Abram J. Chayes
Preface
Robert H. Mnookin and Jonathan R. Cohen
Introduction
PART ONE: NEGOTIATION THEORY REVISITED
Joel Cutcher-Gershenfield and Michael Watkins
Toward a Theory of Representation in Negotiation
Commentary
Lawrence E. Susskind
The Shifting Role of Agents in Interest-Based Negotiations
Roger Fisher and Wayne Davis
Authority of an Agent
Commentary
Max H Bazerman
Rational Authority Allocation to an Agent
Kalypso Nicolaidis
Minimizing Agency Costs in Two-Level Games
Lessons from the Trade Authority Controversies in the United States and the European Union
Commentary
Gordon M. Kaufman
Minimizing Agency Costs
Towards a Testable Theory
PART TWO: AGENCY IN CONTEXT
Eileen F. Babbitt
The Challenges for International Diplomatic Agents
Commentary
Bruce Patton
The Role of Agents in International Negotiation
Jeswald W. Salacuse
Law and Power in Agency Relationships
Commentary
Janet Martinez
Law and Power in Agency Relationships
Robert B. McKersie
Agency in the Context of Labor Negotiations
Commentary
Kathleen Valley
Agency in the Context of Labor Management
David C. King and Richard J. Zeckhauser
Legislators as Negotiators
Commentary
Jonathan R. Cohen
Turning the Tables
Negotiation as the Exogenous Variable
Michael Wheeler
First, Let's Kill All the Agents!
Commentary
Brian S. Mandell
Unnecessary Toughness
Hard Bargaining as an Extreme Sport
PART THREE: PRESCRIPTIVE IMPLICATIONS
Lawrence E. Susskind and Robert H. Mnookin
Major Themes and Prescriptive Implications
Terri Kurtzberg et al
Agents in Negotiations
Toward Testable Propositions
Pacey C. Foster and Jonathan R. Cohen
Annotated Bibliography of Selected Sources