to several measures: they successfully received media and political attention, affected target audiences, received concessions from enemy interests, and disrupted societal routines. Unfortunately for the Montoneros, they were wiped out during the Argentine military's violently repressive Dirty War after having provoked the state into using authoritarian methods.

Uruguay's Tupamaros were likewise successful in achieving the first four measures of effectiveness, and like the Montoneros provoked the state into adopting violent security measures. Unfortunately for the Tupamaros, the group was annihilated during a somewhat popular suppression campaign waged by the Uruguayan military.

When extremist movements adopt terrorism as a methodology, they measure the effectiveness of their violent behavior by linking the incident to identifiable outcomes. These measures of effectiveness are unconventional in the sense that they are frequently media oriented and audience oriented. Table 11.4 summarizes measures of effectiveness by illustrating the linkage between terrorist incidents and outcomes.

**Table 11.4** Measures of effectiveness

Measure of Effectiveness	Activity Profile	
	Incident	Outcome
Media and political attention	Hijacking of TWA Flight 847	Global media and political attention
Impact on an audience	PAGAD's moralist terrorist campaign	Failed campaign to bring about a societal response
Concessions from an enemy interest	Kidnapping of US ambassador to Brazil	Broadcast of terrorists' political manifesto
Disruption of societal routines	Suicidal hijackings of four airliners on September 11, 2001	Fewer Americans traveled via airlines; industry suffered revenue losses
Provoke the state	Viable: Provocations by IRA and PLO Unviable: Provocations by Montoneros and Tupamaros	Government methods failed to eradicate opposition Violent military governments crushed the opposition

## Effective Terrorism: The King David Hotel Bombing

The 1946 **King David Hotel Bombing** by the Jewish terrorist group the **Irgun** (acronym for “National Military Organization in the Land of Israel”) was a successful terrorist operation because the attack produced all five of the measures of effectiveness and desired outcomes presented earlier.

After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, the British Empire occupied and governed Palestine. During the 1930s, communal violence between Palestinian Arabs and Jews led to an unsuccessful rebellion by Arabs. In 1937, a Jewish organization calling itself the Irgun began engaging in revenge attacks against Palestinian Arabs. When the Irgun's leaders, **Vladimir Jabotinsky** and **David Raziel**, were killed in 1940 and 1941, a young **Menachem Begin** and other leaders reinvigorated the violent resistance in 1944. Irgun's membership was small, so its strategy was to engage in urban terrorist attacks against British institutions, such as immigration department, land registry, and taxation offices, as well as British security forces.

The King David Hotel in Jerusalem housed the headquarters of the British military and the government secretariat. On July 22, 1946, the Irgun bombed the hotel, killing 91 people and wounding 45 others.<sup>82</sup> Its victims included civilians, Jews, Palestinian Arabs, and British.

The bombing achieved worldwide attention and began a debate in Great Britain about the failure of the British administration to bring peace to Palestine. The British

responded with an increase in the authoritarian policies that it had already imposed prior to the bombing. These policies included mass arrests of Jews, military road-blocks, random personal and dwelling searches, and curfews. These measures were unpopular in Britain and the United States and led to a gradual shift in political opinion against the British occupation.

When the British executed three Irgun members, the Irgun retaliated in July 1947 by beating and hanging two British sergeants, photographing their hanged corpses, and then releasing the pictures to the media. The effect was the final straw for British public opinion, which turned irrevocably against Britain's administration of Palestine.

On May 15, 1948, the British mandate in Palestine ended. The Irgun, a small, determined, urban terrorist group, had successfully implemented Carlos Marighella's strategy of pushing the state to the point of unacceptable authoritarian measures that ultimately resulted in the state's inability to sustain its rule.

As a postscript, Menachem Begin served as prime minister in Israel from 1977 to 1983.

## Chapter Summary

This chapter analyzed terrorist objectives, methods, and targets. It also discussed the effectiveness of terrorism.

Typical objectives included the terrorists' desire to change the existing order, to promote the psychological and social disruption of a society, to publicize their cause through propaganda by the deed, and to create a generalized revolutionary environment. To accomplish their objectives, terrorists have traditionally directed their attention to the manipulation of specific audiences. In the era of the New Terrorism, objectives have become characterized by vagueness, and methods have included indiscriminate attacks and the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Modern terrorist methods reflect the changing global political environment and are characterized by asymmetrical warfare and new, cell-based organizational models. However, most terrorists rely on age-old methods that can be accomplished by using such conventional weapons as firearms and explosives. Modern technologies such as rocket-propelled grenades, precision-guided munitions, and barometric bombs are updated variations on the same theme. Nevertheless, threats from biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear weapons are unprecedented in the possible arsenals of terrorists.

Terrorist targets are selected because of their symbolic value and the impact they will have on affected audiences. Typical targets include embassies, international

symbols, symbolic buildings and sites, symbolic people, and passenger carriers. These targets are chosen because they represent the interests of a defined enemy. Because of the feasible possibility for institutional disruption, the prospect of cyberattacks by extremists and rival governments has increased in the modern era.

The effectiveness of terrorist attacks is measured by unconventional criteria. From the terrorists' perspective, these criteria include gaining media and political attention, affecting targeted audiences, gaining concessions from an enemy interest, disrupting normal routines, and provoking the state to overreact.

In Chapter 12, readers will assess the role of the media. The discussion will illustrate how the media can be used to manipulate information, what it means to consider the media to be a "weapon," the language of reporting terrorism, and issues involved in regulating the media.



## KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

The following topics are discussed in this chapter and can be found in the glossary:

AK-47	dynamite
Ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) explosives	electronic triggers
anthrax	fallout
armed propaganda	gasoline bombs
assault rifles	improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
biological agents	Iron Dome
botulinum toxin (botulism)	kidnapping/hostage taking
bubonic plague	King David Hotel bombing
chemical agents	"kneecapping"
chlorine gas	M-16
Composite-4 (C-4)	martyr nation
cyberterrorism	media-oriented terrorism
"dirty bomb"	mines
	"Molotov cocktails"

mustard gas	rocket-propelled grenades
nerve gases	RPG-7
netwar	SA-7 (or Grail)
nuclear weapons	Sarin nerve gas
phosgene gas	Semtex
plastic explosives	signature method
potassium cyanide	smallpox
precision-guided munitions	sodium cyanide
pressure triggers	Stinger
Qassam rocket	submachine guns
radiological agents	suicide bombing
RDX	TNT
“roadside bombs”	vehicular bombs

## Prominent Persons and Organizations

The following topics are discussed in this chapter and can be found in Appendix B:

The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA)

David Razieli

Irgun

Menachem Begin

Mikhail Kalashnikov

Revolutionary Organization November 17

People Against Gangsterism and Drugs

Vladimir Jabotinsky

Yehiya Ayyash



## DISCUSSION BOX

### Attacks Against the US Marine and French Paratrooper Headquarters in Beirut

*This chapter's Discussion Box is intended to stimulate critical debate about how determined terrorist attacks can affect the policies of nations.*

In September 1982, 5,000 elite French paratroopers, Italian Bersaglieri, and American Marines were sent into Beirut, Lebanon, as members of the peace-keeping Multinational Force (MNF). The purpose of the MNF was to restore order to the city in the midst of a civil war and an Israeli invasion that had been launched to drive the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon.

Members of radical Lebanese Islamic militia movements, specifically the Sunni Amal and Shi'ite Hezbollah groups, viewed the MNF as an invasion force. From their perspective, the West supported the Lebanese Christian Phalangists and the Israelis. They at first waged low-intensity resistance against the Western presence. A gradual escalation then occurred, with Amal and Hezbollah fighters becoming more aggressive in their opposition. In response to casualties incurred by Marines and French paratroopers, the United States began shelling Syrian-controlled positions from naval vessels.

On October 23, 1983, two suicide bombers driving vehicular bombs simultaneously struck the US Marines' and French paratroopers' headquarters in Beirut; 241 Marines and 58 paratroopers were killed. The terrorist group Islamic Jihad—probably the Lebanese Shi'ite movement Hezbollah—claimed credit for the attacks. The bombings were hailed by Amal and Hezbollah leadership (who were careful to deny any responsibility for the attacks) as legitimate resistance by patriots against occupying armies.

After the attacks, the United States began using air power and naval artillery to shell hostile positions. However, public opinion had turned against the increasingly complicated “peace-keeping” mission, and MNF troops were withdrawn in early 1984.

#### Discussion Questions

1. Were the Lebanese militia fighters terrorists or freedom fighters?
2. Is terrorism “poor man's warfare” and therefore a legitimate option for waging war?
3. Were the suicide bombings acceptable methods for opposing the deployment of the MNF?
4. Was the presence of Western soldiers indeed an understandable precipitating cause of Amal's and Hezbollah's resistance?
5. Were the targets—the French and American headquarters—logical targets for relatively weak opposition forces?





**Photo 11.3** Peacekeeping in Beirut. Two US Marines survey the rubble of the Marine Corps barracks in October 1983, which had been destroyed by a Lebanese vehicular suicide bomb. Two hundred and forty-one of their comrades died in the attack.

(Source: US Department of State)

## On Your Own

The open-access Student Study Site at <https://study.sagepub.com/martinpragerterrorism> has a variety of useful study aids, including eFlashcards, quizzes, audio resources, and journal articles. The websites, exercises, and recommended readings listed below are easily accessed on this site as well.

## Recommended Websites

The following websites provide links to discussions and data about terrorist objectives, methods, and targets:

Al-Qa'ida "Training Manual": [www.justice.gov/ag/manualpart1\\_1.pdf](http://www.justice.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf)

*The Anarchist's Cookbook*: Search engine, enter: Anarchist's Cookbook

Institute for National Security Studies (Tel Aviv): [www.inss.org.il/](http://www.inss.org.il/)

Jihadology: <http://jihadology.net/>

Patterns of Global Terrorism (US State Department): [www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/pgtrpt/](http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/pgtrpt/)

*The Terrorist's Handbook*: Search engine, enter: Terrorist's Handbook

## Web Exercise

Using this chapter's recommended websites, conduct an online investigation of terrorist objectives, methods, and targets.

1. What common patterns of behavior and methods can you identify across regions and movements?
2. Conduct a search for other websites that offer advice for organizing terrorist cells and carrying out terrorist attacks. Do you think that the online terrorist manuals and weapons advice are a danger to global society?
3. Compare the websites for the monitoring organizations. How would you describe the quality of their information? Are they providing a useful service?

For an online search of terrorist tactics and targets, readers should enter the following keywords in the search engine on their Web browser:

“Terrorist Manuals”

“Terrorist Weapons”

## Recommended Readings

The following publications provide discussions on terrorist objectives and methods:

- Bergen, Peter L. *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.
- Berko, Anat. *The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009.
- Cragin, Kim, et al. *Sharing the Dragon's Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007.
- Dolnik, Adam. *Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics, and Global Trends*. London: Routledge, 2007.
- Frantz, Douglas, and Catherine Collis. *The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets—And How We Could Have Stopped Him*. New York: Twelve Books, 2007.
- Glücklich, Ariel. *Dying for Heaven: Holy Pleasure and Suicide Bombers*. New York: HarperOne, 2009.
- Hafez, Mohammed M. *Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.
- Janczewski, Lech J., and Andrew M. Colarik, eds. *Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism*. Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 2008.
- Katz, Samuel M. *The Hunt for the Engineer: How Israeli Agents Tracked the Hamas Master Bomber*. New York: Fromm International, 2001.

- Levi, Michael. *On Nuclear Terrorism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.
- Mueller, Robert. *Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism From Hiroshima to Al Qaeda*. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- Oliver, Anne Marie, and Paul F. Steinberg. *The Road to Martyrs' Square: A Journey Into the World of the Suicide Bomber*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Pape, Robert Anthony. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House, 2005.
- Powell, William. *The Anarchist Cookbook*. New York: Lyle Stuart, 1971; assigned to Barricade Books, 1989.
- Ranstorp, Magnus, and Magnus Normark, eds. *Unconventional Weapons and International Terrorism: Challenges and a New Approach*. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- Stern, Jessica. *The Ultimate Terrorists*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
- Thornton, Rod. *Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the Twenty-first Century*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007.
- Tucker, Jonathan B., ed. *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000.
- Zubay, Geoffrey, et al., eds. *Agents of Bioterrorism: Pathogens and Their Weaponization*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.

## Notes

1. For a discussion of moral disengagement in the use of political violence, see Bandura, Albert. "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement." In *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998, pp. 161ff.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 164.
3. This quotation was more widely reported after the war as "we had to destroy the village to save it." The accuracy and source of the statement have been debated by journalists, scholars, and policy makers. See Oberdorfer, Don. *Tet!* Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971, pp. 184–5, 332. See also Sheehan, Neil. *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*. New York: Random House, 1988, p. 719.
4. A statement made by Republican senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona during his bid for the presidency in 1964 against President Lyndon Johnson.
5. A statement made by Chinese military philosopher Wu Ch'i.
6. See Keegan, John, and Richard Holmes. *Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle*. New York: Elisabeth Sifton Books, 1986, pp. 252–3.
7. Weimann, Gabriel, and Conrad Winn. *The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism*. New York: Longman, 1994, p. 173 (emphasis added).
8. For a good discussion of the objectives of states vis-à-vis dissidents, see Sederberg, Peter C. *Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989, pp. 92ff.
9. Another inventory of objectives is presented by Pillar, Paul R. *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001, pp. 130–1.

10. Heymann, Philip B. *Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998, p. 9.
11. Kershaw, Sarah. "Even 6 Months Later, 'Get Over It' Just Isn't an Option." *New York Times*, March 11, 2002.
12. Debray, Régis. *Revolution in the Revolution?* Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1967. Quoted in Hewitt, Christopher. "Public's Perspectives." In *Terrorism and the Media*, edited by David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmid. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992, p. 189.
13. Crelinsten, Ronald D. "Victims' Perspectives." In *Terrorism and the Media*, edited by David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmid. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992, p. 212.
14. See Heymann, *Terrorism and America*, pp. 10–11.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
16. Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 158.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
18. See Stern, Jessica. *The Ultimate Terrorists*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 70ff.
19. See Stern, Jessica Eve. "The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (1985)." In *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, edited by Jonathan B. Tucker. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 139–57.
20. See Judge Kevin T. Duffy. Sentencing Statement. *United States of America v. Mohammad A. Salameh, et al.*, S593CR.180 (KTD), May 24, 1994, p. 36. Quoted in Parachini, John V. "The World Trade Center Bombers (1993)." In *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, edited by Jonathan B. Tucker. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 185–6.
21. See Parachini, "The World Trade Center Bombers," pp. 186–7.
22. For a discussion of terrorism in the age of globalization, see Martin, Gus. "Globalization and International Terrorism." In *The Blackwell Companion to Globalization*, edited by George Ritzer. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006.
23. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 47.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 48–9.
25. The term was used in a study conducted by the National Defense Panel titled "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century." The 1997 report warned that "unanticipated asymmetries" in the international security environment would likely result in an attack on the American homeland. Leiby, Richard. "Rueful Prophets of the Unimaginable: High-Level Studies Warned of Threat." *Washington Post*, September 22, 2001.
26. Lesser, Ian O. "Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy." In *Countering the New Terrorism*, edited by Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999, p. 94.
27. Haselkorn, Avigdor. "Martyrdom: The Most Powerful Weapon." *Los Angeles Times*, December 3, 2000.
28. Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism." In *Countering the New Terrorism*, edited by Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999, p. 47.
29. See *ibid.*, p. 49.
30. Haselkorn, "Martyrdom."

31. See Hoffman, Bruce. "Terrorism Trends and Prospects." In *Countering the New Terrorism*, edited by Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999, pp. 28ff.
32. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 121.
33. See Witte, Griff, and Ruth Eglash. "Iron Dome, Israel's Missile Defense System, Changes Calculus of Fight With Hamas." *Washington Post*, July 14, 2014.
34. Singer, Peter. "The Evolution of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)," February 7, 2012. [www.brookings.edu/articles/the-evolution-of-improvised-explosive-devices-ieds/](http://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-evolution-of-improvised-explosive-devices-ieds/). Accessed April 27, 2018.
35. Stern, "The Covenant," citing UN General Assembly (UNGA). Report of the Secretary-General on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use. UNGA. A/7575, 1969, p. 6.
36. See Mintz, John. "Technical Hurdles Separate Terrorists From Biowarfare." *Washington Post*, December 30, 2004.
37. Stern, "The Covenant," pp. 21–2.
38. The threat scenarios are very plausible. In early 2007, Iraqi insurgents detonated several chlorine bombs, killing a number of people and injuring hundreds. See Cave, Damien, and Ahmad Fadum. "Iraq Insurgents Employ Chlorine in Bomb Attacks." *New York Times*, February 22, 2007. See also Brulliard, Karin. "Chlorine Bombs Kill 10, Injure at Least 350 in Iraq." *Washington Post*, March 17, 2007; Therolf, Garrett, and Alexandra Zavis. "Bomb Releases Chlorine in Iraq's Diyala Province." *Los Angeles Times*, June 3, 2007.
39. See Warrick, Joby. "An Easier, but Less Deadly, Recipe for Terror." *Washington Post*, December 31, 2004.
40. Stern, "The Covenant," p. 26.
41. For a discussion of the nuclear threat, see Laqueur, Walter. *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 70ff.
42. See Linzer, Dafna. "Nuclear Capabilities May Elude Terrorists, Experts Say." *Washington Post*, December 29, 2004.
43. For an excellent discussion of suicide attacks in the modern era, see Pape, Robert Anthony. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House, 2005.
44. Kricheli, Ilana, Yotam Rosner, Aviad Mendelboim, and Yoram Schweitzer. "Suicide Bombings in 2016: The Highest Number of Fatalities." *INSS Insight*, no. 887 (January 5, 2017). See also Issacharoff, Avi. "2016 Was Deadliest Year Ever for Suicide Bombings Worldwide." *Times of Israel*, January 6, 2017.
45. Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 168.
46. Bloom, Mia. *Bombshell: Women and Terrorism*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011.
47. For a good discussion of Hezbollah's rationale in deploying suicide bombers, see Kramer, Martin. "The Moral Logic of Hezbollah." In *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998, pp. 131ff.
48. HAMAS means "zeal" and is an acronym for *Harakt al-Muqaqama al-Islamiya*.
49. The 1996 attacks by Hamas led to the election of a hawkish Israeli administration.

50. From Ripley, Amanda. "Why Suicide Bombing Is Now All the Rage." *Time*, April 15, 2002.
51. Federman, Josef. "Israel to Target More Hamas Leaders." *Washington Post*, March 23, 2004. Other data, derived from the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, list about 40 attacks. [www.mfa.gov.il](http://www.mfa.gov.il) (accessed July 3, 2008).
52. *Ibid.* Other data, derived from the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, list about 20 attacks.
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*
55. *Ibid.*
56. Kricheli et al., "Suicide Bombings in 2016," p. 5.
57. See MacFarquhar, Neil. "Two Sentenced to Death in Yemen for Bombing U.S.S. *Cole*." *New York Times*, September 29, 2004.
58. MacFarquhar, Neil. "Qaeda Says Bin Laden Is Well, and It Was Behind Tunis Blast." *New York Times*, June 23, 2002.
59. For a discussion of suicide bombers in Iraq, see Ghosh, Aparisim. "Inside the Mind of an Iraqi Suicide Bomber." *Time*, July 4, 2005.
60. See Ratnesar, Romesh. "Season of Revenge: The Inside Story of How Israel Imprisoned Arafat—and Why the Rage Keeps Burning." *Time*, April 8, 2002; and *ibid.*
61. Marighella, Carlos. "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla." In *Terrorism and Urban Guerrillas: A Study of Tactics and Documents*, edited by Jay Mallin. Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971, pp. 103–4.
62. See Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, pp. 34–5.
63. See Stone, Martin. *The Establishment of Algeria*. London: Hurst, 1997. In *The Terrorism Reader*, edited by David J. Whittaker. New York: Routledge, 2001, pp. 146–7.
64. See Sanders, Edmund. "35 Children Die in Baghdad Bombings." *Washington Post*, October 1, 2004. See also Sanders, Edmund, and Raheem Salman. "Children's Curiosity Proved All Too Deadly This Time." *Washington Post*, October 1, 2004.
65. See Mosher, Andy. "Gunmen Mount Attacks on Diplomats in Iraq." *Washington Post*, July 5, 2005.
66. November 17, a Marxist terrorist movement, had a long history of attacks against NATO and American interests. The group was finally suppressed in 2002 after a series of arrests by Greek security officers.
67. Analysis is derived from Kenney, Michael. "Cyber-terrorism in a post-Stuxnet world," *Orbis* 59, no. 1 (2015): 111–28.
68. *Ibid.*, 113.
69. *Ibid.*, 114.
70. *Ibid.*, 117.
71. *Ibid.*, 121; Barry Collin, "The Future of Cyberterrorism," *Crime and Justice International* (March 1997): 15–18.
72. Lesser, "Countering the New Terrorism," p. 95.
73. For a discussion of several myths about terrorism, including the notion that it is highly effective, see Shermer, Michael. "The five myths about terrorism—including that it works (why terror doesn't work)." In *Scientific American* 309, no. 2 (2013). See also Heymann, *Terrorism and America*, pp. 12ff. Another good discussion of effectiveness is found in Laqueur, Walter. "The Futility of Terrorism." In *International Terrorism: Characteristics,*

- Causes, Controls*, edited by Charles W. Kegley Jr. New York: St Martin's, 1990, pp. 69ff.  
And also Sederberg, *Terrorist Myths*, pp. 96ff.
74. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 176.
  75. The Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Gang) is discussed in detail in Chapter 8.
  76. Weimann and Winn. *The Theater of Terror*, p. 59.
  77. Schmid, Alex P. "Terrorism and the Media: Freedom of Information vs. Freedom From Intimidation." In *Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses*, edited by Lawrence Howard. New York: Praeger, 1992, pp. 101–2.
  78. For more information, see the PAGAD website: [www.pagad.co.za/](http://www.pagad.co.za/).
  79. Crenshaw, Martha. "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice." In *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998, p. 22.
  80. Grant, Robert M. *Cases in Contemporary Strategy Analysis*, 5th edn. "Case 3: The U.S. Airline Industry in 2002." New York: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2007.
  81. Rose, Adam Z., et al. "The economic impacts of the September 11 terrorist attacks: a computable general equilibrium analysis." *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* 15.2 (2009).
  82. Menachem Begin said later that the Irgun placed at least three telephone calls warning of the attack—to the hotel, the French consulate, and the *Jerusalem Post* newspaper.