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Rational Choice Politics
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Rational Choice Politics

Four Volume Set
Edited by:
March 2009 | 1 688 pages | SAGE Publications Ltd
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The formal modeling techniques of rational choice theory have become central to the discipline of political science, for example with regard to the understanding of the working of legislatures, coalition governments, executive-bureaucracy relations, or electoral systems. The collection includes the very best work in this field, as well as an editors' introduction to each volume that describes the importance of the articles and their place in political science.

  • Volume I: Social Choice and Equilibrium
  • Volume II: Voting, Elections and Electoral Systems
  • Volume III: Legislatures and Pressure Politics
  • Volume IV: Bureaucracy, Constitutional Arrangements and the State
 
VOLUME 1: SOCIAL CHOICE AND EQUILIBRIUM
 
Part 1: Social Choice
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making

Duncan Black
A Direct Proof of Arrow' s Theorem

Julian H. Blau
A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions

Amaryta Sen
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

Allan Gibbard
 
Part 2: Equilibrium
A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority Rule

Charles R. Plott
Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control

Richard D. McKelvey
Generic Instability of Majority Rule

Norman Schofield
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions

William H. Riker
On 64%-Majority Rule

Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebuff
Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice

Richard D McKelvey
The Uncovered Set and the Core

Gary C. Cox
Bargaining in Legislatures

David P. Baron and John Ferejohn
A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice

Jeffrey S. Banks and John Duggan
 
Part 3: Electoral Systems
Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions

Gary Cox
A Voting Model Implying Duverger's Law and Positive Turnout

Timothy J. Fedderson
Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems

Massimo Morelli
 
VOLUME 2: VOTING, ELECTIONS AND PRESSURE POLITICS
 
Part 4: Voting and Elections
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting

William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook
Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty

Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal
The Swing Voter's Curse

Timothy J. Fedderson and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Voting as Communicating

Thomas Pickety
The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model

Robert J. Barro
Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control

John Ferejohn
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty and convergence

Randall L. Calvert
Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two Party System with Rational Voters

Alberto Alesina
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy

Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate
A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium

Gerald H. Kramer
Elections, Coalitions, and Outcomes

David Austin-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks
Elections, Governments and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems Pressure Politics

David P. Baron and Daniel Diermeier
 
Part 5: Pressure Politics
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft

Gordon Tullock
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society

Anne O. Krueger
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence

Gary Becker
On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests

Stephen Coates and Stephen Morris
Legislators and Interest Groups: How unorganized interests get represented

Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. Munger
Protection for Sale

Gene Grossman and Elhanen Helpman
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective

William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner
 
VOLUME 3: LEGISLATURES
 
Part 6: Bureaucracy
Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over endogenous agendas

David Austen-Smith
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An analysis of sincere and sophisticated behavior

Arthur T. Denzau and Robert J. Mackay
Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure

Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Fedderson
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures

Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson
Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting

John Ferejohn, Fiorina P. Morris and Richard D. McKelvey
Collective Decision Making and Standing Committee: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures

Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel
Buying Supermajorities

Timothy Groseclose and James Snyder
Where's the Party?

Keith Krehbiel
On Division of the Question

John B. Kadane
Coalitions and Cabinet Government

Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle
Committee Design with Endogenous Information

Nicola Persico
Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo

Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal
Modelling the Interaction of Parties, Activists and Voters: Why is the political center empty?

Norman Schofield and Itai Sened
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multi-dimensional Voting Models

Kenneth A. Shepsle
The Industrial Organization of Congress

Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall
 
VOLUME 4: BUREAUCRACY, CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE STATE
 
Part 7: Bureaucracy
Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing

Jeffrey S. Banks
Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority: A model of deception and monitoring in budgeting

Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor and Roland Van Gaalen
Delegation and the Structure of Policy-Making: A transactions cost politics approach

David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloren
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy

John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control

Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms

Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz
 
Part 8: Constitutional Arrangements
The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-preserving federalism and economic development

Barry R. Weingast
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures

Charles M. Tiebout
An Economic Theory of Clubs

James M. Buchanan
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in government

Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole
Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto players and presidentialism, parliamentarism, multi-cameralism, and multipartism

George Tsebelis
 
Part 9: The State
Dictatorship, Democracy and Development

Mancur Olson
Constitutions and Commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century england

Douglas C. North and Barry R. Weingast
Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The case of the merchant guild

Anver Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government

Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard
Comparative Politics and Public Finance

Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini
A Theory of Political Transitions

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson

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ISBN: 9781412945028
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